

Analytical Report

HOW RUSSIA ERASES UKRAINIAN IDENTITY UNDER THE GUISE OF COMBATING EXTREMISM



Analytical Report «How Russia Erases Ukrainian Identity under the Guise of Combating Extremism»

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List of Abbreviations

ARC — Autonomous Republic of Crimea

so-called “SMO” — the so-called “special military operation”, the term used in the Russian Federation for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine

TOT — temporarily occupied territories – territories of Ukraine temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation

RF — Russian Federation



Introduction

Since 2014, the Russian Federation has not only carried out armed aggression but has also systematically pursued a policy of ideological control and assimilation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

Officially, the Russian Federation presents its “fight against extremism” as a mechanism to safeguard state security and public order. In practice, however, both within the RF itself and in the TOT, this tool is used to systematically persecute those who disagree with the system – including children. Particular attention is given to suppressing expressions of Ukrainian cultural, linguistic, historical and national identity.

What is especially alarming is that Russia’s anti-extremism legislation, combined with new ideological programmes – in particular the updated Strategy to Counter Extremism (2024) – intensifies the use of educational, indoctrination and law enforcement practices aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian language, culture, symbols and patriotic upbringing among children. In this way, the “fight against extremism” has become a tool of large-scale ideological intervention designed to reshape the consciousness of the next generation of Ukrainians.

This report examines how the RF’s legal framework on countering extremism is applied to children and young people in the TOT, who are among the most vulnerable groups of the population. Particular attention is given to the long-term consequences for the Ukrainian nation, the international legal aspects of such actions, and the possibilities of holding those responsible to account.

The focus is on the role of anti-extremism legislation in shaping an “all-Russian identity”, eradicating Ukrainian culture, and exerting ideological pressure under the guise of security measures. This analysis shows how Russia’s repressive legal framework has become the foundation for policies of assimilation, militarisation and the destruction of Ukrainian identity in the temporarily occupied territories.

The concept of “extremism” is treated not only as a legal category in RF legislation but also as an ideological construct which, in the Russian context – particularly in relation to the temporarily occupied territories – is often used to label any form of resistance, patriotism or expression of Ukrainian identity.

The report also analyses the notion of “destructive behaviour”, which in current RF practice broadens the scope of “extremism” to include behaviour that does not conform to the state’s ideological line, especially among children and young people.

By temporarily occupied territories (TOT), we mean the areas of Ukraine under the de facto control of the RF as a result of armed aggression (since 2014 – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; since 2022 – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions).

This analytical report is one of the first studies to examine the role of anti-extremism legislation in its impact on participants in the educational process in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

It also outlines a range of issues that require further in-depth research and analysis in order to assess the scale and nature of the harm inflicted by the RF on Ukraine.

The material is intended for a broad audience. In particular, it will be especially useful for representatives of state authorities responsible for education and for shaping policy on the TOT, as well as for law enforcement and security agencies.



Methodology

The study focuses on the systematic use by the RF of legislation on “countering extremism” as a tool for:

- ideological indoctrination and assimilation of children in the TOT
- persecution, intimidation and psychological pressure on Ukrainian children
- erasure of Ukrainian cultural, linguistic and national identity
- creating grounds for the possible prosecution of the RF and its agents for violations of international law

The report includes the following: an analysis of RF legislation on countering extremism, including the provisions applied directly or indirectly to children in the TOT; the ideological categories defined as extremist; practices of prosecuting participants in the educational process in the TOT for extremism; the consequences of RF anti-extremism policies; an assessment of the possible impact on the forced formation of a new identity; and an international legal analysis.

Information Used

The monitoring was carried out on the basis of the following sources:

- Russian sources, primarily RF state authorities
- open sources, including occupation administrations in the temporarily occupied territories
- publications in the media in the temporarily occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol
- information published on social media

The report contains information collected as of 15 August 2025.

Limitations

In this study, the authors relied only on sources available to them. For the preparation of the report, data were drawn from the social network “VKontakte” as well as from Russian sources. This is because most information from representatives of the occupation authorities is published on this social network, which currently makes it virtually the only available channel for accessing the necessary data. Analysis of the RF Legislation on Countering Extremism.

ANALYSIS OF THE RF LEGISLATION ON COUNTERING EXTREMISM

This section presents a comprehensive analysis of the RF's legislative and strategic framework that defines its approaches to countering extremism. The analysis covers the main federal laws that establish legal foundations and terminology; presidential decrees that set out the organisational mechanisms for implementing policy; criminal and administrative provisions that impose penalties for “extremism”; and strategic documents that set ideological guidelines, particularly in the areas of education, youth policy and identity formation. Special attention is given to how these legal and strategic instruments are implemented through local practices in the TOT, especially in educational institutions, and how they are used to influence children and young people.



1.1. Main Regulatory Acts of the RF

The key law that sets out the legal foundations for countering extremism in the RF is the Federal Law “On Countering Extremist Activity” of 25 July 2002 No.114-FZ.¹ This law defines the concepts of “extremist activity (extremism)”, “extremist organisation”, as well as “extremist materials” and “extremist symbols”.

The term “extremism”, as defined in the law, covers a broad range of actions, including:

- violent change of the constitutional order and/or violation of the territorial integrity of the RF (including the secession of part of its territory);
- public justification of terrorism and other terrorist activity;
- incitement of social, racial, national or religious hatred;
- propaganda of the superiority, inferiority or exclusivity of a person on the basis of their social, racial, national, religious or linguistic identity, or their attitude to religion;
- violation of human and civil rights, freedoms and legitimate interests depending on social, racial, national, religious or linguistic identity, or attitude to religion;
- obstructing citizens in the exercise of their electoral rights and the right to participate in a referendum, or violating the secrecy of the ballot, when connected with violence or the threat of its use;
- use of Nazi attributes or symbols, or attributes or symbols resembling Nazi ones to the point of confusion, or attributes or symbols of extremist organisations, except in cases where such use is intended to create a negative attitude towards the ideology of Nazism and extremism and there are no signs of propaganda or justification of Nazi or extremist ideology;
- other actions.

Thus, the concept of extremist activity covers a wide range of socially dangerous actions aimed at undermining the foundations of the state order, interethnic or interfaith peace, as well as at justifying violence or discrimination. In practice, this list may be interpreted quite broadly by RF law enforcement bodies, as will be shown later.

In addition to the Federal Law “On Countering Extremist Activity” of 25 July 2002 No.114-FZ, other federal laws also indirectly relate to extremism. For example, the Federal Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” of 19 September 1997 No.125-FZ regulates the grounds and procedures for terminating the activities of religious organisations that violate the law, including in the context of extremism. It states that a religious association may be dissolved or banned by a court if it is established that its motives or actions are aimed at carrying out extremist activity under Law No.114-FZ “On Countering Extremist Activity”. It also excludes the right to register for organisations or individuals who have appeared on extremist lists or whose activities have been suspended or banned by court decision or under Law No.114-FZ.

Presidential decrees of the RF have defined the organisational framework for countering extremism.

These include:

- Presidential Decree of the RF No.310 of 23 March 1995 “On Measures to Ensure Coordinated Action by State Authorities in Combating Manifestations of Fascism and Other

1 <https://ivo.garant.ru/#/document/12127578/paragraph/11340:0>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/qiOz8>

Forms of Political Extremism in the Russian Federation”.² This decree set out measures to secure coordinated action by state authorities in combating manifestations of fascism and other forms of political extremism in the RF. It became the **legal foundation** for the further development of Russia’s policy on countering extremism and marked the start of legislative and organisational changes in the field of national security.

- Presidential Decree of the RF No.988 of 26 July 2011 “On the Interdepartmental Commission on Countering Extremism in the Russian Federation”.³ Its purpose was to ensure systematic coordination of the work of federal and regional authorities in implementing state policy on countering extremism. As a result, the decree became a key stage in systematising the state’s response to extremist threats within the RF’s legal and organisational framework.

The Criminal Code of the RF⁴ and the Code of Administrative Offences of the RF⁵ contain a significant number of provisions establishing liability for offences of an extremist and terrorist nature. Penalties range from fines, arrests and compulsory labour to imprisonment. The boundaries for applying different types of punishment remain vague.

For example, administrative liability is provided in the form of a fine ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 roubles (USD 12.5–37.5),⁶ or administrative arrest for up to 15 days with the confiscation of extremist materials and the equipment used to produce them, for individuals under Article 20.29 “Production and distribution of extremist materials”.

In addition, on 31 July 2025 the President of the RF signed a law amending the Code of Administrative Offences of the RF, which will enter into force on 1 September 2025. Under the new provisions:

- searching online for knowingly “extremist materials”, including through the use of VPNs, carries a fine of 3,000 to 5,000 roubles (USD 37.6–62.7);
- advertising services for bypassing blocks carries a fine of 50,000 to 80,000 roubles (USD 627.0–1003.2).

The relevant amendments were made to Article 13.53 (which now includes, through a note, the list of “extremist materials”) and Article 14.3 (which was amended regarding liability for advertising VPNs) of the CAO RF.⁷ The mechanism for applying these provisions in practice remains unclear.⁸ However, police officers and the Federal Security Service will have the authority to draw up violation reports. As of the end of July 2025, the list of banned materials published on the website of the Ministry of Justice of the RF contained 5,475 items – ranging from religious literature and opposition publications to popular science texts on political topics.⁹

At the same time, Article 280 of the CC RF (“Public calls to carry out extremist activity”) provides for a fine of 100,000 to 300,000 roubles (USD 1,254–3,762), or compulsory labour for up to five years, or arrest for a term of four to six months, or imprisonment for up to five years.

Article 282.1 of the CC RF (“Organisation of an extremist community”) provides for a fine ranging from 300,000 to 800,000 roubles (USD 3,762–10,032), or compulsory labour for two to five

2 <https://base.garant.ru/10102720/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/L8kzW>

3 <https://base.garant.ru/12188334/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/PViGV>

4 <https://base.garant.ru/10108000/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/yEGim>

5 <https://base.garant.ru/12125267/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/MlLe0>

6 Here and below, the exchange rate is given as of 15 August 2025: 1 rouble = USD 0.012. Amounts are rounded to one decimal place.

7 <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202507310012>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/Tu4ly>

8 <https://news.mail.ru/society/67332100/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/IuLy0#selection-1227.0-1227.82>

9 <https://minjust.gov.ru/ru/extremist-materials/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/DolbM>

years, or restriction of liberty for a term of one to two years, or imprisonment for a term of six to twenty years.

Article 282.2 of the CC RF (“Organisation of the activities of an extremist organisation”) provides for a fine ranging from 300,000 to 800,000 roubles (USD 3,762–10,032), or imprisonment for a term of six to twelve years, or restriction of liberty for up to two years, or compulsory labour for up to five years.

1.2. Strategic Policy Documents of the RF

The National Security Strategy of the RF,¹⁰ which sets out the national interests and strategic national priorities of the RF, along with the goals and objectives of state policy on national security and sustainable development in the long term, also **addresses the issue of extremism.**

Among the identified trends is that international terrorist and extremist organisations seek to intensify propaganda activities and the recruitment of Russian citizens, the creation of clandestine cells on Russian territory, and the **involvement of Russian youth in unlawful activities.** Global internet companies are widely used to spread false information and organise illegal public actions.

“the achievement of the goals of ensuring state and public security is carried out through:

... 7) implementing state policy aimed at addressing the following tasks: preventing and suppressing terrorist and extremist activities by organisations and individuals, as well as attempts to carry out acts of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism

...

9) preventing manifestations of radicalism, and countering extremist and other unlawful acts, especially among minors and young people; ...”¹¹

The priority area of “Information Security” further specifies:

“... on the information and telecommunications network ‘Internet’, materials of terrorist and extremist organisations are posted, along with calls for mass unrest, extremist activity, participation in mass (public) events held in violation of established procedures, suicide, the promotion of a criminal lifestyle, the use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and other unlawful information. The main target of such destructive influence is young people...”¹²

The key document that defines the goals and objectives of state policy on countering extremism, as well as the areas of work in light of current threats, is the Strategy for Countering Extremism in the RF.¹³ This document was updated on 28 December 2024 and currently has no set period of implementation (the previous version was valid until 2025). Among the main sources of extremist threats it names both internal and external ones, including the ideas of Nazism, neo-Nazism, radical nationalism, radical groups from Ukraine allegedly supported by external forces, as well as the activities of foreign NGOs, support for “colour revolutions”, falsification of the history of the RF, and others. The Strategy for Countering Extremism also defines the terms “Russophobia”, “xenophobia”, “radicalism”, “ideology of violence”, and “extremist

10 <https://ivo.garant.ru/#/document/401425792/paragraph/1:0>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/54ZX4>

11 In the original, the text appears in Russian.

12 In the original, the text appears in Russian.

13 <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202412280115?ysclid=m5aysfziug379203810>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/bFcoR>



ideology”, which serve as grounds for taking measures to counter extremism (see section “Ideological Categories of Extremism in the RF”).

Education and state youth policy are the main focus of state policy on countering extremism. This part of the document outlines the measures and approaches to the prevention of extremism through the education system and youth policy of the RF. It refers to:

- publication of teaching and methodological materials aimed, in particular, at fostering a culture of interethnic and interfaith communication, patriotism, civic responsibility, and pride in the history of Russia;
- shaping an all-Russian civic identity among children and young people at all stages of the educational process;
- cooperation between actors responsible for countering extremism and youth public associations, sports federations and clubs, supporters’ organisations, as well as individual young people and youth groups, in order to prevent manifestations of extremism in youth and sports environments;
- improving measures aimed at preventing extremist behaviour in educational institutions;
- providing support for learners from at-risk groups (including those showing signs of mental health or personal development difficulties), conducting preventive work with learners who have been exposed to extremist ideology and with their families, and involving representatives of religious, civic and sports organisations in this work;
- conducting monitoring within educational institutions of information and telecommunication networks, including the Internet, when used for educational purposes, in order to stop the spread of extremist ideology and extremist materials, particularly those that justify extremist or terrorist activities or call for the preparation and commission of terrorist acts;
- integrating into educational activities, for the purpose of patriotic upbringing of adolescents and youth, a unified course on the history of Russia that objectively presents and assesses the most significant events related to the formation and development of our country as a state, and also addresses external and internal threats to Russia’s existence during various historical periods;
- other activities.

Thus, children and young people are regarded as one of the main vulnerable groups in need of “protection” from the influence of external threats, including the Internet, foreign organisations, and others. Ukraine, as an “unfriendly state”, is allegedly using extremist or terrorist organisations to wage hybrid warfare against the RF, while the so-called “Ukrainian crisis” is used as a tool to fuel Russophobia around the world. Within the educational process, an “all-Russian identity” and loyalty to the state policy of the RF are being formed through patriotic upbringing, control of the information space, and supervision of “at-risk” school students. Thus, the concept of “extremism” is essentially used as an ideological tool to influence the consciousness of children and young people in Russia and in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

In addition, this approach is detailed and specified in a number of other strategic documents, including:

- Presidential Decree of the RF No. 358 dated 17 May 2023 “On the Strategy for the Comprehensive Safety of Children in the Russian Federation until 2030”¹⁴ contains a direct reference to extremism as one of the threats to the child social circle. One of the tasks in



the field of preventing offences committed by or against minors is to develop in children a strong negative attitude towards the ideology of terrorism and extremism in its various forms, as well as to counter interethnic and interfaith conflicts among children;

- Presidential Decree of the RF No. 1666 dated 19 December 2012,¹⁵ which enshrines the Strategy of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025 and defines the counteraction of extremist and separatist manifestations as the foundation of national unity. Although the text **does not explicitly mention children or youth**, it sets the general framework for education and upbringing, implicitly assigning a role to the younger generation in the implementation of the state's cultural and identity policy.
- Presidential Decree of the RF No. 809 dated 9 November 2022 “On the Approval of the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values”¹⁶ is a strategic planning document in the field of national security of the RF. It defines a system of goals, objectives, and tools for the implementation of the strategic national priority “Protection of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, culture and historical memory”, specifically in the area of protecting traditional Russian spiritual and moral values. Among other things, the document states that “the threats to traditional values include the activities of extremist and terrorist organisations, certain mass media and mass communication outlets, the actions of the United States of America and other unfriendly foreign states, a number of transnational corporations and foreign non-profit organisations, as well as the activities of certain organisations and individuals within the territory of Russia”.¹⁷ The document further specifies that the implementation of state policy takes place in the fields of education, upbringing and youth work, and identifies among the main directions the improvement of forms and methods of educating children and youth in accordance with the strategic values of the RF.

Thus, these documents create further regulatory grounds for restricting rights and freedoms – particularly those of children, young people, civil society initiatives and the media – under the guise of “countering extremism”.

1.3. Regulatory and Legal Framework in the TOT

The RF's policy on countering extremism in the temporarily occupied territories is implemented through a clearly structured vertical system – from nationwide strategic documents to local plans in schools and kindergartens. Education serves as a cross-cutting target of such influence, which is consistently reflected in the adopted regulatory and legal acts.

In the TOT of Donetsk Region, the “Plan of Measures for the Prevention of and Response to Manifestations of Extremism and Terrorism in State Educational Organisations of the Donetsk People's Republic for the 2024–2025 Academic Year” has been implemented.¹⁸

15 <https://base.garant.ru/70284810/?ysclid=mesacjcudy297580866>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/01KeT>

16 <https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/405579061/?ysclid=mc2h6g517s454037960#review>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/adSxK>

17 In the original, the text appears in Russian.

18 <https://surl.li/awwsaf>, archive: <https://archive.ph/vNV7a>



According to the preamble, the document was adopted in accordance with: Government Decree of the RF No. 1006 of August 2019 “On the Approval of Requirements for Terrorism Protection of Facilities (Territories) of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation and Facilities (Territories) within the Scope of the Ministry’s Activities, and the Safety Passport Form for such Facilities (Territories)”; the Comprehensive Plan for Countering the Ideology of Terrorism in the Russian Federation for 2024–2028, approved by the President of the RF (Pr-2610 dated 30.12.2023). The Plan is aimed at **shaping civic awareness and a strong rejection among children and youth of extremist and terrorist ideologies, as well as the prevention and suppression of manifestations of extremism** and terrorism in educational organisations of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

In addition, the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic adopted the “Comprehensive Plan to Counter the Ideology of Terrorism in the Russian Federation for 2024–2028”, with specific measures outlined for implementation in the Donetsk People’s Republic in 2024.¹⁹ A significant part of the activities is implemented within the educational system. In particular, it provides for the “formation of an anti-terrorist worldview and resilience to the propaganda of terrorist organisations and movements that promote mass killings among learners, through the development and implementation of educational, methodological, informational, explanatory, and outreach materials for use in the educational process and upbringing activities in educational institutions located in territories previously under the control of the ‘Kyiv regime’.” In addition, in order to eliminate the causes and conditions conducive to involving the population in terrorist activities, the plan provides for regular monitoring of the psychological climate in educational institutions and analysis of trends in violent behaviour among minors, based on which measures are to be taken to improve the quality of educational and preventive work. As part of targeted prevention, it was planned to conduct outreach activities aimed at preventing the involvement of foreign citizens who have arrived in the RF for educational purposes in terrorist activities, including with the involvement of representatives of public and religious organisations, psychologists, and student self-government bodies. The activities continue to be implemented in the subsequent period, despite the absence of an officially published plan.²⁰

7	Organise the development and implementation of educational, methodological, informational, explanatory and outreach materials for use in the educational process and upbringing activities with learners of educational institutions located in territories previously under the control of the Kyiv regime.	Throughout the academic year
8	Ensure the review of library collections to identify and remove publications containing terrorist, extremist, and destructive content, including materials that falsify Russian history at all stages of its development and discredit its policies.	Once per half-year
9	Carry out work to involve children and young people in the activities of public organisations, volunteer military-patriotic youth and children's associations aimed at shaping an anti-terrorist worldview, instilling traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, and also organise methodological support for this activity.	Ongoing
10	Ensure maximum coverage of learners of educational institutions with a positive agenda during holidays and non-study time, involving public organisations, volunteer and patriotic movements, as well as reconciliation (mediation) services for resolving conflict situations.	Ongoing

19 <https://surl.li/lumnm>, archive: <https://archive.ph/f98pw>

20 <https://atk.glavadnr.ru/zasedaniya-antiterroristicheskoy-komissii-v-doneczkoj-narodnoj-respublike-v-pervom-kvartale-2025-goda/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/eCnLE>



Similar regional documents have also been approved in the TOT of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol:

- List of measures for the implementation in 2025 of the Comprehensive Plan to Counter the Ideology of Terrorism in the Russian Federation for 2024–2028 in the territory of the Republic of Crimea²¹

11	Conducting a series of seminars and meetings with deputy heads of educational institutions located in the territory of the Republic of Crimea on countering the ideology of extremism among youth	State Committee for Youth Policy of the Republic of Crimea	Formation of anti-terrorist worldview among young people	Throughout 2025	At the expense of funds allocated for core activities
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In implementation of subparagraph 1.3.1 of paragraph 1.3 of the Comprehensive Plan

21	Conducting lectures with opinion leaders involving representatives of law enforcement, religious, civic, and sports organizations on the topic “Anti-terrorism security and prevention of extremism”, aimed at explaining the criminal nature of terrorist, Ukrainian nationalist, and neo-Nazi organizations.	Ministry of Sports of the Republic of Crimea	Countering propaganda influence on the population	Throughout 2025	At the expense of funds allocated for core activities
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- List of Activities for the Implementation of the “Comprehensive Plan to Counter the Ideology of Terrorism in the Russian Federation for 2024–2028” in the Territory of the City of Sevastopol for 2024²²
- Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy for Countering Extremism in the Russian Federation up to 2025 in the Republic of Crimea for 2022–2025²³

12	Conducting preventive work to track and take measures to eliminate extremist-nationalist and extremist-terrorist websites on the Internet, actively promoting the ideology of extremism, nationalism, and terrorism, containing calls to commit extremist and terrorist crimes against people of other nationalities or religions, foreign nationals, as well as detailed instructions for making explosive devices and committing terrorist acts.	Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Crimea	Annually 2022–2025
13	Identification and suppression of the dissemination of extremist materials in electronic mass media, print, audio and video productions, as well as on the Internet.	Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Crimea Federal Security Service Directorate for the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol	Annually 2022–2025

21 <https://rk.gov.ru/documents/e09d86e1-18f2-459c-8507-8dc7ea42ab44>, apxib: <https://archive.ph/Pzjpbz>

22 https://sev.gov.ru/files/iblock/1b8/40q6femshv9bx13dukanj8xodf5oxou8/Perechen-meropriyatiy_dlya_Profilakticheskikh-meropriyatiy.pdf, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/OgXwg>

23 <https://rk.gov.ru/documents/e3212c91-8352-41c8-8ca8-9ad56db4a655>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/KFQ0h>

- Action Plan to Counter the Ideology of Terrorism and Extremism for the 2024-2025 Academic Year²⁴ (approved by the Ministry of Education of Crimea)

The key tools outlined in the documents include school meetings, themed lessons, and cultural and educational events aimed at fostering rejection of extremist ideas, instilling the “correct” moral and value orientations, and ensuring control over the information space for minors.

Also in the TOT of Luhansk Region:

- Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Luhansk People’s Republic No. 124-od dated 10 February 2025 “On the Approval of the List of Measures of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Luhansk People’s Republic for 2025 for the Implementation of the Plan to Counter the Ideology of Terrorism in the Luhansk People’s Republic for 2024–2028”²⁵

Local educational institutions are required to develop their own internal plans in accordance with the above-mentioned strategies and activity plans at the local level.

For example:

- At the State Budgetary General Education Institution “School No. 48, Gorlovka Urban District”²⁶ (TOT of Donetsk Region), an Activity Plan for 2025 has been approved for the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan to Counter the Ideology of Terrorism. The document provides for:
 - targeted individual preventive measures;
 - informational and propaganda work with school students;
 - monitoring of “at-risk” children.

2. Targeted Preventive Measures					
2.1	Conducting individual work with family members of persons involved in terrorist activities (active, convicted, neutralized), who have approached employment services, with the aim of adapting them to the labour market through the provision of state services for professional orientation to choose a field of activity (profession), employment, vocational training, and obtaining further professional education, with psychological support.	Educational psychologist E.A. Ponasenkova State Budgetary General Education Institution “School No. 48, Gorlovka Urban District”	Socialization in Russian society of this category of persons. Formation of positive peer connections that promote the adoption of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values.	April – October	At the expense of funds allocated for core activities

- At the Municipal Budgetary General Education Institution “Bratsky Educational Complex” (TOT of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), an Activity Plan was approved for the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan to Counter the Ideology of Terrorism for 2024–2028.²⁷ The document focuses on cooperation with law enforcement agencies, fostering “civic responsibility”, and strengthening security within the educational environment.

24 https://www.krympatriotcentr.ru/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/order_ideology.pdf, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/05s7w>

25 https://edu.lpr-reg.ru/profilaktika_terrorizma_i_ekstremizma.html, archive: <https://archive.ph/5JoPP>

26 https://sh48-gorlovka-r897.gosweb.gosuslugi.ru/netcat_files/30/41/Terrorizm_Kompleksnyy_plan.pdf, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/qhTZl>

27 <https://bratuvk.educrimea.ru/conditions/safety/antiterror/doc/2151046>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/5FNkf>



1.9	Ensuring the review of library collections to identify and remove publications containing terrorist, extremist, and destructive content, including those falsifying the history of Russia at all stages of its formation and development, and discrediting its policies.	Annually	Teacher-librarian Kirichenko N.N.
2.10	Submitting to the Anti-Terrorism Commission Office of the Republic of Crimea the lists of individuals who have been influenced by terrorist ideology, for consideration by interdepartmental working groups on targeted preventive work and the results of the work carried out.	Annually	Deputy Director Melnychuk N.N.

Thus, the RF is integrating the education system in the TOT of Ukraine into its overarching policy of countering extremism by establishing a top-down system of governance.

IDEOLOGICAL CATEGORIES OF EXTREMISM IN THE RF

In recent years, the concept of “extremism” in the official policy of the RF has undergone a profound transformation: from general approaches to combating violent forms of radicalism to an expanded, ideologically charged interpretation that encompasses political, cultural, and even historical narratives that contradict the Kremlin’s official line.

This enables the RF to legally equate a wide range of opposition or alternative views with forms of extremism, thereby applying corresponding tools of state control and informational pressure (see Section 3).





2.1. Key manifestations of ideological extremism in the RF

Extremism in the RF refers not only to actual threats of violence or terrorism, but also to opposition to the ideological policy of the state. The Strategy for Countering Extremism in the RF identifies a number of ideological categories that, within the internal discourse, are equated with extremist manifestations. Among them are:

- **radicalism** – adherence to the ideology of violence, characterised by the pursuit of decisive and fundamental changes to the constitutional order of the RF and the disruption of the unity and territorial integrity of the RF. In the context of the RF, radicalism is directly associated with extremist and neo-Nazi ideas, especially in the information space, and particularly as a targeted influence from abroad – with the aim of destabilising the RF;
- **radical nationalism** – an ideology or political stance that places the nation at the centre of social, political, and cultural life, but in extreme forms that deny the rights of other nations or ethnic groups, incite hatred, discrimination or violence, and promote the superiority of one nation over others. It often borders on or overlaps with neo-Nazism or fascism. In the RF context, it is commonly equated with: neo-Nazism, armed nationalist formations (mentioned in relation to Ukraine), and attempts to undermine the “unity of the multinational people of Russia”;
- **neo-Nazism** – a modern form of Nazism that relies less on a consistent study of history and more on the selective use of historical fragments, symbols, and myths. This ideology creates a distorted view of the past and uses it to construct a new worldview system;
- **xenophobia** – the expression of hatred, hostility, or intolerance towards specific social groups or individuals, as well as towards particular representatives of those groups;
- **Russophobia** – a hostile, prejudiced, or antagonistic attitude towards citizens of the RF, as well as towards the Russian language and culture, traditions, and the history of the RF. It is expressed, in particular, through aggressive sentiments and actions by political forces or their individual representatives, and through discriminatory measures taken by the authorities of unfriendly states against the RF. The term was officially introduced only in 2024 and is positioned alongside threats such as neo-Nazi and radical nationalist ideologies (especially from the territory of Ukraine), which are also presented as tools of hybrid destabilisation against the RF;
- **propaganda of violence and hatred** – a component of extremist ideology that justifies the use of violence or incites public hatred, especially through calls for violence via media channels.

In addition, “attempts to falsify history” can also be classified as a form of “extremism”. This refers to large-scale distortions of historical facts aimed at downplaying the role of the USSR in the World War II, rewriting historical events in order to undermine Russia’s positive image, and using history as a tool of hybrid attacks against the state. In political documents, this is often defined as an external threat, which includes deliberate political manipulation of historical memory and facts.



The RF deliberately shifts the focus to the ideological aspect of extremism. The reasons for this include the difficulty of objective assessment, the possibility of preventive measures, and the legitimisation of repressive actions against those who step outside the system or who pose, or may pose, a threat to the RF system. This creates the possibility of interpreting any criticism of state policy or any alternative viewpoint as a threat to national security, **which is typical of authoritarian regimes.**

At the level of methodological guidelines and materials for teachers, manifestations and types of extremism that increase the risk of terrorist acts are specified. For example, political extremism is said to include:

- **ultra-left ideologies** promoting class struggle and calling for revolution;
- **movements** that delegitimise the modern RF and recognise the legislation and political system of the Soviet Union as valid;
- **radical anarchism** calling for the overthrow of state authorities;
- **ultra-right ideologies** spreading ideas of racism and xenophobia;
- **ideologies of “Maidans” and colour revolutions** calling for mass unrest with the aim of destabilising the situation and seizing power.

“Political extremism is usually understood as the promotion of violent or aggressive methods, and/or those based on intimidation and fear, of influencing the activities of state authorities, up to and including the unlawful change of the political system of society. In its extreme forms, political extremism transforms into political terror, examples of which include both large-scale tragedies such as the Beslan school siege or the explosion at the drama theatre in Mariupol, and isolated terrorist acts such as those carried out by the anarchist M. Zhlobitsky on 31 October 2018 in Arkhangelsk”.²⁸

Ideological manifestations of extremism are actively promoted through various forms, namely:

- RF legislation (including the updated Strategy for Countering Extremism);
- the education system (thematic lessons, “Conversations about Important Things”, courses on “Fundamentals of Security and Patriotism”);
- information and awareness campaigns (television, cinema, print and online media);
- administrative and criminal prosecution.

Thus, the concept of “extremism” in the RF is a flexible tool of state ideology that allows the authorities to set boundaries of what is permissible to suit their own needs and to justify repression under the guise of “protecting security”.

2.2. The Role of Ukraine in Russia's Concept of Extremism

Ukraine is presented as the central source of extremist threats in Russian strategic documents, in particular in the RF Strategy for Countering Extremism. This approach is also reflected in a number of information and educational campaigns, including the course "Prevention of Neo-Nazi Ideology among Children and Young People" on the Znanie (Knowledge) Society's website. This analytical report highlights only the main narratives circulated in the RF concerning Ukraine and linked to its countering of extremist activity.

Ukraine is a source of radical nationalism

The RF Strategy for Countering Extremism identifies Ukraine as a source of radical nationalism:

"...the wide spread of neo-Nazi ideas and the strengthening of radical nationalist armed groups (including in Ukraine) create real extremist threats..."

Thus, Ukraine is associated with extremist ideas which, according to the official RF narrative, pose a threat to Russia's security.

Ukraine is a stronghold of neo-Nazism

The RF Strategy for Countering Extremism also states that neo-Nazism and radical nationalism, particularly in Ukraine, are among the most serious extremist threats. It stresses the need to prevent neo-Nazi elements from entering Russian territory.

Materials from the Znanie Society's course reinforce this position, describing the ideological basis of Ukrainian neo-Nazism as a combination of historical revisionism, ethnic nationalism, racial intolerance and Russophobia. They highlight, in particular, the mythologisation and glorification of historical figures linked to Nazism, as well as the creation of a totalitarian ideology promoting strict control over society and the suppression of dissent. It is also claimed that ethnic Ukrainians are given special rights compared to other national groups. In this context, emphasis is placed on building a "Great Ukraine" and preserving the "purity" of the Ukrainian nation.²⁹

"It is worth remembering the relatively recent history, when the backbone of the state coup that began on the Maidan in Ukraine consisted of activists from the Ultras fan movement. A serious threat today is what is often called liberal Nazism. When Western democracies developed the concept of liberalism with its attractive lists of natural and civil rights and freedoms, they were by no means thinking about universal equality and peace across the world".³⁰

29 Quotation from the Znanie Society's course "Prevention of Neo-Nazi Ideology among Children and Young People". <https://akademiya.znanierussia.ru/course/profilaktika-ideologii-neonacizma-sredi-detej-i-molodezhi/?ysclid=m43yr90etz554769849>, archive: <https://archive.ph/iUV40>

30 Quotation from the Znanie Society's course "Prevention of Neo-Nazi Ideology among Children and Young People" <https://akademiya.znanierussia.ru/course/profilaktika-ideologii-neonacizma-sredi-detej-i-molodezhi/?ysclid=m43yr90etz554769849>, archive: <https://archive.ph/iUV40>

Ukraine is an example of an artificially created anti-Russian state that threatens the “Russian world”

Although the RF Strategy for Countering Extremism does not use the phrase “artificially created anti-Russian state”, it describes the “Ukrainian crisis” as a tool used by unfriendly states to wage hybrid wars against Russia and to fuel aggressive Russophobic sentiments worldwide. This reinforces the official RF narrative about the anti-Russian nature of Ukrainian statehood.³¹

Ukraine is one of the states where falsified historical narratives are being promoted

The RF Strategy for Countering Extremism classifies the active promotion of falsified historical narratives, particularly the revision of Russia’s role in world history, as an external threat. A significant share of such threats, according to the RF, originates from Ukraine, which provides grounds for linking the Ukrainian information space with “historical information war”.³² Russian media immediately presented the Strategy as a tool for countering the “falsification of history”, reinforcing the state narrative that portrays Ukraine as a source of “historical information war”.³³

Materials from the Znanie Society’s course specify that the mythological constructs of nationalist propaganda in Ukraine can be conditionally divided into three broad groups, united by an ideological doctrine of total denial of any positive interaction between Ukraine’s modern development and Russia. The course also emphasises that among nationalist myths, a special place is given to the mythologised Holodomor, which is presented as one of the key propaganda tools.³⁴

In Ukraine, Russophobia has gradually evolved from a socially supported practice into a component of state policy.

According to the RF Strategy for Countering Extremism, Russophobia in Ukraine has transformed from a social practice into part of official state policy. In their view, this is carried out through legislative and cultural initiatives aimed at excluding Russia from Ukrainian identity and the information space.

According to materials from the Znanie Society’s course, organisations recognised in the RF as extremist, including the Ukrainian National Assembly, the Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence, UNA-UNSO, demonstrate that Ukrainian nationalism, initially marginal, spread significantly after the Orange Revolution.³⁵

31 In the original, the text appears in Russian.

32 The term “historical information war” is a literal translation of the wording used in Russian official and propagandist discourse. It does not correspond to established academic terminology and is used here to reflect the original source.

33 <https://smotrim.ru/article/4291217?ysclid=mefqk08ie834180063>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/C72m>; <https://1prime.ru/20241228/strategiya-853941749.html?ysclid=mefr5qrbz317707885>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/179eV>; <https://ria.ru/20241228/falsifikaytsiya-1991927417.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/3B07B>

34 From Russian: ... The third group of nationalist myths includes biased interpretations of recent events in twentieth-century history, linked to the key propaganda clichés of the modern Ukrainian state. In this context, the mythologised Holodomor takes on a priority role...

Quotation from the Znanie Society’s course “Prevention of Neo-Nazi Ideology among Children and Young People”. <https://akademiya.znanierussia.ru/course/profilaktika-ideologii-neonacizma-sredi-detej-i-molodezhi?ysclid=m43yr90etz554769849>, archive: <https://archive.ph/iUV4Q>

35 Quotation from the Znanie Society’s course “Prevention of Neo-Nazi Ideology among Children and Young People”. <https://akademiya.znanierussia.ru/course/profilaktika-ideologii-neonacizma-sredi-detej-i-molodezhi?ysclid=m43yr90etz554769849>, archive: <https://archive.ph/iUV4Q>

The presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky, starting in 2019, has been marked by an escalation of these processes:

“At the end of 2020, one of the outcomes of his activity, according to Russian and Ukrainian political scientists, was the transformation of the President of Ukraine, who had promised voters peace, into an outspoken nationalist who supports any legislative initiatives aimed against Russians, Russian culture, the Russian language and the entire ‘Russian world’.”³⁶

Thus, in the Russian concept of extremism, Ukraine is presented as a key source of threats linked to radical nationalism, neo-Nazism, the falsification of history and Russophobia. Russian official rhetoric consistently constructs the image of Ukraine as a state with an anti-Russian ideology which, according to this narrative, threatens Russia’s security through hybrid wars, the spread of extremist ideologies and control over the information space. At the same time, in Russian documents Russophobia in Ukraine is portrayed not only as a social phenomenon but also as an institutional component of state policy, actively implemented through legislative and cultural initiatives.

2.3. Destructive Activity and Destructive Behaviour

In the context of countering extremism in the RF, the terms “destructive activity”, “destructive influence”, “destructive movements” and “destructive behaviour” are frequently used, both in official documents (including activity plans) and in information and awareness campaigns.

The RF Strategy for Countering Extremism defines destructive activity and destructive influence as the actions of foreign organisations and those under their control which, under the cover of cultural and humanitarian projects, incite protest activity in Russia, apply information-psychological influence, and use mass protests to destabilise the situation inside the RF.

“In order to destabilise the socio-political and socio-economic situation in the RF, the special services and organisations of foreign states are increasing their destructive information-psychological influence on the Russian population, especially on young people.”³⁷

“A significant negative impact on the situation in the country is caused by the destructive activity of foreign and international non-governmental organisations ... carried out under the guise of humanitarian, educational, cultural and religious projects, including the instigation of protest activity among the population.”³⁸

These provisions serve as a basis for legitimising Moscow’s political and propaganda-driven logic of strengthening internal control and security measures.

In addition, the RF notes that specialists in prevention work with young people regularly face a wide range of threats affecting youth through destructive ideological influence, which has intensified in the context of the so-called SMO. Among the main threats, they highlight the destructive influence of terrorist, extremist and neo-Nazi organisations, for which the Internet serves as a space for engaging young people in terrorist and extremist destructive activity.

³⁶ Quotation from the Znanie Society’s course “Prevention of Neo-Nazi Ideology among Children and Young People”. <https://akademiya.znanierussia.ru/course/profilaktika-ideologii-neonacizma-sredi-detej-i-molodezhi/?ysclid=m43yr90etz554769849>, archive: <https://archive.ph/iUV40>

³⁷ para.29

³⁸ para.30



Among the terrorist organisations considered most dangerous for today's Russian youth are listed "Columbine", "Maniacs. Cult of Murder (M.K.U.)", the religious-fundamentalist organisations "Party of Islamic Liberation" (Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami) and "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant", as well as the "Freedom of Russia" Legion and the "Azov" Battalion. It is stated that a separate threat is posed by the destructive ideological activity targeting Russian youth carried out by foreign agents and undesirable organisations. For example, the "Feminist Anti-War Resistance", whose activists are said to take part in sabotage operations, raise funds for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and pass information on RF troop movements to Ukrainian intelligence.³⁹

In the RF, a List has been approved of public associations and religious organisations against which a court decision has entered into legal force on liquidation or prohibition of activity on the grounds provided for by Federal Law No.114-FZ of 25 July 2002 "On Countering Extremist Activity".⁴⁰ It is these organisations included in the list that are said to exert a destructive influence.

The term **"destructive behaviour"** is not separately defined in the RF Strategy for Countering Extremism, but it can be understood as a set of actions and practices aimed at undermining stability, violating the law, committing violent acts, inciting conflicts and engaging in extremism. Other documents, including methodological materials, offer different definitions of the term.

According to the Methodological Recommendations on Introducing Modern Approaches to the Moral and Civic Education of Adolescents and Young People in Educational Institutions (based on the work of Russian scholars),⁴¹ destructive behaviour is the persistent behaviour of a mentally healthy individual or group of individuals that deviates from the most important social norms in a given society and causes real harm to the person themselves, their immediate social circle and society as a whole. It is classified into two main categories: *delinquent behaviour* (unlawful) and *deviant behaviour*, which does not fall under the category of unlawful.

Information materials for parents⁴² note that manifestations of destructive behaviour in a minor may pose an increased danger both to the child and to their family, social circle and society as a whole. If signs of destructive behaviour in a child are ignored or not detected in time, this often results in the child harming themselves or others, attempting suicide, or developing addictions such as drug use or alcoholism. It is also noted that under RF legislation, certain destructive actions by minors carry administrative or criminal liability.

It is important to note that **in the RF, destructive behaviour is seen not only as isolated actions but also as a systemic influence carried out through organised groups or networks, often under external factors**. This allows official RF bodies to treat any expressions of protest, criticism or alternative views as potentially destructive, which has a significant impact on the formation of security policy and preventive measures.

According to the Recommendations for Teaching and Administrative Staff of General Education Institutions on Identifying and Preventing Destructive Behaviour among Learners Exposed to the Influence of Terrorist and Other Radical Ideologies,⁴³ **the key features of destructive behaviour are defined as:**

- a destructive ideology based on the uncertainty of adolescents (and many young people) in their "search for self", who, while trying to answer the question "Who am I?", often fall under the influence of a "negative identity";

39 <https://surl.li/udihuv>, archive: [archive: https://archive.ph/wip/9hmRK](https://archive.ph/wip/9hmRK)


40 <https://minjust.gov.ru/ru/documents/7822/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/U2C11>

41 https://fioco.ru/about_ac, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/QAHDM>

42 <https://www.cism-ms.ru/upload/doc/metodicheskie-rekomendacii-dlya-roditelei-obuchayuchikhsya.pdf>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/fxhu8>

43 https://edu.lpr-reg.ru/profilaktika_terrorizma_i_ekstremizma.html, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/fxhu8>

- manifestations both in conditions of a “value (ideological) vacuum” and in situations of excessive “pressure” and the imposition of certain values (expressed as a “negativist reaction”);
- communities where personality is suppressed and some form of violence is cultivated are considered at risk of destructive behaviour and of committing terrorist acts;
- terrorism often arises where systems of socialisation based on fundamental, traditional higher-order values have been lost.



At the same time, it is noted that destructive behaviour and terrorist actions among young people arise from a combination of socio-economic problems, the influence of radical ideology, cultural and religious conflicts, insufficient control over access to information, and involvement in extremist or violent communities.

In the RF, the term ‘destructive behaviour’ may refer to a broad spectrum of actions, ranging from participation in certain subcultures to membership in specific religious organisations. In some cases, such behaviour can indeed pose a threat to the life and health of young people (for example, when suicidal practices are promoted by certain groups). These cases are not examined within this report.

Thus, the overly broad interpretation of “destructive activity” and “destructive behaviour”, particularly through expanding the scope of their assessment, **provides a basis for restricting activities and exerting influence on children and young people on a scale that serves the interests of the Russian authorities under the framework of countering extremism.**

COUNTERING EXTREMISM IN THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS IN THE TOT

In the RF, countering extremist activity is regarded as an important component of the moral and civic education of the younger generation and of preventing neglect and juvenile delinquency.



3.1. Identifying Target Groups in Countering Extremism within the Educational System

As noted earlier, **within its counter-extremism policy the RF singles out certain groups considered at risk and vulnerable to being drawn into extremist activity**. According to the “Comprehensive Plan for Countering the Ideology of Terrorism in the Russian Federation for 2024–2028”,⁴⁴ these include:

- **young people**, especially those who share the ideas of terrorist, extremist, nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations, as well as those belonging to various destructive movements (subcultures), and those registered with agencies and institutions of the prevention system due to a tendency towards suicidal behaviour or committing violent acts;
- **the population of the new subjects of the RF**, especially individuals who previously lived in territories under the control of the Ukrainian government;
- **migrants** who have arrived in the RF for work or study, as well as their family members;
- **persons serving or who have served sentences** in the penal system, primarily for terrorist activity;
- **family members of individuals involved in terrorist activity** (active, convicted or eliminated);
- **minors who have returned (or arrived) from zones of armed conflict**.

The Russian authorities pay particular attention to young people,⁴⁵ as the category most vulnerable to manipulation and recruitment. The Znanie Society's course acknowledges that the most dangerous age for becoming involved in destructive activity is from 14 to 25 years,⁴⁶ or from 14 to 22 years.⁴⁷

This approach is considered most relevant for young people living in the TOT of Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, as well as the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol) **or those who have left the combat zone**. RF policy emphasises that Ukrainian recruiters are allegedly actively exploiting the motive of revenge for the actions of the RF and its representatives. It is claimed that among this category there are often relatives serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine or involved in nationalist movements, which, according to the Russian authorities, increases the risk of their recruitment into terrorist and extremist activity.

This is directly reflected in education and youth policy, which form part of the state strategy for countering extremism (see section 1.2). **In the TOT of Ukraine, RF measures in this area focus on three key target groups:**

44 <https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/408366785/?ysclid=mbri3v38og274577288>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/zeEdB>

45 https://www.kubsu.ru/sites/default/files/insert/page/metodicheskie_rekomendacii_po_organizacii_individualnoy_profilakticheskoy.pdf, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/9hmRK>

46 “...For a prevention specialist, it is always important to remember that the most dangerous period for becoming involved in destructive activity is between the ages of 14 and 25.” — quotation from the Znanie Society's course “Prevention of Neo-Nazi Ideology among Children and Young People”. <https://akademiya.znanierussia.ru/course/profilaktika-ideologii-neonacizma-sredi-detej-i-molodezhi/?ysclid=m43yr90etz554769849>, archive: <https://archive.ph/iUV40>

47 https://pravdinsk-edu.ru/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Metodicheskie_rekomendacii_po_profilaktike_terrorizma_v_molodyozhnoj_srede.pdf, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/dA4aA>

1. School students

Measures targeting them include instilling loyalty to state ideology, eradicating pro-Ukrainian sentiments, and preventing support for nationalist movements, particularly those linked to Ukrainian identity. This is pursued through a set of measures such as compulsory participation in patriotic events, monitoring behaviour via social media surveillance and in-school oversight, and more. On the official website of Rosfinmonitoring, a “List of Terrorists and Extremists” has been published, which includes young people from the TOT of Ukraine and government-controlled territory of Ukraine aged 14 to 18 (see also section 3.3).

Similar counter-extremism measures are also applied to higher education students, particularly those studying at universities and technical colleges in the RF.

In addition, significant resources are devoted to identifying young people prone to destructive behaviour within the education system (see also section 3.2).

The Znanie Society’s course⁴⁸ sets out the following markers for adolescents and learners who fall under the influence of radical propaganda:

- publications containing statements or other content aimed at dehumanising the image of the Russian soldier, as well as content that discredits the Armed Forces of the RF;
- publications promoting the views of foreign agents and opinion leaders who support the pro-Ukrainian and Western agenda; these may include publications containing knowingly false information about the course of the so-called SMO;
- materials that challenge the territorial integrity of the RF, in particular those promoting the idea of secession of part of its territory;
- subscriptions to pro-Ukrainian communities that spread “fake news” about the course of the so-called SMO and also call for extremist activity.

Markers of Inclination towards Political Extremism

1. Non-recognition of RF state authorities and public holidays.
2. Support for Russia’s geopolitical opponents (unfriendly states), including posting statuses, materials and comments on social networks that criticise or insult state authorities, the RF Armed Forces, and patriotic organisations.
3. Expressing support for structures banned in the RF, such as A. Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) or M. Khodorkovsky’s “Open Russia”.
4. Strong rejection of Russia’s status as a thousand-year-old civilisation and of its right to statehood.
5. Denial of Russia’s territorial integrity (especially through non-recognition of the results of referendums on joining the RF in the Republic of Crimea, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and the Kherson and Zaporozhie Oblasts).⁴⁹

48 Quotation from the Znanie Society’s course “Prevention of Neo-Nazi Ideology among Children and Young People”. <https://akademiya.znanierussia.ru/course/profilaktika-ideologii-neonacizma-sredi-detej-i-molodezhi/?ysclid=m43yr90etz554769849>, archive: <https://archive.ph/iUV40>

49 https://edu.lpr-reg.ru/profilaktika_terrorizma_i_ekstremizma.html, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/dqihM>



2. Teaching staff, including teachers and lecturers

The RF takes measures to ensure the ideological loyalty of teachers and to monitor their activities for any “unpatriotic” statements or attitudes towards state policy, particularly during teaching. At the same time, it is teachers who are tasked with implementing counter-extremism measures in the RF within the educational process, both through classroom teaching and extra-curricular activities.

3. Parents and other legal representatives

They are seen as intermediaries in shaping the worldview of children and adolescents. They are involved in “conversations”, propaganda events and prevention programmes aimed at eradicating “extremist ideas” within the family circle.

Thus, the RF’s policy of “countering extremism” in the TOT **is comprehensive and systematic, aimed primarily at controlling the ideological space and subordinating young people, educators and families to the official state doctrine.**

3.2. RF’s Approaches to Preventing Extremism in the Educational Process

Measures to counter (prevent) extremism and terrorism in the RF, including in the TOT of Ukraine, are carried out in line with the Comprehensive Plan for Countering the Ideology of Terrorism for 2024–2028, which is further implemented throughout the entire vertical structure. The Plan provides for:

- carrying out preventive measures among adolescents and young people to reduce the risk of involvement in extremist and terrorist ideologies;
- information and educational work aimed at explaining the criminal and destructive nature of terrorist and neo-Nazi organisations;
- applying a comprehensive approach that combines educational, social and psychological tools to foster critical thinking and resilience to radicalisation.

Countering extremism in the RF is a multi-level process that involves all participants in the educational process. This includes teachers, educators, psychologists, social workers, form teachers, subject teachers and other individuals engaged in cooperation, as well as parents and the learners themselves. This approach is applied both in the territory of the RF and by the RF in the TOT of Ukraine.

The work of educators is carried out in two main areas:

1. Identifying school students in “at-risk groups” and working with them.
2. Carrying out preventive work.

To identify those inclined towards terrorism and extremism, the following recommended set of socio-psychological diagnostic tools is applied:

- sociometric testing of school students in each class at least once a year, followed by the creation of sociograms;

- content analysis of written assignments (essays, creative tasks) on topics related to destructive ideology, with the involvement of psychologists and linguists, and comparison of the findings with sociometric data;
- observation by psychologists, teachers and social workers during class events and themed meetings to assess students' actual positions;
- conversations and interviews with informal student leaders to clarify their views and develop an expert assessment of the dominant value orientations in the class and the school as a whole.

In addition, **monitoring behaviour plays a significant role in the system of measures and involves the systematic surveillance of social networks**, messaging platforms and public statements by participants in the educational process.

According to the Methodological Recommendations on Preventing the Spread of the Ideology of Terrorism, Extremism and Neo-Nazism among Young People in the Donetsk People's Republic, the Luhansk People's Republic, Zaporozhie Oblast and Kherson Oblast,⁵⁰ it is recommended that the following aspects be considered when reviewing accounts:

- nickname and status, which can provide additional information about interests;
- subscriptions to communities as a source of information about the student's circle of interests;
- content of posts and comments for signs of aggression or anxiety;
- posted photos or stories in which the student is tagged;
- audiovisual content (images, logos, video clips, songs, short videos).

Markers within such monitoring include, among others, the phrases "Slava Ukraini – Heroyam slava" ("Glory to Ukraine – Glory to the Heroes") and "Ukraine above all".

Текст, расположенный ниже, предлагается для служебного пользования специалистами органов по молодежной политике и не предназначен для распространения.

Отметки группы риска, разделяющие идеи терроризма, экстремизма, в том числе неонацизма и радикального национализма, представители которых могут быть выявлены по результатам изучения аккаунтов соцсетей.

1 группа риска

Обучающиеся, разделяющие идеи неонацизма и радикального национализма, в том числе украинского.

Представлены следующие маркеры:

- Фотографии, содержащие эмблемы и атрибутику нацистских и фашистских организаций, нацистскую символику, в том числе изображённую на нацистской военной форме, флагах, татуировках.
- Изображения эмблем радикальных политических объединений Украины.
- Фотографии сторонников радикального украинского национализма.
- Публикации, содержащие одобрение или поддержку действий украинских нацистов, ВСУ.
- Фотографии, содержащие изображение личностей, вооружения, военной техники и вооружённых сил Третьего Рейха.

The text below is intended for official use by youth policy specialists and is not intended for distribution.

We note **risk groups that adhere to the ideas of terrorism, extremism, including neo-Nazism and radical nationalism**, whose representatives may be identified based on the analysis of social media accounts.

Risk Group 1

Students who share the ideas of neo-Nazism and radical nationalism, including Ukrainian nationalism.

The following markers may indicate risk:

Photos containing emblems and paraphernalia of Nazi and fascist organisations, Nazi symbols, including those depicted on Nazi military uniforms, flags, or tattoos.

Images of emblems of radical Ukrainian political organisations.

Photos of supporters of radical Ukrainian nationalism.

Posts expressing approval or support for the actions of Ukrainian Nazis or the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

50 https://shkolainternatinzhavinskaya-r68.gosweb.gosuslugi.ru/netcat_files/userfiles/bezopasnost/metodicheskie.pdf, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/YHp1M>



Публикации, содержащие цитаты лидеров националистических движений, лозунги националистических экстремистских организаций.

Фотографии и видеозаписи, продвигающие идею исключительности или превосходства одного народа над другими, в том числе содержащие сцены насилия и враждебного отношения к представителям других рас и народов.

Видеозаписи, содержащие выступления лидеров общественного мнения (далее — ЛОМы), придерживающихся нацистской идеологии.

Публикации, содержащие слова-маркеры нацистских движений («14/88», «скины», «РаХоВа» (от английского «Racial Holy War»), «White Power», «1312», «Слава Украине — Героям слава (СУГС)», «от сердца к Солнцу», «Слава Нации — Смерть Врагам», «Москаляку на гиляку», «Украина превыше всего!» и т. д.);



Подписка на сообщества, публикующие контент, который содержит нацистские идеи, поддержку деятельности сторонников неонацизма и радикального национализма, призывы к вражде, дискриминации, либо насильственным действиям по национальному признаку.

The image shows “risk group 1 markers,” which are used for monitoring according to the “Methodical Recommendations for the Prevention of the Spread of Terrorist, Extremist, and Neo-Nazi Ideologies among Youth from the Donetsk People’s Republic, Luhansk People’s Republic, Zaporizhzhia Region, and Kherson Region.” Source – https://shkolainternatizhivinskaya-r68.gosweb.gosuslugi.ru/netcat_files/userfiles/bezopasnost/metodicheskie.pdf, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/YHp1M>

Posts containing quotes from leaders of nationalist movements or slogans of nationalist extremist organisations.

Photos and videos promoting the idea of superiority or exclusivity of one nation over others, including scenes of violence and hostile attitudes toward members of other races or ethnicities.

Videos featuring public opinion leaders (hereinafter referred to as “influencers”) who adhere to Nazi ideology.

Posts containing key terms and slogans associated with Nazi movements (e.g., “14/88”, “skinheads”, “RaHoWa” (an abbreviation of “Racial Holy War”), “White Power”, “1312”, “Slava Ukraini - Heroyam Slava (SUGS)”, “From the heart to the Sun”, “Glory to the Nation? Death to Enemies”, “Moskalyak to the gallows”, “Ukraine above all!” etc.).

Subscriptions to communities that publish content promoting Nazi ideology, supporting the activities of neo-Nazi and radical nationalist followers, or containing calls for hatred, discrimination, or violence on the basis of nationality or ethnicity.



Markers also include subscriptions to pro-Ukrainian communities whose publications adhere to a pro-Ukrainian or pro-Western position, as well as posts that convey layperson comments on the so-called SMO, in particular references to the negative impact of the so-called SMO on the socio-economic sphere of society (living standards in Russia, spending on social benefits, rising prices and tax rates).

2 группа риска

Обучающиеся, подпавшие под влияние антироссийской пропаганды на фоне проведения СВО.

Представлены следующие маркеры:



Публикации, содержащие высказывания или иной контент, направленный на дегуманизацию образа российского солдата, дискредитирующий Вооружённые силы Российской Федерации, политических лидеров и дестабилизацию общества.

Публикации, транслирующие мнение иноагентов и ЛОМов, придерживающихся проукраинской и западной повестки.

Публикации, содержащие заведомо ложную информации о ходе проведения СВО, действиях Вооружённых сил Российской Федерации.

Публикации, призывающие к осуществлению действий, направленных на нарушение территориальной целостности Российской Федерации, в том числе продвигающие идею отчуждения части её территорий.

Публикации, содержащие слова-маркеры, указывающие на оппозиционные и антироссийские настроения («Пыня», «кремлёвский карлик», «путиноиды», «обнулёнш», «рашка»).

Подписка на «проукраинские» сообщества, распространяющие фейки о ходе СВО, а также призывающие к экстремистской деятельности.

Risk Group 2

Learners who have come under the influence of anti-Russian propaganda in the context of the SMO.

The following markers may indicate risk:

Posts containing statements or other content aimed at dehumanising the image of the Russian soldier, discrediting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or political leaders, and destabilising society.

Posts amplifying the views of foreign agents and public opinion influencers (opinion leaders) who promote pro-Ukrainian or Western narratives.

Posts containing deliberately false information about the progress of the SMO or the actions of the Russian Armed Forces.

Posts calling for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, including those promoting the idea of secession of parts of its territory.

Posts containing key terms and slogans that indicate oppositional and anti-Russian sentiment (e.g. “Pynya”, “Kremlin dwarf”, “Putinoids”, “Zeroed one”, “Rashka”).


Subscriptions to “pro-Ukrainian” communities that spread false information about the course of the SMO or promote extremist activity.

The image shows “risk group 2 markers,” which are used for monitoring according to the “Methodical Recommendations for the Prevention of the Spread of Terrorist, Extremist, and Neo-Nazi Ideologies among Youth from the Donetsk People’s Republic, Luhansk People’s Republic, Zaporizhzhia Region, and Kherson Region.” Source – https://shkolainternatinzhavinskaya-r68.gosweb.gosuslugi.ru/netcat_files/userfiles/bezopasnost/metodicheskie.pdf, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/YHp1M>

3 группа риска

Обучающиеся, критикующие специальную военную операцию.

Представлены следующие маркеры:



Публикации, основывающиеся на высмеивании официальной информации о ходе проведения спецоперации и о руководстве войсками, проявлений патриотизма, а также участников спецоперации.

Публикации, транслирующие бытовые оценки спецоперации, в том числе отсылки к негативному влиянию проведения СВО на социально-экономическую сферу общества (уровень жизни в России, расходы на социальные выплаты, рост цен и налоговых ставок).

Публикации, содержащие слова-маркеры, указывающие на критику СВО («Путлер», «рашисты», «оппозиционеры», «спецобсрация» и т. д.).

Публикации, транслирующие мнение ЛОМов, критикующих специальную военную операцию.

The image shows “risk group 3 markers,” which are used for monitoring according to the “Methodical Recommendations for the Prevention of the Spread of Terrorist, Extremist, and Neo-Nazi Ideologies among Youth from the Donetsk People’s Republic, Luhansk People’s Republic, Zaporizhzhia Region, and Kherson Region.” Source – https://shkolainternatnzhavinskaya-r68.gosweb.gosuslugi.ru/netcat_files/userfiles/bezopasnost/metodicheskie.pdf, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/YHp1M>

Risk Group 3

Learners who criticise the SMO.

The following markers may indicate risk:

Posts that mock official information about the course of the SMO, military leadership, displays of patriotism, or the participants of the operation.

Posts expressing layperson opinions about the SMO, including references to its negative impact on the socio-economic sphere (standard of living in Russia, social spending, price increases, and tax hikes).

Posts containing keywords and slogans indicating criticism of the SMO (e.g. “Putler”, “rashists”, “liber-failers”, “special mess-up, etc.).

Posts that convey the views of public opinion influencers (opinion leaders) who criticise the SMO.

The practice of monitoring school students’ social networks is widespread. For example, at the municipal budgetary general education institution ‘Zernivska School’ in the Krasnohvardiske district of the TOT of the AR of Crimea, measures were carried out during the first semester of the 2024/2025 academic year to identify “at-risk” school students inclined towards destructive actions. These included:

- monitoring school students’ social networks;
- psychological and diagnostic studies of learners in grades 7–11 and certain groups of participants in the educational process;
- sociological studies of learners in grades 8–11 and certain groups of participants in the educational process.

The annual report states that the school’s work on identifying “at-risk” learners inclined towards destructive actions and providing them with support is carried out on a regular basis. Positive results of this work include the absence of cases of destructive behaviour among learners and incidents of bullying in the school.⁵¹

According to statements by the so-called head and deputy head of the State Committee on Youth Policy of the Republic of Crimea,⁵² more than 500,000 accounts were monitored in the first half of 2024. Based on the identified materials, nine criminal cases were opened against individuals committing crimes in the “Internet” information and telecommunication network. In the first five months of 2024, staff of the so-called Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of

51 https://edu.lpr-reg.ru/profilaktika_terrorizma_i_ekstremizma.html, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/KxEdO>

52 <https://gkmp.rk.gov.ru/structure/7f4d917f-6d2e-4be0-8c3f-a37d3f746263>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/q5nJj>

Crimea and its territorial bodies drew up 293 administrative protocols, of which:

- 110 – under Article 20.3 of the RF Code of Administrative Offences, “Public display of Nazi symbols”,
- 4 – under Article 20.29 of the RF Code of Administrative Offences, “Distribution of extremist materials”,
- 179 – under Article 20.3.3 of the RF Code of Administrative Offences.

In addition, measures were taken to block (restrict) access to prohibited content on the Internet.

Prevention is defined as one of the main tools for countering extremism. From the RF’s perspective, its ultimate goal is to significantly reduce the vulnerability of young people to destructive influences, particularly neo-Nazi influence, in order to protect them from being drawn into unlawful activity.

The main types of preventive work include: *general prevention*

According to Russian claims,⁵³ three main tools are predominantly used to implement general preventive measures, namely:


- 1) Integration of general preventive components into the educational process, where within the framework of academic disciplines, primarily in the humanities (history, social studies, political science, law, etc.), the destructive nature of neo-Nazism is demonstrated, and positive meanings are formed that function as a kind of immunity for future protection. For example, in law classes, students are taught about legal responsibility for actions of a Nazi nature; in history lessons, destructive myths permeating neo-Nazi propaganda are debunked; and in social studies or political science classes, the social dangers of these phenomena and the possible consequences of neo-Nazism, if not countered, are explained.

7. This is especially important in the context of awakening historical memory among children and young people in the liberated territories, where the formation of an all-Russian civic identity among the younger generations must be built on the basis of consistent and team-based work by history teachers, literature teachers, psychologists and educators, relying on the image of the continuity of Russia’s existence from Ancient Rus to the present day.⁵⁴

- 2) carrying out extracurricular preventive activities, as well as integrating the preventive component into educational and patriotic programmes. For example, independently organising or ensuring the involvement of young people in meetings with participants of the so-called “special military operation”, in commemorative events, youth forums, excursions and similar formats.

53 <https://akademiya.znanierussia.ru/course/profilaktika-ideologii-neonacizma-sredi-detej-i-molodezhi?ysclid=m43yr90etz554769849>, archive: <https://archive.ph/iUV40>; https://edu.lpr-reg.ru/profilaktika_terrorizma_i_ekstremizma.html, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/5JoPP>

54 https://edu.lpr-reg.ru/profilaktika_terrorizma_i_ekstremizma.html, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/5JoPP>



В Геническе провели гражданско-патриотическую игру «Патриоты Херсонской области»

#новости

Мероприятие направлено на формирование у молодежи критического мышления по отношению к экстремистским идеологиям, воспитание патриотизма, любви к Родине, чувства принадлежности к российской культуре и истории.

Судьями игры стали военнослужащие и сотрудники регионального Управления Росгвардии. В соревнованиях приняли участие 6 команд, они

Administration of Kherson Oblast

In Genichesk, a civic-patriotic game "Patriots of Kherson Oblast" was held

#news

The event aimed to develop in young people critical thinking regarding extremist ideologies, foster patriotism, love for the Motherland, and a sense of belonging to Russian culture and history.

The image shows a screenshot of a post dated 22.10.2024 on the page of the so-called Administration of Kherson region about the holding in Henichesk (temporarily occupied territory of Kherson region) of the civic-patriotic game "Patriots of Kherson Region," aimed at "developing critical thinking among young people with regard to extremist ideologies, fostering patriotism, love for the Motherland, and a sense of belonging to Russian culture and history." Source – https://vk.com/wall-214129347_23198, archive: <https://archive.ph/08y5X>

In Berdyansk, the forum brought together 150 participants, including specialists in the prevention of terrorism and extremism from general secondary schools and kindergartens, students from secondary and higher education institutions, as well as volunteers from the "Volunteer Youth Brigade" and the "All-Russian Student Rescue Corps".⁵⁵

As part of the "Soldier of Law and Order" campaign, juvenile affairs inspectors conducted preventive sessions for students of the Lyubimovskaya and Ivanovskaya schools of the Ivanovsky District, the Klinovskaya, Brilevskaya and Tarasovskaya schools of the Aleshkinsky District, the Shirokovskaya and Yubileynovskaya schools of the Skadovsky District, the Verkhneserogozskaya school of the Nizhneserogozsky District, and the Podovskaya and Chumakshlyakhovskaya schools of the Novotroitsky District. The law enforcement officers showed the children specially prepared videos about administrative and criminal liability for minors for storing, distributing and using narcotic substances, for disseminating information aimed at inciting hatred or hostility, as well as for extremist and terrorist acts.⁵⁶

Law enforcement officers are actively involved in such activities. For example, in schools in the TOT of Kherson region, a series of lessons was held as part of the "Soldier of Law and Order" campaign.

⁵⁵ <https://www.юрмолодой.рф/post/0h4p1pz2b1-v-zaporozhskoi-oblasti-proshel-forum-po>, archive: <https://archive.ph/IBVIL>

⁵⁶ https://t.me/police_kherson_press/11138, archive: <https://archive.ph/OZaXF>

Инспекторы по делам несовершеннолетних разъяснили основы российского законодательства старшеклассникам Каховского округа



фото: 84.30-блзевком-
p1a1

В рамках акции «Солдат правопорядка» инспекторы по делам несовершеннолетних провели профилактическую лекцию «Мы в ответе за свои поступки» с учениками 8-11 классов Красноперекопской школы Каховского округа.

В ходе мероприятия полицейские поговорили с ребятами о важности разностороннего развития личности и ведения активного и здорового образа жизни, ознакомили со статьями Уголовного кодекса Российской Федерации за хранение, распространение и употребление наркотических веществ, а также за распространение информации, направленной на возбуждение ненависти или вражды.

Кроме того, офицеры рассказали слушателям о задачах полиции по предотвращению проявлений экстремизма и терроризма в молодёжной среде, недопущению вовлечения несовершеннолетних в деструктивную, в том числе экстремистскую деятельность.

В завершение встречи полицейские ответили на вопросы школьников и пожелали ребятам успехов в учебной, спортивной и творческой деятельности.

Пресс-служба ГУ МВД России по Херсонской области

The image shows a screenshot of a news item reporting that the so-called juvenile affairs inspectors explained the basics of Russian legislation to high school students of the Kakhovka district (temporarily occupied territory of Kherson region). Source – <https://herson.bezformata.com/listnews/kahovskogo-go/139269327/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/uoKSe>

Juvenile Affairs Inspectors Explained the Basics of Russian Legislation to Senior Pupils of the Kakhovka District

As part of the «Soldier of Law and Order» campaign, juvenile affairs inspectors conducted a preventive lecture titled «We Are Responsible for Our Actions» for pupils in grades 8–11 of the Krasnoperetsk School in the Kakhovka District.

During the event, police officers spoke with the pupils about the importance of well-rounded personal development and maintaining a healthy, active lifestyle. They also familiarised the pupils with articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation concerning the storage, distribution, and use of narcotic substances, as well as the dissemination of information aimed at inciting hatred or enmity.

In addition, officers explained to the pupils the role of the police in preventing manifestations of extremism and terrorism among youth, as well as the dangers of involving minors in destructive or extremist activities.

The event concluded with police officers wishing the pupils success in their studies, sports, and creative activities.

Press Service of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Kherson Oblast

In the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the Department for Countering the Ideology of Extremism and Terrorism of the Krympatriotcentr is actively implementing preventive measures.⁵⁷

Among other things, this includes the development of methodological materials for delivering lectures and talks on countering terrorism and extremism, the organisation of military-patriotic and anti-extremist events (including in the All-Russian children's camp «Scarlet Sails», in schools and technical colleges), as well as the monitoring of content on social networks. These activities are scheduled on a regular basis, both throughout the year⁵⁸ and on a monthly basis.⁵⁹

The same body is also responsible for developing, implementing and reporting on the Action Plan for the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan for Countering the Ideology of Terrorism in the RF for 2024–2028.

⁵⁷ <https://surl.lt/ithkke>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/wDJzi>

⁵⁸ <https://www.krympatriotcentr.ru/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PlanAT2025.pdf>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/dgnd6>

⁵⁹ <https://herson.bezformata.com/listnews/kahovskogo/139269327/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/nfMs3>

In educational institutions in the TOT of the AR of Crimea, more than 11,450 preventive lectures and discussions on legal awareness were conducted, aimed at explaining the criminal nature of terrorist, Ukrainian nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations. Thematic class hours were held on such topics as: “The Threat of Extremism and Terrorism”, “Liability for Unlawful Acts”, “Misdemeanour. Offence. Crime”, “Terrorism and the Danger of a Teenager Being Drawn into Terrorist and Extremist Activities. The Role of Moral Positions and Personal Qualities of Teenagers”, and “Ukrainian Radicalism – a Threat to Russia’s National Security”.⁶⁰

The target group for such activities in the TOT of Ukraine consists of all participants in the educational process.



Ministry of Education and Science of the Donetsk People's Republic

A series of foresight sessions was held for educators and parent community representatives in the Donetsk People's Republic

The image shows a screenshot of a publication dated 18.04.2025 by the so-called Ministry of Education and Science of the “DPR” about the holding of a series of events for the teaching and parent community. Source – https://vk.com/wall-76988535_26871, archive: <https://archive.ph/aRZgt>.

3) Filling the socio-political space in which young people are regularly present with constructive preventive content. For example, the unveiling of monuments, memorial plaques, heroes’ benches and similar initiatives

Thus, general prevention is aimed at shaping a constructive worldview among broad audiences.⁶¹

- **targeted prevention**

It is aimed at minimising the impact of external factors that contribute to learners being drawn into destructive activity; correcting personal characteristics that lead learners to destructive actions; teaching useful skills that will help them be more resilient to external threats in the future; preventing students from being involved in destructive unlawful activity by neutralising specific causes and conditions that give rise to it, as well as identifying those individuals who already require individual preventive intervention.

- **individual prevention**

This refers to targeted work with individuals who are most vulnerable to destructive influence, with the aim of preventing their involvement in terrorist, extremist or neo-Nazi ideologies. It includes the organisation of mentoring with the participation of psychologists, social workers and trained student activists. The mentor’s work follows several stages: accompaniment (support and prevention of the escalation of problems); demythologisation (identifying and refuting

⁶⁰ <https://gkmp.rk.gov.ru/structure/7f4d917f-6d2e-4be0-8c3f-a37d3f746263>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/q5nJi>

⁶¹ https://vk.com/wall-76988535_26871, archive: <https://archive.ph/aRZgt>

destructive beliefs of the mentee); demonstration (showing an alternative life path and positive values by personal example); emphasis (highlighting the mentee's achievements through their own efforts); and completion (a properly structured closure of the mentoring process).

Educators from regions of the RF outside the TOT of Ukraine are actively involved in preventive measures carried out in the TOT of Ukraine.

Запорожский Телеграф



... В Запорожской области принимаются все меры для искоренения проукраинского экстремизма среди школьников

Zaporozhsky Telegraph

All possible measures are being taken in Zaporozhskaya Oblast to eradicate pro-Ukrainian extremism among schoolchildren.

This was stated by the Deputy Head of the regional government for social development, Aleksey Lysov. According to him, since 2022...

The image shows a screenshot of a publication about a statement by the so-called Deputy Head of the Government of Zaporizhzhia region for Social Development, O. Lysov, regarding measures to eradicate pro-Ukrainian extremism among schoolchildren⁶². Source – https://t.me/zo_telegraf/14705, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/f4BMB>

Scientific events are also held in the TOT of Ukraine with the participation of representatives from various regions of the RF.

The interest in the All-Russian Scientific Conference “*Denazification: History and the Present*”, held in Donetsk, exceeded all expectations: 160 scholars, public figures and journalists from Moscow, St Petersburg, Volgograd, Ryazan, Voronezh, Crimea, Lugansk and other Russian cities announced their participation.

Since 2014, the Donetsk People’s Republic has been paving the way for the “Russian world” in many of the most important areas. And in the fight against modern neo-Nazism, Donbass has been a pioneer. We were the first to experience not only the manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism and neo-Nazism, but also to begin implementing countermeasures.⁶³

To ensure preventive work within the education system in the TOT of Ukraine, centres have been established to organise and coordinate activities aimed at fostering an active

⁶² In the Zaporozhie oblast, all measures are being taken to eradicate pro-Ukrainian extremism among school students. This was stated by the region’s Deputy Prime Minister for Social Development, Aleksei Lysov. According to him, since 2022 educational institutions in the Zaporozhie oblast have fully switched to the new federal state educational standards of the RF. “Teachers from other regions of our country are gladly coming to take up employment in schools and secondary vocational education institutions. The project ‘*Faces of Friendship*’ is being implemented, under which schools located in other regions provide methodological assistance to teachers in organising the educational process in our schools. All necessary measures are being taken to eradicate pro-Ukrainian extremism among students of educational institutions in the Zaporozhie oblast. Results are already evident,” said Lysov. https://t.me/zo_telegraf/14705, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/f4BMB>

⁶³ <https://t.me/PushilinDenis/4020>, archive: <https://archive.ph/Khbcl>

civic position among young people, averting interethnic and interfaith conflicts, countering the ideology of terrorism and preventing extremism. These centres mainly operate on the basis of higher education institutions:

- **TOT of Donetsk Region** – “Donetsk Academy of Management and Public Administration” (Donetsk Academy of Management).
Head: Malik Olena Vitaliivna.⁶⁴
- **TOT of Luhansk Region** – “Luhansk State University named after Volodymyr Dahl”.
Head: Markov Ihor Vasylovych
- **TOT of Zaporizhzhia Region** – “Melitopol State University”.
Head: Serhii Oleksandrovych Dubovyk.⁶⁵
- **TOT of Kherson Region** – “Kherson Technical University”.
Head: Khazbulatov Turpal-Ali Magomedovych.⁶⁶
- **TOT of the AR of Crimea** – Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education “Crimean Federal University named after V. I. Vernadskyi”.
Head: Olena Viktorivna Gubanova.⁶⁷
- **TOT of Sevastopol** – Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education “Sevastopol State University”.
Head: Andrii Mykhailovych Puzanov.⁶⁸

These structures systematically implement measures to counter extremism, often portraying Ukraine as a party allegedly supporting “destructive activity”. **The list of activities is displayed on the Interactive Map of Preventive Activities in Educational Organisations and Research Institutions**⁶⁹ (its operation is mentioned in the Comprehensive Plan for Countering the Ideology of Terrorism, para. 5.8.1).

Интерактивная карта профилактической деятельности

в образовательных организациях и научных учреждениях Российской Федерации



Interactive Map of Preventive Activities in educational organisations and scientific institutions of the Russian Federation

64 <https://donampa.ru/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/uMER2>


65 <https://melsu.ru/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/scgXm>

66 <https://htuedu.ru/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/PDZM4>

67 <https://cfuv.ru/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/TJj3A>

68 <https://welcome.sevsu.ru/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/RqAJ6>

69 <https://map.ncpti.ru/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/MZPcW>



Interactive Map of Preventive Activities

in educational organisations and research institutions of the Russian Federation

Southern Federal District

Republic of Crimea


491 – total number of events

185 – this year

0 – upcoming events

Nearest events: None

ALL EVENTS IN THIS REGION



Interactive Map of Preventive Activities

in educational organisations and research institutions of the Russian Federation

Southern Federal District

Kherson Oblast


30 – total number of events

28 – this year

0 – upcoming events

Nearest events: None

ALL EVENTS IN THIS REGION



Interactive Map of Preventive Activities

in educational organisations and research institutions of the Russian Federation

Southern Federal District

Zaporozhskaya Oblast


226 – total number of events

149 – this year

0 – upcoming events

Nearest events: None

ALL EVENTS IN THIS REGION



Interactive Map of Preventive Activities

in educational organisations and research institutions of the Russian Federation

Southern Federal District

Donetsk People's Republic


302 – total number of events

90 – this year

0 – upcoming events

Nearest events: None

ALL EVENTS IN THIS REGION



Interactive Map of Preventive Activities

in educational organisations and research institutions of the Russian Federation

Southern Federal District
Lugansk People's Republic

133 – total number of events

59 – this year

0 – upcoming events

Nearest events: None

ALL EVENTS IN THIS REGION

The images show screenshots from the Interactive Map of Preventive Activities, depicting centers located in the temporarily occupied territories.

Source – <https://map.ncpti.ru/?ysclid=m60m6k136t163256402>,

archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/HYMIq>

It should be noted that this Report does not aim to list all the measures implemented by the RF and the occupation administrations, given their number and variety. However, the examples provided illustrate a vertically integrated and cross-cutting approach to introducing extremism prevention through the education system.

3.3. Analysis of Punitive Practices

The RF systematically applies administrative and criminal prosecution against the civilian population in the TOT of Ukraine. The main focus is on minors, educators and parents. Grounds for punishment include statements, posts on social networks, or the use of Ukrainian symbols, which occupation authorities interpret as “extremism” (see section 3.2).

Data on offences and court decisions in the TOT remain limited. While the Unified State Register of Court Decisions of the RF⁷⁰ has gradually started to include information from the TOT, most such decisions are published with delays and frequently contain incomplete data. Certain registers remain practically inaccessible or redirect users to Russian resources. Cases involving minors are often closed.

Accordingly, the information presented in this report is based on publicly available data posted on the official resources of RF authorities and occupation administrations.

For example, the Federal Security Service of the RF, together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RF and the Investigative Committee, reported⁷¹ large-scale operations in 78 regions of the RF against 252 individuals, including 156 minors. As a result of these actions, 39 individuals aged 14–35 were detained for supporting Ukrainian terrorist organisations banned in Russia and for inciting children and adolescents to commit violent acts against representatives of state authorities, classmates and teachers. In addition, according to their reports, nine minors were found to be involved in preparing armed attacks, including in educational institutions, with weapons, explosive devices and propaganda materials seized.

70 <https://sudact.ru>, archive: <https://archive.ph/GPWtk>

71 <http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/press/message/single.html?id%3D10440093@fsbMessage.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/vhgF6#selection-275.0-291.70>

Separately, it was reported⁷² that in the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”, 161 minors were prosecuted, of whom 48 (nearly one in three children) were “placed in compulsory psychiatric treatment”.

“Specialists noted that the involvement of schools is very important in the work of preventing such phenomena, since it is easier to conduct explanatory work with a child at the initial stage of their involvement by third parties in such destructive communities than to prevent the consequences later.

At the meeting of the interdepartmental commission, the prevention of juvenile delinquency was also discussed. Thus, 263 minors are registered with the Juvenile Affairs Office of the Republic, of which 19 adolescents have been registered since the beginning of the year”.

The forced placement of minors in psychiatric treatment requires further targeted research in order to document such cases.

The analysis of recorded cases **demonstrates the systematic use of fines, forced public apologies (to the people of Russia and the President of the RF)**, as well as dismissals from employment and pressure on families. The most common grounds, both from publicly available cases and those documented in the course of this study, are “discrediting the Armed Forces of the RF”, posting Ukrainian symbols, listening to Ukrainian songs, or criticising the war in Ukraine.

Examples include:

School students and young people:

- **AR of Crimea, Yalta:** a 17-year-old school student was fined 40,000 roubles under Part 1 of Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the RF (“Public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the RF for the purpose of protecting the interests of the RF and its citizens, and maintaining international peace and security”) for the phrase “We are for Ukraine”, spoken during video recording.⁷³

“The incident occurred when a girl in Yalta asked two boys passing by whether they were afraid of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. One of the school students replied: “We are for Ukraine”. After that, the police began an inspection and established that the author of this phrase was 17-year-old Yevhen F., a student of the 11th grade of Yalta Secondary School No. 2.”


- **AR of Crimea, Simferopol:** five persons aged 17–21 were detained for singing Ukrainian songs in Gagarin Park, and administrative protocols were drawn up under Part 1 of Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the RF (“Public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the RF for the purpose of protecting the interests of the RF and its citizens, and maintaining international peace and security”), as well as for drinking alcohol in a public place and minor disorderly conduct.

“The grounds were the performance of Ukrainian songs in Gagarin Park, which, according to law enforcement officers, was accompanied by “prohibited slogans” and the consumption of alcohol. Administrative protocols were drawn up against the detainees under Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the RF, as well as for drinking alcohol in a public place and minor disorderly conduct”.

72 <https://bloknot-donetsk.ru/news/k-ugolovnoy-otvetstvennosti-privlechen-161-nesover-1783846?ysclid=m2jenodjbc608320394>, archive: <https://archive.ph/n3LzB>

73 https://vk.com/wall-76675302_19918, archive: <https://archive.ph/wofg8>

- **AR of Crimea, Yalta:** Regina Olegovna (born 2006) posted on the social networks Instagram* and VKontakte marking Crimea as the territory of Ukraine and listened to “Nazi songs”; she was forced to make a public apology.⁷⁴



Regina Olegovna was actively posting statuses on Instagram and VKontakte, marking Crimea as the territory of Ukraine, and later even started listening to Nazi songs.

The image shows a screenshot from a video of apologies by Regina Olegivna, published on Telegram. Source – <https://t.me/cremeasmersh/502>, archive: <https://archive.ph/uJbe5>

Teachers:

- **AR of Crimea, Dzhankoi:** A geography teacher at School No. 8, Susana Bezazieva, was fined 30,000 roubles for denying the existence of “Nazis” in Ukraine during a conversation with school students who expressed support for the actions of the Russian army during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. She was dismissed under pressure from the school administration and parents.⁷⁵

“The geography teacher at School No. 8 in Dzhankoi, Susana Bezazieva, during a conversation with school students who expressed support for the actions of the Russian army during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, stated that she had never seen in Ukraine any “Nazis” whom the Russian army allegedly eradicates”.

- **AR of Crimea, Ukromne village, Simferopol district:** Mathematics teacher Said Asanov was fined 45,000 roubles under Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the RF (“Public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”) for criticising the war and supporting Ukraine.⁷⁶

During an extracurricular class “Conversations about Important Things”, mathematics teacher Said Asanov made critical remarks about the war in Ukraine, which became the basis for a statement to the police by the mother of one of the school students. According to the complainant, the teacher said: “Russia attacked Ukraine, unleashed a war and is now justly suffering defeat”, and also spoke out against mobilisation and in support of Ukraine.


74 <https://t.me/cremeasmersh/502>, archive: <https://archive.ph/uJbe5>

75 <https://graty.me/ru/monologue/vy-nachali-kommentirovat-bukvu-z-monolog-uchitelniczy-iz-dzhankoya-kotoruyu-uvolili-posle-razgovora-s-detmi-o-vojne-v-ukraine/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/hZWWp>

76 [t.me/dva_majors/3090](https://dva_majors/3090), archive: <https://archive.ph/3ijZ1>

- **AR of Crimea, Bilohirsk district:** Chemistry teacher Linara Shukhratova was dismissed for performing the Ukrainian national anthem and the song “Chervona Kalyna”; pro-Russian media called for her to be deprived of citizenship.⁷⁷

According to the occupation authorities, chemistry teacher of Murom School in the Bilohirsk district of Crimea, Linara Shukhratova, played the Ukrainian national anthem and the song “Chervona Kalyna” to children during lessons, posted on social media that “Crimea is Ukraine”, expressed hope for the arrival of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and insulted the Russian army, the state and the president of the Russian Federation. She was dismissed from her job. In addition, a video was circulated, recorded on a school bus, where Shukhratova tried to sing the Ukrainian anthem and “Chervona Kalyna”, while school students interrupted her by performing the Russian anthem. Pro-Russian comments included calls to permanently ban her from teaching in the RF, deprive her of citizenship, and deport her forcibly.



The image shows a screenshot from a video of apologies by Linara Shukhratova, published on Telegram.

Source – <https://t.me/cremeasmersh/73>, archive: <https://archive.ph/uJbe5>

- **AR of Crimea, Dzhankoi district:** Music teacher Liudmila Shkodenko was dismissed and held accountable for “discrediting” the Russian army (Part 1, Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation) and for “displaying prohibited symbols” (Part 1, Article 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation) for posting the coat of arms and flag of Ukraine on social media.⁷⁸

Music teacher of the Pobiednoye School in Dzhankoi District, Crimea, Liudmila Shkodenko, was dismissed and held liable for “discrediting” the Russian army and “displaying prohibited symbols” following a post by the pro-Russian platform Crimean SMERSH.⁷⁹ The grounds were posts on the social network VKontakte, where Shkodenko had shared the coat of arms and flag of Ukraine. In a video circulated by occupation media, the teacher, identifying herself as a resident of the village of Pobiednoye, publicly apologises for her actions and admits “guilt”.

Parents:

- **AR of Crimea, Saky:** The mother of a 10-year-old schoolgirl was held liable for posting a video that “discredits the Armed Forces of the RF” and “desecrates” the flag of the RF. Due to the minor age of the child, administrative liability was imposed on the mother, aged 38, under Art. 5.35 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the RF (“failure by

⁷⁷ <https://t.me/cremeasmersh/71>, archive: <https://archive.ph/xQzWl>

⁷⁸ <https://t.me/cremeasmersh/71>, archive: <https://archive.ph/xQzWl>

⁷⁹ Crimean SMERSH refers to a pro-Russian Telegram propaganda channel named after the Stalin-era counterintelligence agency SMERSH.

parents or other legal guardians of minors to fulfil obligations regarding the maintenance and upbringing of minors”).⁸⁰

In the fight against extremism in the RF, one of the key tools is the Rosfinmonitoring register⁸¹ — a list of individuals and legal entities “for whom there is information” suggesting involvement in extremist or terrorist activities. The grounds for including a person in the list may be:

- being under investigation or charged under articles on extremism and terrorism (in particular Articles 282.1, 205.2, 280.2, 280.3, 280.4, 282.4 of the Criminal Code of the RF);
- a guilty verdict of a court under articles on extremism and terrorism;
- legal entities recognised as “extremist” or “terrorist” organisations;

as well as

- verdicts delivered on the grounds of “political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred”, including cases involving so-called “fakes” about the army or “discrediting the Armed Forces of the RF” (from 1 June 2025 onwards).

Inclusion in the register does not require a court ruling – investigative data alone are sufficient. In practice, a person may be added by order of an investigator or by decision of the Federal Security Service even before trial, on the basis of a case initiated under an “extremism” article, including in situations involving a post or comment on social media. Those entered in the register are subject, in particular, to financial restrictions, such as the freezing of bank accounts and limitations on financial transactions.

As of 15 August 2025, the “List of Terrorists and Extremists” included 12 individuals from the TOT of Ukraine and government-controlled areas of Ukraine, aged 15–18 (born between 2007 and 2010).⁸²

1. Kurasov Heorhii Ihorovych*, born 02.01.2007, Donetsk, Donetsk Region, Ukraine
2. Alekperov Aslan Ilham oghly*, born 22.12.2007, Luhansk, Luhansk Region, Ukraine
3. Semanikin Ruslan Viacheslavovych*, born 23.07.2008, Simeiz, Yalta, Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine
4. Makarets Yevhen Viktorovych*, born 25.05.2008, Tsyurupynsk, Tsyurupynsk District, Kherson Region, Ukraine
5. Bulatov Valerii Vitaliiiovych*, born 29.04.2008, Mariupol, Donetsk Region, Ukraine
6. Lunkov Ivan Andriiovych*, born 27.04.2009, Makiivka, Donetsk Region, Ukraine
7. Korchemkin Timur Pavlovich*, born 26.06.2010, Odesa, Odesa Region, Ukraine.
8. Tsyganok Valentyn Kostiantynovych, born 15.01.2008, Donetsk, Donetsk Region, Ukraine.
9. Knysh Serhii Oleksandrovyh, born 06.01.2007, Chaplynka, Chaplynka District, Kherson Region, Ukraine.
10. Edemov Selim Dlaverovych, born 09.03.2007, Simferopol, Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine.

⁸⁰ <https://t.me/mvdCrimea82/18325>, archive: <https://archive.ph/U222A>

⁸¹ <https://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terr-list>, archive: <https://archive.fo/wip/TkAhR>

⁸² As of 15.08.2025. <https://www.fedsfm.ru/documents/terrorists-catalog-portal-act>, archive: <https://archive.ph/3yB7L>



11. Karpov Illia Serhiiiovych, born 08.08.2008, Chaplynka, Chaplynka District, Kherson Region, Ukraine.
12. Popov Artem Yevheniiiovych, born 19.04.2008, Sverdlovsk, Luhansk Region, Ukraine.

Particular concern is caused by the targeted use of the register against minors. The grounds for their inclusion require further research and analysis.

The systematic practice of the RF in persecuting civilians, including minors, indicates political motivation and the absence of legal safeguards for residents of the TOT. The use of mechanisms such as the Rosfinmonitoring register reinforces the systemic nature of this approach.

IV.

CONSEQUENCES OF COUNTERING EXTREMISM IN THE RF FOR CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE TOT





4.1. Long-term Impact on Ukraine.

Countering extremism in the RF through measures targeting children and young people in the TOT of Ukraine has a direct impact on the formation of national identity, and consequently on Ukraine's strategic interests. The key aspects include:

1. Imposition of Russian identity

Counter-extremism measures in the RF are closely intertwined with patriotic and educational activities, the aim of which is the "formation of Russian civic identity". Through schools, youth organisations and large-scale patriotic events (gamified lessons, forums, themed lectures), children in the TOT are systematically integrated into the Russian cultural and historical context.

2. Discrediting Ukrainian identity

Through curricula and educational programmes, as well as through counter-extremism measures, children are introduced to negative narratives about Ukrainian nationalism, the "glorification of fascism" in Ukraine's history, and the "radical manifestations" of Ukrainian statehood. This produces cognitive dissonance that weakens children's identification with Ukraine and, as a result, contributes to the severing of ties with the country.

3. Psychological and social effect

A system of stereotypes and prejudices about the Ukrainian state, its culture and its citizens is gradually being formed. Trust in Ukrainian institutions and values is eroded, which complicates future reintegration. Coercive measures, including administrative penalties and forced public apologies, create an atmosphere of fear. Every child and young person is subjected to this atmosphere without exception.

Given the conditions of life in the TOT, children and young people require a comprehensive reintegration process into a democratic environment – either after relocating to Ukrainian-controlled territory or following the de-occupation of these areas – as well as the removal of the ideological influence imposed by the RF regarding Ukraine."

It should also be taken into account that some children continue to seek ways of maintaining connections with Ukraine under occupation, despite security risks.

Ukraine is forced to take into account the risk of a generation forming with a dual or distorted national identity, which could become a source of domestic political and cultural tension. Since human potential forms the foundation of the national idea, such processes pose the threat of losing an entire generation.

In conclusion, the Russian policy of "countering extremism" in the TOT not only affects the behaviour of children but also systematically reshapes their national consciousness towards the Russian narrative, creating strategic risks for Ukraine in the spheres of national security and cultural identity. This, in turn, requires the state of Ukraine to develop systemic measures of support and diversified pathways to Ukrainian education

4.2. International Legal Qualification of the Actions of the RF against Ukrainian Children and Young People

The involvement of law enforcement in so-called “counter-extremism” measures within the education system – including the use of punitive actions against children and young people deemed part of “at-risk groups” (such as coercing them into making public apologies), monitoring their social media activity by teachers, controlling the information environment, and centrally embedding political narratives into educational content, **points to a deliberate strategy of pressure on children and young people in the TOT of Ukraine.**

Although children and young people are protected under a wide range of international human rights treaties and international humanitarian law, including norms regulating the conduct of occupying authorities, **such practices may be qualified as potential violations of international law.**

Particularly concerning are the statements and documents issued by the RF that declare a “special focus” on children and young people from the so-called “new subjects of the RF”. In practice, this amounts to the ethnic and political labelling of part of the population, followed by attempts to shape their identity, views and allegiance through methods prohibited under international law.

The policy of forcibly “educating loyalty” by exerting pressure on children and young people under the pretext of “countering extremism” may be regarded as the persecution of specific population groups (in particular, on political, national, ethnic, cultural or other grounds) within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Such actions may fall under the classification of crimes against humanity, including Article 7(h) of the Statute, which covers the persecution of any identifiable group on the grounds listed above, in conjunction with other acts within the Court’s jurisdiction. In addition, violations of the human dignity of children, coercion into demonstrative obedience, psychological pressure and systematic ideological indoctrination – particularly in relation to children from the “new subjects of the RF” who previously lived in Ukraine-controlled territories or were displaced (including forcibly displaced) – may constitute breaches of international humanitarian law, as well as acts under Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute, which encompasses inhumane acts involving humiliation, discrimination and intimidation.

In addition, the introduction of centralised propaganda programmes under the pretext of countering extremism in educational institutions in the TOT, which simultaneously undermine Ukrainian cultural and national identity, directly contradicts:

- **The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child**⁸³ (Articles 28–29), according to which every child has the right to education, which states must provide on the basis of respect for the child’s human dignity; fostering respect for human rights, as well as the child’s cultural identity, language and values, including those of their country of origin.
- **The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights**⁸⁴ (Articles 18 and 19), which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and the right to hold one’s opinions without interference. The latter includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers. The violent imposition of

83 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child>

84 <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>



political or ideological doctrines, restrictions on access to alternative information, as well as the blocking of Ukrainian-language content or the criminalisation of Ukrainian cultural identity within the educational process, may be regarded as forms of violation of these fundamental freedoms.

The actions of the RF should be subject both to international monitoring, including official reports on the state of compliance with international instruments, and to legal assessment by the relevant international mechanisms, including the International Criminal Court, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, as well as the Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council.

The RF potentially violates international counter-terrorism standards, in particular through the misuse of the term “extremism”. While counter-terrorism is strictly regulated at the international level — through the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,⁸⁵ the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,⁸⁶ the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,⁸⁷ and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1373 of 28 September 2001,⁸⁸ among others — the concept of “extremism” does not have a unified legal definition at the international level, and, accordingly, there are no universally recognised benchmarks regarding the means and limits of countering this phenomenon.

At the same time, given that extremism in many national contexts is interpreted as a potential precondition for committing terrorist acts (for example, in the United Kingdom the term “extremism” has been further specified⁸⁹), measures to counter extremism should be subject to international counter-terrorism standards. This means that such measures must:

- comply with the principle of legality;
- be necessary and proportionate;
- not violate fundamental human rights;
- not be used for political pressure, discrimination or the suppression of those holding different views.

The RF’s incorporation of the term “extremism” into its national legislation and the implementation of related countermeasures systematically breaches both general principles of international law and specific international counter-terrorism standards:

- **In the RF, the concept of “extremism”** undermines legal certainty, as it is vague and applied arbitrarily. It is used, among other things, in cases of criticism of the authorities, support for opposition political movements, actions linked to Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, Chechen and other “disloyal” identities, religious activities of certain denominations, or activity on social media (likes, reposts, posts), without clear criteria, which creates scope for abuse.
- **Counter-extremism measures are often excessive and lack justification based on necessity.** The restriction of freedom of expression through school student social

85 <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy>

86 <https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-11.pdf>

87 <https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-15.pdf>

88 <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1373>

89 “Extremism is the promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred or intolerance, that aims to: negate or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of others; or undermine, overturn or replace the UK’s system of liberal parliamentary democracy and democratic rights; or intentionally create a permissive environment for others to achieve the results in (1) or (2).”

This definition is narrower and more precise than the previous one, which was part of the Prevent Strategy (2011).

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-strengthens-approach-to-counter-extremism>



media monitoring and coercive involvement in ideological activities within the education system are just some of the examples.

As a result, alongside the direct impact on specific individuals, there is a gradual discrediting of the international counter-terrorism system, since the RF uses counter-extremism measures for repression, assimilation and propaganda. At the same time, this “blurred” application underscores the need to establish clearer criteria at the international level:

Ideological control over children and young people from the TOT through counter-extremism measures is carried out within a rigid top-down structure. Numerous RF documents indicate that those responsible for “shaping within Russian society – particularly among young people – a firm civic stance regarding the crimes committed by Ukrainian nationalists, neo-Nazis, and their accomplices; preparing and disseminating thematic materials that, using specific examples, expose the criminal nature of terrorism and refute the arguments and facts used to justify it” include the following actors:

- **At the federal level,** these are the Ministry of Culture of Russia and the Ministry of Digital Development of Russia, with Federal Agency for Youth Affairs Rosmolodyozh involved in the dissemination of materials through forum campaigns.
- **At the regional level,** these are the executive bodies of the subjects of the RF responsible for culture, the press and mass communications.
- **In the field of education,** responsibility lies with the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the RF, the Ministry of Education of the RF, regional and local education departments, as well as pre-school, general, supplementary and vocational education institutions, special educational institutions of both open and closed type, and institutions for orphans and children deprived of parental care.⁹⁰

It is also noted that “the subjects of prevention in the field of countering extremism, including neo-Nazism, are all state and public institutions involved in the nationwide system of countering terrorism and extremism. Their composition varies depending on the age and status characteristics of the object of prevention — adults, minors, school students or university students, working youth and so on. To specify the object of prevention, geographical and situational limitations are applied. Some of the subjects of prevention are defined in federal laws, while others are determined in strategic planning documents adopted at the state level. The organisations, agencies and social institutions that form part of the nationwide system of countering terrorism, extremism, including neo-Nazism, can be conditionally divided into three levels: federal authorities, whose activities are coordinated by the National Anti-Terrorism Committee, the Federal Operational Headquarters and the Security Council of the RF within their respective competences”.⁹¹

A clear structure, extending from policymakers at the federal level to implementers in educational and child development institutions, can be used to demonstrate the systemic nature of the criminal activity and to establish the individual responsibility of those involved in the commission of international crimes, including crimes against humanity. This requires further research to determine the specific contours of this structure.

90 In the original, the text appears in Russian.

91 Quotation from the Znanie Society's course “Prevention of Neo-Nazi Ideology among Children and Young People”. <https://akademiya.znanierussia.ru/course/profilaktika-ideologii-neonacizma-sredi-detej-i-molodezhi?ysclid=m43yr90etz554769849>, archive: <https://archive.ph/iUV40>



CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **The RF's legislative framework in the field of countering extremism is extremely broad and allows for arbitrary interpretation of concepts.**

The category of “extremism” has been deliberately expanded for ideological purposes, covering not only genuine acts of violence but also expressions of dissent or criticism of the authorities and the RF Armed Forces. Such conceptual distortion enables countering “extremism” to serve as a tool of repression.

2. **Ukraine is one of the main targets within the system of countering and preventing extremism.**

Ukraine, in the Russian concept, is portrayed as a source of radical nationalism, a stronghold of neo-Nazism, an example of a falsifier of historical memory, and a state with an official policy of Russophobia. These narratives are used to legitimise aggression, intensify repression within the RF and through the occupation administrations in the TOT of Ukraine, and to justify the so-called “SMO”. In addition, within the framework of the concept of combating extremism, the RF seeks to present Ukraine as an artificially created anti-Russian state that “threatens the Russian world”. This allows the Kremlin to justify aggressive actions and policies towards Ukraine, while creating the image of an external threat that fuels Russophobic sentiments.

3. **The RF systematically implements legal and strategic instruments of countering extremism in the TOT of Ukraine. Education and youth policy are key areas of this counteraction, which at the same time serve to shape an “all-Russian identity”.**

Through the introduction of federal strategies at the regional level and, subsequently, at the level of educational and research institutions, the RF fosters loyalty among children and young people to the Russian state and hostility towards Ukraine, its national ideas and Ukrainian identity.

4. **The RF's policy on countering extremism in the TOT covers all levels of the educational process and its participants, from students to educators and parents, with the aim of fostering ideological loyalty to the state doctrine of the RF.**

The existing vertical system for implementing preventive measures in educational institutions demonstrates a coordinated RF policy, in which countering extremism is used as yet another tool to transform education into an instrument of ideological influence. The widespread use of socio-psychological surveillance through preventive measures and the monitoring of social networks creates an atmosphere of total control, which may lead to self-censorship and psychological pressure.

5. **The use of “countering extremism” as a tool for suppressing Ukrainian identity leads to the persecution of pro-Ukrainian views among young people**

The RF systematically uses legislative instruments of “countering extremism” as a tool of repression against Ukrainian identity, particularly in the TOT. Children, young people, teachers, and parents who demonstrate a pro-Ukrainian stance are placed under scrutiny, whether through their statements, the preservation of symbols, or even certain contacts, including with relatives. Fines, public apologies, inclusion in “extremist” registers, and the compulsory psychiatric treatment of minors form part of a systemic practice that clearly reflects politically motivated persecution without legal safeguards.



6. **Russian “counter-extremism” measures in the TOT of Ukraine pose a systemic threat to the preservation of Ukrainian national identity among children and young people**

The RF’s instrumentalisation of the educational process and so-called “counter-extremism” activities serves not only to control behaviour but also to reshape the consciousness of the younger generation in line with Russian narratives. This is reflected in the imposition of a Russian identity, the discrediting of Ukrainian symbols and history, and the cultivation of an atmosphere of fear and submission. The result is the formation of distorted or dual identities, which in the long term undermines reintegration efforts and threatens the unity of Ukrainian society.

7. **The actions of the RF towards children and young people in the TOT must be subject to international legal assessment.**

The policy of ideological pressure, including coercion into demonstrative loyalty, the imposition of censorship, ethnic labelling, and the use of the term “extremism” as a tool of repression, violates key international legal norms. The involvement of state institutions at various levels in this policy indicates its systemic nature, which makes it possible to speak of the potential commission of crimes against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute. These actions must be the subject of investigation by international mechanisms, primarily the International Criminal Court, and the subject of consideration by UN institutions.

Therefore, the following is recommended:

1. **The state authorities of Ukraine and international institutions** should ensure the systematic documentation of cases of coercion, ideological pressure, and interference in the personal space of educators and children, including within the framework of the RF’s “counter-extremism” measures, as evidence of human rights violations. These materials should be used as evidence for future international judicial proceedings, human rights reports, advocacy campaigns, and related processes.
2. **International institutions and foreign governments** should support the imposition of sanctions and other measures against those responsible for initiatives targeting children and young people from the temporarily occupied territories with the aim of eradicating their Ukrainian identity.
3. **The state authorities of Ukraine and international partners** should intensify further efforts to ensure the international legal protection of children. The practices employed by the RF under the guise of countering extremism against children and young people from the TOT must be recognised as potentially constituting crimes against humanity, and political pressure should be exerted on the aggressor. In addition, international standards in the field of countering extremism should be reviewed by the international community.
4. **The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine** should approve a comprehensive strategy for supporting and preserving the Ukrainian identity of children and young people in the TOT. The implementation of such a strategy should ensure, inter alia, access to Ukrainian education, cultural initiatives and information support for Ukrainian families in the TOT, as well as assistance after return to government-controlled territory, in order to strengthen their ties with Ukraine and provide the necessary support.

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