

## Analytical Report:

# THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S POLICY ON THE ERADICATION OF CHILDREN'S IDENTITY IN THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF UKRAINE: 2024 OVERVIEW



**Analytical Report:  
“The Russian Federation’s Policy on the Eradication of Children’s Identity  
in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine: 2024 Overview”**

Author: Anastasiia Vorobiova

Monitoring: Olha Shapoval

Translation: Olga Androsova

Layout and design: Olena Afanasieva

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The Centre for Civic Education “Almenda” (CCE “Almenda”) is a non-governmental organisation registered in Yalta in 2011. Until 2014, the organisation’s priority area of activity was human rights education. In 2014, due to the occupation of Crimea, the organisation was forced to move to Kyiv. Currently, the organisation’s priority is to ensure the systematic collection of accurate, timely, verified data on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict.

In preparing its reports, the CCE “Almenda” is guided by the principles of objectivity, reliability and timeliness.

Read more about the Centre for Civic Education “Almenda”: <http://almenda.org>

E-mail for comments and suggestions: [info@almenda.org](mailto:info@almenda.org)

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# List of abbreviations

- AR of Crimea** – Autonomous Republic of Crimea
- EU** – European Union
- OSCE** – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
- PACE** – Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
- RF** – Russian Federation
- so-called “SMO”** – so-called “Special Military Operation”<sup>1</sup>
- TOT** – Temporarily Occupied Territories
- UAVs** – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
- UK** – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- UN** – United Nations
- USA** – United States of America

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1 The RF calls the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, by this name.

# Introduction

Since the beginning of its armed aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the Russian Federation has implemented a system aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian identity of children and youth in the territories it has occupied. This system, which can be conditionally referred to as the “Crimean Scenario”, was developed and enforced in the occupied territories of the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. It consists of three key components: russification, indoctrination, and militarisation. Russification is designed to systematically eliminate the Ukrainian studies component from education and to push the Ukrainian language out of public use. Indoctrination seeks to impose a Russian civic identity. Militarisation involves the promotion of a war-centric culture and the cultivation of motivation to serve in the armed forces of the RF.<sup>2</sup>

Since 24 February 2022, Russia has controlled approximately 20% of Ukraine's territory,<sup>3</sup> including the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions. Since 30 September 2022, following the unlawful “incorporation” of these territories into Russia, Russian federal legislation has been extended not only to occupied Crimea but also to all other territories under Russian occupation.<sup>4</sup> As of January 2025, at the time of writing this report, the “Crimean Scenario” is being systematically implemented in the territories occupied by Russia after 24 February 2022.<sup>5</sup> The implementation of this plan is confirmed by high-ranking Russian officials. In early 2024, Russian Minister of Education Sergey Kravtsov reported that “active work is underway to support educational institutions” in the so-called “new regions” and that the “full integration” of these territories into the Russian education system is planned within two years.<sup>6</sup>

Russia implements the “Crimean Scenario” through formal education, non-formal education, youth and children's movements, and an extensive network of camps. Those responsible for its implementation include federal authorities of the RF, including the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Sport, the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, occupation authorities in the TOT of Ukraine, local self-government bodies, educational institutions, cultural, artistic, cinematographic, and sports institutions, recreation facilities (including camps), educational and scientific organisations, youth and children's organisations, veterans' organisations of the armed forces of the RF, public organisations, and traditional religious denominations.

The aim of this study is to systematise the information collected by the CCE “Almenda” for 2024, identify the dynamics in comparison with the statistical data available for 2023 and 2022, and to identify the main trends in Russia's actions regarding the russification, militarisation, and indoctrination of Ukrainian children and youth.

The report also provides information on the reaction of the international community and offers recommendations for further action.

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2 Diagram “[The Russian System for the Eradication of Children's Identity in the TOT](#)”

3 <https://www.holosameryky.com/a/zakhoplennia-vuhledara-reaktsiyi/7807494.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/wmlWZ>

4 The UN General Assembly adopted a [resolution](#) condemning Russia's “illegal so-called referendums” in regions within Ukraine's internationally recognised borders and demanding that it immediately reverse its attempted annexation.

5 For more details, see the reports by the CCE “Almenda” “[The Crimean Scenario](#)” and “[The Crimean Scenario 2.0.](#)”

6 <https://edu.gov.ru/press/8036/integraciyu-novyh-regionov-v-rossiyskuyu-sistemu-obrazovaniya-planiruet-sya-osuschestvit-v-techenie-dvuh-let/>, archive <https://archive.ph/admR1>



## Methodology

The areas of study include Russia's policy in the occupied territories of Ukraine, aimed at russification, indoctrination, and militarisation of children and youth; their involvement in actions supporting Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine; the eradication of Ukrainian identity; and the assimilation of the population in the occupied territories. The information presented in the report is considered with the aim of documenting the crimes of the Russian Federation and countering the disinformation it spreads.

The report includes information from the following sections: an overview of statistical data for 2024 compared to the data for 2023 and 2022; a review of the main changes in Russian federal legislation in 2024 and key trends regarding Russia's measures for russification, militarisation, and indoctrination of Ukrainian children in the TOT. The third section is dedicated to an overview of the coverage of the eradication of Ukrainian children's identity in the TOT in reports from international organisations.

## Legal Framework

The actions documented during the monitoring period, carried out by the RF in the TOT either directly or through the occupation authorities under its control, constitute violations of at least:

- Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which establishes that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Education shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups.
- Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which also addresses the issue of education;
- Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which stipulates that any propaganda of war shall be prohibited by law;
- Article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that a child's education should be directed towards preparing them for a responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of men and women, and friendship among all nations, ethnic, national, and religious groups, as well as indigenous peoples;
- Articles 38 and 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which concern the protection of children in armed conflict;
- Article 50 of the Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), which prohibits the occupying power from, among other things, enlisting children in formations or organizations subordinate to it;
- Article 51 of the Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), which stipulates that the occupying power may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted.

## Sources of Information

The analysis is based on information gained from:

- State authorities of Ukraine;
- Reports from civil society organizations;
- Open sources from temporarily occupied territories;
- Russian sources;
- Publications from local media in the temporarily occupied parts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and Sevastopol;
- Information published on social media.

In this study, the authors relied solely on the sources that were available to them. The report also incorporated data found on the social network “VKontakte” as well as Russian sources. This is due to the fact that after the full-scale invasion of the RF into Ukraine, most of the information from the occupation authorities has been published on this social network, making it currently the only viable source for obtaining the necessary information.


# Statistical Data


## General Information

Due to limited access to the occupied territories, the statistical information is taken from open sources and statistical data from the RF and the occupation administrations. It is accurate as of the date of writing the report (January-February 2025), and the actual numbers may differ.<sup>7</sup>

As of October 2024, approximately

**1,600,000**<sup>8</sup> children aged 0 to 18 years live in the occupied territories of Ukraine.





TOT of Luhansk region  **310 227**<sup>9</sup>  
 > 100 000<sup>10</sup>

TOT of Donetsk region  **462 476**<sup>11</sup>  
 147 000<sup>12</sup>

TOT of Zaporizhzhia region  **184 479**<sup>13</sup>  
 > 41 000<sup>14</sup>


TOT of Kherson region  **149 823**<sup>15</sup>  
 ~ 20 000<sup>16</sup>

TOT of the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol  **500 060**  
 282 900

**AR of Crimea 395 241**<sup>17</sup>  
**Sevastopol 104 819**<sup>18</sup>

**AR of Crimea 229 900**<sup>19</sup>  
**Sevastopol > 53 000**<sup>20</sup>

 мешкає дітей

 children are studying in schools

At least 590,900 children are studying in schools in the occupied territories, which have been fully transitioned to Russian standards:

7 More information on the statistical data regarding TOT is available in the report „[Crimean Scenario 2.0: How Russian Federation Eradicates Ukrainian Identity of Children on the Occupied Territories](#)”

8 Due to limited access to the occupied territories, the statistical information is taken from open sources and statistical data from the Russian Federation. The actual number of children may differ.

9 <https://bdex.ru/naselenie/luganskaya-narodnaya-respublika/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/E0KvH>

10 <https://edu.ru/news/regiony/bolee-100-tysyach-detey-poydut-v-shkoly-luganskoy-/?ysclid=m4wg-t2r46164970736>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/kVBz9>

11 <https://vk.com/@-224569566-rabota-nad-strategiei-razvitiya-promyshlennosti-dnr>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/Sgpru>

12 [https://t.me/minobrnauki\\_dnr/16201](https://t.me/minobrnauki_dnr/16201), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/rIOU2>

13 <https://bdex.ru/naselenie/zaporozhskaya-oblast/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/NMcPF>

14 <https://t.me/BalitskyEV/3814>, archive: <https://archive.ph/Tjmwn>

15 <https://bdex.ru/naselenie/hersonskaya-oblast/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/6x619>

16 <https://t.me/depobrherson/8842>, archive: <https://archive.ph/a8f3a>

17 <https://rosstat.gov.ru/compendium/document/13284>, archive: <https://archive.ph/ySfij>

18 <https://rosstat.gov.ru/compendium/document/13284>, archive: <https://archive.ph/ySfij>

19 <https://monm.rk.gov.ru/structure/3748b454-d262-48b3-b605-85cf93fadbbc>, archive: <https://archive.ph/vWZkl>

20 [https://vk.com/wall-177557250\\_27298](https://vk.com/wall-177557250_27298), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/UDn9P>





According to the data from the occupation authorities of the AR of Crimea, only 197 children are studying in Ukrainian.

2013/2014 academic year (TOT of the AR of Crimea):	2024/2025 academic year (TOT of the AR of Crimea):
<p><b>7</b> schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction</p>	<p><b>1</b> school with Ukrainian as the language of instruction (Grades 1–9)</p>
<p><b>76</b> schools with both Ukrainian and Russian as languages of instruction</p>	<p><b>164</b> pupils with Ukrainian as the language of instruction</p>
<p><b>829</b> classes with Ukrainian as the language of instruction</p>	
<p><b>12 694</b> pupils in schools and classes with Ukrainian as the language of instruction</p>	

On the TOT of the AR of Crimea, only one school operates with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. However, according to monitoring data, even in this school, de facto, education in Ukrainian is not taking place.<sup>21</sup> In July 2024, the occupation authorities announced the closure of two “pro-Ukrainian Islamic schools” in the temporarily occupied city of Simferopol.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, in practice, the entire educational process (including primary, secondary, and higher education) on the occupied peninsula is conducted exclusively in Russian.

As of the time the report was prepared, the organizations have been unable to find information on the dynamics of access to education in Ukrainian in the TOT of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Kherson regions. However, it should be noted that since 2022, education in these territories has been transitioned to Russian standards, with Russian as the language of instruction. According to reports from the human rights organization Human Rights Watch, on 12 August 2022, the Ministry of Education of the RF stated that education in the TOT of Ukraine would be conducted exclusively in Russian, and schools outside of the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions would be allowed to teach Ukrainian only as a “native” language or as an “elective” subject for a few hours per week. In early September 2022, the de facto authorities of the TOT of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions formally allowed teaching Ukrainian in schools for no more than three hours per week.<sup>23</sup> The Ministry of Education of the RF also reported that during the 2023-2024 academic year, Ukrainian was taught as a mandatory subject only in the TOT of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions within the framework of the subject “Native Language and Reading Literature in Native Language” (2 hours per week in grades 1-3, and 1 hour per week in grade 4).<sup>24</sup>

21 <https://www.facebook.com/CCE.Almenda/posts/pfbid033aR2H9DKWFJwZkXC9oqWNzUKLmuBo3FoLZ2bv8n-32So742it5EbESLUpV4yYtfyal>

22 [https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/21271853?utm\\_source=yxnews&utm\\_medium=desktop](https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/21271853?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop), archive: <https://archive.ph/I787a>

23 <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/06/20/education-under-occupation/forced-russification-school-system-occupied-ukrainian>

24 <https://rtvi.com/news/minprosveshheniya-v-etom-uchebnom-godu-ukrainskij-yazyk-prepodavalsya-v-bashkortostane-i-eshhe-pyati-regionah-rossii/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/XvOUV>

The occupation administrations provide contradictory data regarding the study of the Ukrainian language in the TOT. For example, a representative of the occupation authorities in Zaporizhzhia region reported that in 2024, the number of pupils in the TOT of Zaporizhzhia region allegedly studying Ukrainian decreased by more than half compared to the 2023 academic year, from 18,182 to 7,984 (only 20% of the total number of pupils in the region).<sup>25</sup> The occupation authorities of Kherson region did not provide statistical data, but instead stated that “there is a trend of significant reduction in the number of children choosing to study Ukrainian”.<sup>26</sup> According to the so-called “Governor” of Kherson region, V. Saldo, the study of Ukrainian language is only available for pupils in grades 1-4 in 44 schools, while more than 100 schools operate in the occupied region. In upper and middle grades, Ukrainian is not taught at all.<sup>27</sup>

It is worth noting that the study of the Ukrainian language, even in such a limited format, is formally possible only after parents submit the relevant applications, which does not always happen due to security concerns.<sup>28</sup> Meanwhile, the CCE “Almenda” is well aware of the pressure on parents from the occupation authorities to submit a formal refusal to study the Ukrainian language.

## Cadet Classes

The cadet movement is one of the tools used by the RF to influence the consciousness of children and youth. In the TOT of Ukraine, Russia uses cadet classes for militarization, indoctrination, and the promotion of military service in the Russian Armed Forces. The education of pupils in cadet classes includes intensified physical training, studying special military subjects, and adhering to discipline in the classroom, similar to military service.<sup>29</sup> As of the end of 2024, according to the occupation authorities, there were 260 cadet classes and 16 Cossack classes operating in the temporarily occupied territory of the AR of Crimea, with 6,265 children enrolled.<sup>30</sup> In the temporarily occupied city of Sevastopol, as of the 2023/2024 academic year, at least 9 schools with cadet training were operating, with at least 1,220 children attending.<sup>31</sup>

On other TOT, the de facto authorities provide the following data regarding the functioning of cadet classes:

- TOT of Kherson region – 9 classes<sup>32</sup>
- TOT of Zaporizhzhia region – 13 classes<sup>33</sup>
- TOT of Luhansk region – 86 classes<sup>34</sup>
- TOT of Donetsk region – unknown.

25 <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21953463>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/2pMJr>

26 <https://runews24.ru/kherson/23/08/2024/v-shkolax-xersonshhinyi-sokratilos-chislo-zhelayushhix-izuchat-ukrain-skij-yazyi>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/gpAKr>

27 <https://aif.ru/society/saldo-v-hersonskoy-oblasti-snizhaetsya-interes-k-izucheniyu-ukrainskogo-yazyka>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/1jX4e>

28 <https://analytics.kittysoloma.org/pdf/%D0%91%D1%96%D0%BB%D0%B0%20%D0%BA%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%B0.pdf>

29 More details on the cadet movement can be found in the report by the CCE “Almenda”: “[How the war is produced: childhood spent in the cadet classes in the TOT of the AR Crimea and the city of Sevastopol](#)”.

30 <https://monm.rk.gov.ru/structure/a98ae330-6d53-4d32-ad5c-df3bfe1d20c5>, archive: <https://archive.ph/4Lqm7>

31 According to the calculations of the CCE “Almenda”, more details can be found in the report “[How the war is produced: childhood spent in the cadet classes in the TOT of the AR Crimea and the city of Sevastopol](#)”.

32 <https://vuz.edu.ru/news/regiony/v-shkolah-hersonskoy-oblasti-otkryto-devyat-kadets/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/jspNa>

33 <https://edu.gov.ru/press/9330/v-shkolah-vossoedinennyh-regionov-rabotayut-okolo-12-tys-profilnyh-klassov>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/Ly5Hy>; <https://edu.ru/news/regiony/v-zaporozhskoy-oblasti-v-profilnyh-klassah-obuchae/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/jspNa>

34 <https://edu.gov.ru/press/9330/v-shkolah-vossoedinennyh-regionov-rabotayut-okolo-12-tys-profilnyh-klassov>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/Ly5Hy>; <https://edu.ru/news/regiony/v-shkolah-lnr-otkryto-svyshe-520-profilnyh-klassov/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/Vd0o3>

Although as of the time the report was prepared no statistical data was found regarding the number of cadet classes in the TOT of Donetsk, Russian sources reported that in 2023, the first two cadet classes were opened in Zhadanivka, Donetsk region.<sup>35</sup> The occupation authorities of Mariupol also reported the opening of cadet classes in the occupied town under the patronage of Russian law enforcement and security agencies, including the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations.<sup>36</sup> As of December 2024, classes with a “Cossack component” were opened in Zhadanivka, Stepanivka, and Yenakiieve.<sup>37</sup> In total, by the end of 2024, the opening of 11 more cadet classes was planned in the TOT of Donetsk region.<sup>38</sup>

The Russian occupation authorities are also opening military-oriented educational institutions. In the occupied town of Mariupol, a branch of the Nakhimov Naval School (the main school is located in St. Petersburg) was opened, along with four other branches in Vladivostok, Murmansk, Kaliningrad, and occupied Sevastopol. Overall, starting from the 5<sup>th</sup> grade, children will be encouraged to join the Russian navy. 240 children<sup>39</sup> were planned to be enrolled in 2024 (with training planned for at least 560).<sup>40</sup>

In the occupied city of Donetsk, there is also a “School No. 4 - Cadet Corps,” where minors are being trained for military or other state service in the RF.<sup>41</sup>



35 <https://dzen.ru/a/Z1gPef-7MkTQaE0E>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/7uxEc>

36 [https://vk.com/wall-227749635\\_13](https://vk.com/wall-227749635_13), archive: <https://archive.fo/wip/1h4Mp>

37 <https://dzen.ru/a/Z1gPef-7MkTQaE0E>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/7uxEc>

38 <https://dzen.ru/a/Z1gPef-7MkTQaE0E>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/7uxEc>

39 <https://nvmu.mil.ru/About/Istoriya/Istoriya-Nahimovskogo-voenno-morskogo-uc/item/25918>,

archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/ZyOLz>

40 <https://pobedarf.ru/2024/09/02/mariupol-vospitaet-nahimovczev/?ysclid=m6w4c0lo4k448926343>,

archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/aTN5z>


41 [https://vk.com/rou\\_school4\\_city\\_of\\_donetsk?z=photo-132323859\\_457253953%2Fwall-132323859\\_4851](https://vk.com/rou_school4_city_of_donetsk?z=photo-132323859_457253953%2Fwall-132323859_4851),

archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/8slSm>

## Youth Policy

According to the analysis of Russian youth policy in the occupied territories conducted by the CCE "Almenda", it is aimed at eradicating Ukrainian identity and imposing Russian militarised patriotism. This is why expenditure on youth policy in Russia is rapidly increasing year by year, especially after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<sup>42</sup>

Expenditures on youth policy in the federal budget of the RF.  
( billion roubles)



The increase in funding for youth policy may be related to the Russian authorities' intention to raise the proportion of patriotic youth from 40 to 70 percent by 2030 through the promotion of "traditional moral values",<sup>43</sup> including by involving young people in patriotic mass youth associations and movements.

## Youth and Children's Movements


The development of children's and youth movements in Russia is one of the priority areas receiving significant funding. The new movement "Movement of the First" is described as "the foundation of a strong Russia", aiming to raise children in the spirit of collectivism and focus on achieving common goals.<sup>44</sup> On the occupied territories, the most active movements are:

42 For more details, refer to the analytical report: "[The Youth Policy of the Russian Federation as a Tool for Eradicating Identity in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine](#)"

43 <https://politika.sevastopol.su/news/v-rossii-hotjat-uvelichit-chislo-patrioticheskoy-molodjozhi/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/LljJT>.

44 More details can be found in the report "[Youth movements as the instrument of indoctrination and militarization in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine](#)"





### The Russian children and youth movement «Movement of the First»

is essentially an equivalent of the Soviet Pioneers and is the largest movement in both the RF and the TOT. As of 2024, the following data is available regarding the number of children involved:<sup>45</sup>

- **TOT of the AR of Crimea:** The movement started in January 2023, with over 13,000 children involved (as of March 2024).<sup>46</sup>
- **TOT of the city of Sevastopol:** The movement started in February 2023, with over 11,400 children involved (as of December 2024).<sup>47</sup>
- **TOT of Zaporizhzhia region:** The first branch opened in January 2023,<sup>48</sup> with 4,215 children involved within the year.<sup>49</sup> As of the end of 2024, the occupation authorities reported 16,000 participants in the movement (13,000 children and 3,000 mentors).<sup>50</sup>
- **TOT of Kherson region:** The first branches were opened in December 2022, with 2,000 children involved (as of May 2024).<sup>51</sup>
- **TOT of Donetsk region:** The first branch was opened in December 2022,<sup>52</sup> with over 18,000 children involved (as of December 2024).<sup>53</sup>
- **TOT of Luhansk region:** The first branch was opened in December 2022,<sup>54</sup> with over 60,000 children involved (as of December 2024).<sup>55</sup>



### The all-Russian children's and youth military-patriotic movement "Young Army" ("Yunarmiya")

organizes and regularly conducts militaristic events and games, including those with transferring children to the territory of the RF.

45 The data presented was identified as of the time the report was prepared, specifically January 2025.

46 <https://xn--90acagbhqca7c8c7f.xn--p1ai/news/655?ysclid=m4v84l2nwk358458779>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/VCTlw>

47 [https://vk.com/wall-101503754\\_25881](https://vk.com/wall-101503754_25881), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/C7riU>

48 <https://www.xn--c1acpgembb1l.xn--p1ai/tpost/z41boj8801-v-zaporozhskoi-oblasti-otkrilos-pervoe-p>, archive: <https://archive.ph/QGARq>

49 <https://www.arhcity.ru/data/115/16022024PR.pdf?ysclid=m10bshbzqa799329617>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/9ifAQ>

50 <https://t.me/vokostromina/4>, archive: <https://archive.fo/OtEx9>

51 <https://rutube.ru/video/fed47bfc270f39e37e03634d5f46b422/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/e0me9>

52 <https://pobedarf.ru/2022/12/30/pervaya-yachejka-novogo-molodezhnogo-dvizheniya-sozdana-v-dnr/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/te1Xc>

53 <https://denis-pushilin.ru/news/denis-pushilin-obsudil-s-aktivistami-dvizheniya-pervyh-planov-po-realizatsii-regionalnyh-proektov?ysclid=m70x87pdzc795372329>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/85ET2>

54 <https://lug-info.ru/news/rossijskoe-dvizhenie-detej-i-molodezhi-dvizhenie-pervyh-otkrylo-v-lnr-pervuyu-yachejku/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/yTxSE>

55 <https://t.me/myperielnr/10144>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/2FYTU>



The number of children involved (as of 2024):<sup>56</sup>

- **TOT of the AR of Crimea:** from 1,500 (2017)<sup>57</sup> increased to approximately 15,020 (as of November 2024)<sup>58</sup>
- **TOT of the city of Sevastopol:** from 40 (2016)<sup>59</sup> increased to over 17,000 (as of January 2025)<sup>60</sup>
- **TOT of Kherson region:** from 200 (2023)<sup>61</sup> increased to over 600 (as of February 2024)<sup>62</sup>
- **TOT of Zaporizhzhia region:** around 1,000 members, of which 300 are active participants (as of January 2025)<sup>63</sup>
- **TOT of Donetsk region:** from 77 (2019)<sup>64</sup> increased to over 5,000 (as of November 2024)<sup>65</sup>
- **TOT of Luhansk region:** from 100 (2019)<sup>66</sup> increased to over 6,000 (as of December 2024)<sup>67</sup>



### The "Eaglets of Russia"

programme was created in 2021 and aims to involve the youngest children (from 1<sup>st</sup> grade) in activities of a russification and militaristic nature. It is the first step for a child to transition into membership of the "Movement of the First" and "Young Army". As of 2024, flagship schools have been established across all TOT of Ukraine to implement the project, assisting educators in «effectively mastering the programme's methodology, communicating, and exchanging experiences».<sup>68</sup>

Number of children involved (as of 2024):<sup>69</sup>

- TOT of the AR of Crimea: more than 23,000 children involved over 3 years (as of November 2023).<sup>70</sup>

56 The data presented was identified as of the time the report was prepared, specifically January 2025.

57 <https://alushta24.org/blog/alushta/id-17549-yunarmiya-kruglyiy-stol-na-temu-razvitiye-yunarmii-v-munitsipal-nom-obrazovaniy-gorodskoy-okrug-alusht.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/RVn9u>

58 <https://gkmp.rk.gov.ru/structure/9bd500bf-caa3-4220-b187-2379acc5c373>, archive: <https://archive.ph/JxWaB>

59 <https://sevastopol-news.com/politics/2019/04/18/92073.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/CjZAQ>

60 [https://vk.com/wall-177557250\\_30123](https://vk.com/wall-177557250_30123), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/j3dVX>

61 [https://vk.com/wall-145460148\\_158561](https://vk.com/wall-145460148_158561), archive: <https://archive.ph/OQYg0>

62 [https://vk.com/wall-215245628\\_1367](https://vk.com/wall-215245628_1367), archive: <https://archive.ph/uKvCL>

63 [https://vk.com/wall-223755027\\_239](https://vk.com/wall-223755027_239), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/mEFEQ>

64 <https://dan-news.ru/defence/pervye-77-uchastnikov-dvizheniya-molodaya-gvardiya-yunarmiya-prisyagnu-li-na-vernost-narodu-dnr-v-donecke/?ysclid=m4v3rhxis977140271>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/cFmfu>

65 <https://www.mk-donbass.ru/social/2024/11/26/bolee-pyati-tysyach-zhiteley-dnr-voshli-v-sostav-yunarmii.html?ysclid=m4v4bb8qin863969007>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/wADNc>

66 <https://gorod-lugansk.com/2019/06/26/gorodskoy-shtab-yunarmii-v-2019-m-sformirovan-v-stolice.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/VjWou>

67 <https://lug-info.ru/news/okolo-shesti-tys-chelovek-sostojat-v-junarmii-v-lnr/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/J50w8>

68 [https://orlyatarussia.ru/o-programme/flagman-school/index.php?sphrase\\_id=141532](https://orlyatarussia.ru/o-programme/flagman-school/index.php?sphrase_id=141532), archive: <https://archive.fo/wip/IF9T7>

69 The data presented was identified as of the time the report was prepared, specifically January 2025.

70 <https://www.crimea.kp.ru/online/news/5560306/>, archive: <https://archive.fo/MJdUd>

- **TOT of the city of Sevastopol:** from 2,000 (2022)<sup>71</sup> increased to 15,000 (as of January 2025).<sup>72</sup>

Russian official sources indicate that as of January 2025, more than 50,000 children from the TOTs of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions, along with approximately 3,000 educators, are participating in the “Eaglets of Russia” programme.<sup>73</sup>

- **TOT of Zaporizhzhia region:** from 500 (2023)<sup>74</sup> increased to 7,329 (as of the end of 2024).<sup>75</sup>
- **TOT of Kherson region:** from 75 (2023)<sup>76</sup> increased to 5,722 (as of February 2024).<sup>77</sup>
- **TOT of Donetsk region:** over 18,000 (as of February 2024).<sup>78</sup>
- **TOT of Luhansk region:** appr. 20,000 (as of May 2024).<sup>79</sup>

## Camps and Recreation

Another large-scale tool for erasing identity is the Russia's practice of transferring children to the territory of the RF, supposedly for excursions or holidays, where they are in fact subjected to re-education in the spirit of Russian patriotism. One such tool is the operation of so-called “health camps”. During the summer campaign of 2024 alone, according to the occupation authorities, over 25,000 children from the TOT of Luhansk region<sup>80</sup> were taken to other regions of Russia under the pretext of recreation. Additionally, over 13,000 children from the TOT of Donetsk region,<sup>81</sup> appr. 3,000 from the TOT of Kherson region,<sup>82</sup> and over 6,000 from the TOT of Zaporizhzhia region<sup>83</sup> were affected. Furthermore, 174,000 children from the TOT of the AR of Crimea were also sent to so-called “recreation”, including in “labour and recreation” camps, where nearly 4,000 schoolchildren were assigned daily labour tasks by camp authorities, working from morning until 4 p.m. on landscaping, “volunteering” to assist the elderly, and other such activities.<sup>84</sup>

71 <https://nts-tv.com/news/boleee-dvukh-soten-sevastopolskikh-shkolnikov-stali-46281/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/WLVBA>

72 [https://vk.com/wall-177557250\\_30148](https://vk.com/wall-177557250_30148), archive: <https://archive.ph/8FfdC>

73 <https://www.edu.ru/news/regiony/v-vossoedinennyh-regionah-programma-orlyata-rossii/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/Zs8BI>

74 [https://t.me/mypervie\\_zp1442](https://t.me/mypervie_zp1442), archive: <https://archive.ph/qZnyg>

75 <https://t.me/obrzp/28170>, archive: <https://archive.ph/TTjOV>

76 <https://t.me/depobrherson/3199>, archive: <https://archive.ph/VZZhr>

77 <https://t.me/depobrherson/4504>, archive: <https://archive.fo/2o7Pb>

78 <https://dan-news.ru/obschestvo/k-proektu-orljata-rossii-v-dnr-prisoedinilis-svyshe-18-tys.-shkolnikov-mladshih/>, archive: [archive.ph/wip/fQSVE](https://archive.ph/wip/fQSVE)

79 <https://www.lugansk.kp.ru/daily/27610.5/4936641/?ysclid=m4wj4b9pmy349519880>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/e59ig>

80 <https://dzen.ru/a/ZugdEmOpGQxyr46r?ysclid=m16dcfqwb924256637>, archive: [archive.md/wip/ZJgNZ](https://archive.md/wip/ZJgNZ)

81 <https://dnr-online.ru/v-dnr-podveli-promezhutochnye-itogi-otdyha-i-ozdorovleniya-detej-v-2024-godu/>, archive: [archive.md/wip/xy3Xp](https://archive.md/wip/xy3Xp)

82 <https://surl.li/tdzps0>, archive: <https://archive.md/9uTP1>

83 <https://www.edu.ru/news/regiony/boleee-3-500-shkolnikov-iz-zaporozhskoy-oblasti-otd/>, archive: [archive.md/wip/k4Tib](https://archive.md/wip/k4Tib)

84 <https://crimea.mk.ru/social/2024/09/14/otdykhali-i-rabotali-kak-proveli-eto-letu-krymskie-deti.html?ysclid=m1b2aokji6716863557>, archive: [archive.md/wip/TF2jb](https://archive.md/wip/TF2jb)

Trips for Ukrainian children from the TOT to the RF are also organised under other programmes aimed at “career guidance and the formation of Russian identity”, such as “University Sessions”<sup>85</sup> or “Cultural Map 4+85”,<sup>86</sup> which is designed to integrate children from the TOT of Ukraine into a “unified Russian society”. As part of “University Sessions”, 10,611 children were transferred in 2022, 10,700 in 2023, and more than 12,000 in 2024.<sup>87</sup> Under “Cultural Map 4+85”,<sup>88</sup> more than 10,000 children visited Russia in 2023,<sup>89</sup> while in 2024, the number exceeded 20,000.<sup>90</sup>

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85 The program is detailed in the analytical report “[The “University Sessions” Program as The Instrument For The Destruction Of Ukrainian Identity And The Indoctrination Of Children And Youth From The Temporarily Occupied Territories](#)”

86 [https://culture.gov.ru/press/news/\\_kulturnaya\\_karta\\_4\\_85\\_startuet\\_vserossiyskaya\\_programma\\_kulturno\\_prosvetitel'skikh\\_marshrutov\\_dlya\\_sh/](https://culture.gov.ru/press/news/_kulturnaya_karta_4_85_startuet_vserossiyskaya_programma_kulturno_prosvetitel'skikh_marshrutov_dlya_sh/), archive: <https://archive.ph/sAaQw>.

87 [https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/molodezhnaya-politika/91838/?sphrase\\_id=8324831](https://minobrnauki.gov.ru/press-center/news/molodezhnaya-politika/91838/?sphrase_id=8324831), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/vfUn3>

88 [https://culture.gov.ru/press/news/\\_kulturnaya\\_karta\\_4\\_85\\_startuet\\_vserossiyskaya\\_programma\\_kulturno\\_prosvetitel'skikh\\_marshrutov\\_dlya\\_sh/](https://culture.gov.ru/press/news/_kulturnaya_karta_4_85_startuet_vserossiyskaya_programma_kulturno_prosvetitel'skikh_marshrutov_dlya_sh/), archive: <https://archive.ph/sAaQw>

89 [https://culture.gov.ru/press/news/bolee\\_10\\_tysyach\\_detey\\_iz\\_novykh\\_regionov\\_stali\\_uchastnikami\\_programmy\\_kulturnaya\\_karta\\_4\\_85\\_v\\_2023\\_/](https://culture.gov.ru/press/news/bolee_10_tysyach_detey_iz_novykh_regionov_stali_uchastnikami_programmy_kulturnaya_karta_4_85_v_2023_/), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/la3wg>

90 <https://lug-info.ru/news/bolee-20-tys.-detey-iz-donbassa-i-novorossii-pouchastvovali-v-proekte/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/sDVRQ>

# MAIN PART



# Major Changes in the RF Legislation

## The Law on Education and the Patriotic Upbringing as a Duty of Teachers

In 2024, a series of changes were introduced to the federal legislation of the RF, indicating a strengthening of the militarisation and indoctrination aspects in both formal and informal education. For example, in 2024, an amendment to the Russian federal law on education came into force, requiring teachers to carry out their activities “based on traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” and to “foster in pupils, through pedagogical activities, a sense of patriotism, respect for the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland and the feats of the Heroes of the Fatherland... [ ]... a careful attitude towards the cultural heritage and traditions of the multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation”.<sup>91</sup>

As of 1 September 2024, amendments to the law on education came into force, abolishing the requirement for parental consent to involve children in labour activities during the learning process. This means that teachers can engage children in activities such as sewing uniforms for Russian military personnel in the SMO zone or even assembling drones without parental consent, under the guise of the “labour-educational process”.<sup>92</sup> Additionally, from 1 September 2024, the subject “Technology” was renamed “Labour (Technology)” along with the introduction of a new federal curriculum. The content of the “Robotics” module for pupils in years 7, 8, and 9 was expanded to include the study of unmanned aerial systems, their design, programming, and piloting.<sup>93</sup> Thus, the new subject serves as yet another tool for the militarisation of children and their indirect involvement in supporting the war against Ukraine.

As of 1 September 2024, the subject “Fundamentals of Life Safety” was replaced with “Fundamentals of Security and Defence of the Homeland” for pupils in years 8 to 11. The transition is being implemented under Order No. 1028 of the Ministry of Education of the RF, aimed at strengthening military training within the school curriculum, fostering patriotism, and preparing future graduates for the defence of the Homeland (i.e., the Russian Federation).<sup>94</sup> The head of the Defence Committee of the Russian State Duma, Andrey Kartapolov, emphasised that changes to the subject were driven by the so-called “SMO” (in reality, Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine), and therefore, the new curriculum should “prepare children and grandchildren for the necessity of defending their country” (i.e., Russia).<sup>95</sup>

Under the updated requirements, pupils are obliged to:

- Be prepared to defend their Fatherland (i.e., Russia);

91 [https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_140174/82d348bfa91f54b262e7b00b71659c9f-5c69e2ad/](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_140174/82d348bfa91f54b262e7b00b71659c9f-5c69e2ad/), archive <https://archive.ph/wip/4iSS5>

92 <https://www.kp.ru/edu/shkola/trudovoe-vospitanie/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/KVwxT>

93 Methodological letter on the academic subject “Labour (Technology)” Regarding the change of the name and content of the subject “Labour (Technology)” <https://edsoo.ru/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/metodicheskoe-pismo-po-predmetu-trud-tehnologiya.pdf?ysclid=m69odo9p9u979092622>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/i25P6>

94 [https://yaychitel.ru/osnovy-bezopasnosti-i-zachity\\_rodiny#popup:infoblock3](https://yaychitel.ru/osnovy-bezopasnosti-i-zachity_rodiny#popup:infoblock3), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/zhZ9x>

95 <https://solncesvet.ru/blog/baza-znanij/osnovy-bezopasnosti-i-zashchity-rodiny/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/rG-DOK>



- Develop an anti-extremism and anti-terrorism mindset (it should be noted that loyalty to Ukraine is perceived in Russian discourse as a form of Extremism – more details on the new counter-extremism programme can be found in the “Changes in Strategic Documents” section);
- Understand Russia's place in the global context and the role of the RF Armed Forces in the country's defence, as well as study relevant military statutes;
- Acquire marching skills and learn the basics of tactical, firearms, and military medical training;
- Feel patriotism towards their country (i.e., Russia).<sup>96</sup>

The emphasis in the updated programme is placed specifically on militarism, and veterans of the so-called “SMO” are to be involved in its teaching. For example, in one of the schools in occupied Melitopol, the updated subject is being taught by a special forces officer from the regional department of the Russian Guard, with the call sign Sarmat.<sup>97</sup>



The teaching of “Fundamentals of Safety and Defence of the Homeland” in the temporarily occupied Berdyansk. Source photo: <https://t.me/bikbulatovfidail/1336>, archive: <https://archive.ph/T0Jra>

## Forced Passportisation

In 2024, there was also a recorded increase in pressure to impose Russian citizenship on residents of territories occupied by Russia. With the onset of the full-scale invasion, the Russian Federation made changes to its citizenship legislation, which affected the passportisation of Ukrainian children, simplifying the procedure for minors under 14, for whom applications for Russian citizenship can be submitted by their legal representatives.<sup>98</sup> In April 2023, the RF allowed not only parents but also guardians, caregivers, and heads of occupation administrations or institutions where these children are located (both in the temporarily occupied territories and in RF) to submit such applications.<sup>99</sup> Through passportisation, the Russian authorities are conduct-

<sup>96</sup> <https://solncesvet.ru/blog/baza-znanij/osnovy-bezopasnosti-i-zashhity-rodiny/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/rGD0k>

<sup>97</sup> <https://zonews.ru/news/povezlo-s-uchitelem.-osnovam-bezopasnosti-v-melitopolskoj-shkole-obuchit-boec/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/LLRD5>

<sup>98</sup> <https://zmina.info/news/navyazuvannya-gromadyanstva-ye-odniyeyu-zi-skladovyh-rosijskoyi-strategiyi-z-asymilyaciyi-ukrayinskyh-ditej-ekspertka/>

<sup>99</sup> <https://zmina.info/news/navyazuvannya-gromadyanstva-ye-odniyeyu-zi-skladovyh-rosijskoyi-strategiyi-z-asymilyaciyi-ukrayinskyh-ditej-ekspertka/>

ing a “legitimation” of the occupation and presenting the residents of the temporarily occupied territories as their own citizens.<sup>100</sup>

From 1 January 2025, residents of the TOT who do not have a Russian passport will be given the status of foreign nationals or stateless persons. They will be required to register with the migration authorities or obtain permission from the occupation authorities for temporary residence.<sup>101</sup> According to Ukrainian sources, the Russians are creating a “register of foreigners” who are in the country “illegally.” Once included in this register, Ukrainians will be banned from driving, using banking services, registering property, entering into or dissolving marriages, as well as enrolling children in preschool and educational institutions.<sup>102</sup>

By the end of 2024, Russia planned to issue passports to all residents of the TOT aged 14 and over.<sup>103</sup> In September 2024, the occupation authorities reported the issuance of at least 3.4 million Russian passports,<sup>104</sup> and in January 2025, Russian officials stated that the passportisation of the population in the temporarily occupied territories was “successfully completed”.<sup>105</sup> This rapid pace of passport issuance may be linked to Russia’s urgent need to increase its mobilisation reserve by recruiting young residents of the occupied territories. In the summer of 2024, the Russian State Duma passed a bill allowing for the revocation of citizenship if the “new” Russian citizens do not register for military service.<sup>106</sup> The new rule requires individuals to register at the military enlistment office within two weeks of receiving their Russian passport.<sup>107</sup> By autumn, Russian sources reported that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs had made a request to military commissariats for data on individuals who had acquired Russian citizenship but had not registered for military service.<sup>108</sup> These children are at risk not only of forced conscription into the Russian armed forces but also of being expelled from the TOT.

In 2024, public ceremonies for the issuance of Russian passports to Ukrainian children took place in all TOTs (Zaporizhzhia<sup>109, 110</sup> and Kherson regions,<sup>111, 112</sup> as well as AR of Crimea<sup>113</sup>) as part of the celebrations of “Russia Day”, “Cosmonautics Day”, and with the participation of high-ranking officials from the occupation authorities and representatives of youth movements, including the “Movement of the First”, who are co-organisers of these events. Through such “ceremonies”, the acquisition of citizenship of the occupying state is presented as a positive event. Moreover, the Russian occupation authorities are conducting forced passportisation of Ukrainian children who have been deprived of parental care and who remain in the occupation.<sup>114</sup>

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100 <https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/vorog-prodovzhuye-prymusovu-pasportyzatsiyu-naselennya-tot-ukrayiny/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/hqmnA>

101 <https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/novyj-status-dlya-osib-bez-rosijskogo-pasporta-kreml-zaprovadyt-na-tot-ukrayiny/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/QRDTb>

102 <https://detector.media/infospace/article/235763/2024-12-09-ukraintsi-v-okupatsii-berut-rosiyski-pasporty-z-riznykh-prychyn-yaki-pravookhorontsi-zyasovuvatymut-pislya-deokupatsii-igor-klymenko/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/RbzPw>

103 <https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/nasylnytska-rusyfikatsiya-na-tot-nabyraye-krytychnyh-obertiv/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/JAdGj>

104 [https://t.me/IrinaVolk\\_MVD/2599](https://t.me/IrinaVolk_MVD/2599), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/SerGX>

105 <https://mvdmedia.ru/news/official/aleksandr-gorovoy-podvel-itogi-raboty-guv-mvd-rossii-za-2024-god/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/DmdVZ>

106 <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/975720>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/SMPZe>

107 <https://suspilne.media/861753-u-rosii-pocali-pozbavlati-nabutogo-gromadanstva-cerez-vidmovu-vouvati-proti-ukraini/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/Zd8Ql>

108 <https://www.forbes.ru/society/521067-mvd-zaprosilo-v-voenkomatah-dannye-o-polucivsih-grazdanstvo-rossii-inostrancah>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/IYLxB>

109 [https://vk.com/wall-216422329\\_6686](https://vk.com/wall-216422329_6686), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/J8exW>

110 [https://vk.com/mypervie\\_zp?w=wall-218359825\\_650&z=photo-218359825\\_457240262%2F-wall-218359825\\_650](https://vk.com/mypervie_zp?w=wall-218359825_650&z=photo-218359825_457240262%2F-wall-218359825_650), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/t7vJ6>

111 [https://t.me/molodezh\\_genichesk/1711](https://t.me/molodezh_genichesk/1711), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/593Xf>

112 [https://t.me/tavriiaa\\_kherson/27606](https://t.me/tavriiaa_kherson/27606), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/VeH18>

113 [https://vk.com/wall-153744445\\_32665](https://vk.com/wall-153744445_32665), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/lFjBM>

114 <https://t.me/MTSPVGAZO/5461>, archive: <https://archive.ph/1N0rq>



Handing Over of Russian Passports in the TOT of Luhansk Region

Source photo: [https://sun9-57.userapi.com/imp/gYJetlVf81tdEA26-38AeVmOjFbY4lq8UDX80A/Ctdi\\_yQz6V8.jpg?size=1280x853&quality=95&sign=a4afd4a2e124e42d3a6fcc51766cde1a&type=album](https://sun9-57.userapi.com/imp/gYJetlVf81tdEA26-38AeVmOjFbY4lq8UDX80A/Ctdi_yQz6V8.jpg?size=1280x853&quality=95&sign=a4afd4a2e124e42d3a6fcc51766cde1a&type=album), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/Hu3jc>

According to the data of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, having Russian citizenship in the temporarily occupied territories is mandatory for gaining access to employment, education, and the state healthcare system; receiving pensions, humanitarian aid, and social payments; as well as for the ability to move freely, including leaving the occupied territories. In addition to violating international humanitarian law regarding occupation, the application of these regulations, restrictions, and intimidation towards Ukrainian citizens likely violates the prohibition on discrimination based on nationality and may be considered as a forced declaration of loyalty to the occupation authorities. The imposition of Russian citizenship may also lead to forced conscription, which is a direct violation of international humanitarian law.<sup>115</sup>

In the TOT, the conscription of Ukrainian citizens into the Russian Armed Forces is actively taking place. As part of the autumn conscription, a ceremony was held to send more than 30 recruits from occupied Sevastopol to serve in the Russian Armed Forces in the Moscow Military District.<sup>116</sup> From 1 October 2024, the first autumn conscription of residents from the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region began, with them joining the Russian Armed Forces for mandatory military service.<sup>117</sup> Meetings with the military commissariats of the occupation authorities are also taking place with the participation of youth from the TOT, such as within the framework of the career guidance project “State Start. Dialog” with students from colleges in construction, healthcare, and service sectors, as well as pupils from schools No. 2, 3, and the sanatorium school, and cadets from “Young Army” and the “Warrior” centre in occupied Kherson region. During the meeting, they talked about the benefits of serving in the Russian army and the necessity of preparing for compulsory military service.<sup>118</sup>



115 [https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/e/573346\\_3.pdf](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/e/573346_3.pdf) para. 81.

116 [https://vk.com/wall-122681115\\_7569](https://vk.com/wall-122681115_7569), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/jPanF>

117 <https://t.me/bikbulatovfidail/1067>, archive: <https://archive.ph/OOnGy>

118 <https://t.me/minmolXO/2878>, archive: <https://archive.ph/msJe6>

It should be noted that the forced conscription of Ukrainian citizens into the Russian army is a direct violation of Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.<sup>119</sup>

## ■ Youth Policy<sup>120</sup>

In 2024, Article 7.2 “Patriotic Education of Youth” was added to the federal law “On Youth Policy”, which grants authorities at various levels the power to develop measures for fostering “citizenship, patriotism, continuity of traditions, respect for domestic history, historical, national, and other traditions of the peoples of the RF, and the formation of readiness in youth to fulfil their constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland”. Additionally, the authorities of the RF are tasked with supporting the activities of patriotic education centres, military-patriotic and other associations, and conducting monitoring of the effectiveness of patriotic education.<sup>121</sup> The law also introduced the concept of “patriotic education of youth”.

4.1) Patriotic education of youth is the systematic and purposeful activity of public authorities and other entities engaged in youth policy, aimed at fostering in young citizens love and respect for the Fatherland (note – Russia), loyalty to it, and a sense of personal responsibility for the fate of the Fatherland before the present and future generations, readiness to fulfil their civic duty and constitutional obligations to defend the Fatherland, as well as defending historical truth and preserving historical memory, the formation and strengthening of a unified Russian civic identity in young citizens (including based on regional characteristics and folk traditions of the respective territory), respect for domestic history, pride in the achievements of the Fatherland and its citizens, and the development of socially significant creative activity among the youth.<sup>122</sup>

The revised youth policy strategy, approved in 2024 as a continuation of the “Fundamentals of State Youth Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025”, also emphasizes militarism, highlighting “readiness to fulfil civic duty and constitutional obligations to safeguard the interests of the Fatherland”.<sup>123</sup> The primary tool for implementing the strategy is the new national project “Youth and Children”, developed by the Russian Federation government in 2024.<sup>124</sup> One of its key focuses is patriotic education.<sup>125</sup> The expenditure for the implementation of the new national project “Youth and Children” will amount to 458.1 billion roubles in 2025; in 2026, it will increase to 547 billion roubles, and thereafter to 550 billion roubles.<sup>126</sup> For the implementation of the national project “Youth and Children” in occupied Crimea, more than 2.7 billion roubles have been allocated for 2025.<sup>127</sup>

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119 [https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995\\_154#Text](https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/995_154#Text)

120 For more details, refer to the analytical report: “[The Youth Policy of the Russian Federation as a Tool for Eradicating Identity in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine](#)”

121 <https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2024/09/12/1061720-zakonoproekt-menyayuschii-zakon-o-molodezhnoi-politike>, archive: <https://archive.ph/6nay1>.

122 <https://www.garant.ru/hotlaw/federal/1778171/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/V7VhJ>

123 <http://static.government.ru/media/files/jjBrmuJi7WMLGBOftXWhrMlzKFCglgq07.pdf>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/LXaT6>.

124 <https://lenta.ru/news/2024/08/29/strategiyu/?ysclid=m3fsc8rkw9714446441>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/4W-FIO>

125 <https://kianews24.ru/news/v-krimu-videlili-27-milliarda-rublej-na/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/JaMhq>

126 <https://www.pnp.ru/social/byudzhet-nacproekta-molodezh-i-deti-sostavit-458-milliardov-rublej-v-2025-godu.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/OvM4B>

127 <https://kianews24.ru/news/v-krimu-videlili-27-milliarda-rublej-na/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/JaMhq>





Youth policy in the TOT includes a full range of measures aimed at the eradication of Ukrainian identity, including militarisation.

Source photo: <https://t.me/yunarmeetz-zo/2771>, archive: <https://archive.ph/LHjuP>

## Changes in Strategic Documents

On 11 September 2024, the Russian Federation approved the “State Cultural Policy Strategy until 2030”, which states that its “most important task is the integration of new subjects of the Russian Federation – Donetsk People’s Republic, Luhansk People’s Republic, Zaporizhzhia region, and Kherson region into the Russian cultural and humanitarian space”. The strategy also addresses other priorities, such as the “preservation and popularisation of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” and the “preservation of a unified Russian civic identity”.<sup>128</sup> One of the intended outcomes of the strategy is to increase the number of children taking part in entertainment events focused on “military–historical themes”.<sup>129</sup> According to information from the UN monitoring mission, such provisions violate the occupying state’s obligations to respect the customs and traditions of the protected persons and may have a negative impact on the residents of the occupied territory, including children, both individually and within the community, in terms of their free choice of cultural identity and the free choice of access to and participation in cultural life.<sup>130</sup>

On 7 May 2024, the decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 309 “On the National Development Goals of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2030 and Prospects up to 2036” was approved. One of the priorities is “the upbringing of a patriotic and socially responsible individual”, and the proportion of young people participating in projects and programmes aimed at patriotic education should be no less than 75 percent by 2030.<sup>131</sup> In July 2024, the government decree of the RF No. 1734-r “On the Approval of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values in 2024–2026” was published. This decree was created to implement the presidential decree of the RF from 9 November 2022, No. 809 “On the Approval of the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values”. Thus, Russian and occupation authorities are required to conduct pa-

128 <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/50360>, archive: <https://archive.ph/Uj6jY>

129 <http://static.government.ru/media/files/jlx0zkwFvU0sCnXIQTwpZ00RqTMMVL7v.pdf>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/AohjT>

130 [https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/2024-12-31%20OHCHR%2041st%20periodic%20report%20on%20Ukraine\\_UKR.pdf](https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/2024-12-31%20OHCHR%2041st%20periodic%20report%20on%20Ukraine_UKR.pdf)

131 <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/news/73986>, archive: <https://archive.ph/cuBxl>



triotic activities, for example, “in order to counter attempts to diminish the significance of Russian culture, discredit the ‘Russian world’, its traditions, and ideals”. Projects aimed at military-patriotic education for the younger generation must also be created and implemented.<sup>132</sup>

The use of a distorted version of history to promote Russian narratives in society is also intensifying. The Decree of the President of the RF dated 8 May 2024, No. 314 “On the Approval of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the RF in the Field of Historical Education” confirms that historical education in the RF should shape a unified Russian civic identity and strengthen the unity of the “Russian World” based on traditional Russian spiritual-moral and cultural-historical values. Thus, Russia uses historical education firstly as a tool for patriotic upbringing, to “preserve the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland” and “prevent the diminishing of the significance of the people’s heroism in defending the Fatherland”.<sup>133</sup> When analysing contemporary memorial culture in Russia, it should be noted that through references to the “heroism of the people in defending the Fatherland”, the Russian authorities attempt to create historical parallels between the so-called “Great Patriotic War” and the “Special Military Operation” – that is, the full-scale war against Ukraine – and portray Ukraine as a Nazi state, whose very existence threatens the security of the RF. These are the narratives the Russian authorities spread among children in the occupied territories, including during propagandist sessions called “Conversations about Important Matters”.

## **New Strategy for Countering Extremism**

On 24 December 2024, the decree “On the Approval of the Strategy for Countering Extremism in the RF for 2025” was signed. Ukraine is directly mentioned in the document as the source of major and global extremist threats, allegedly marked by the “widespread dissemination of neo-Nazi ideas” and the “strengthening of radical nationalist armed groups” that “spread to neighbouring countries and regions”. One of the key tasks in countering extremism listed in the document is the “elimination of the source of extremist threats originating from Ukrainian territory and preventing the infiltration of representatives of foreign and international extremist and neo-Nazi communities into Russian territory”.<sup>134</sup> Russia uses the façade of “fighting extremism” as another tool to influence children and adolescents in the occupied territories. Oleksiy Lysov, Deputy Head of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Government for Social Development, stated that all measures are being taken in the region to eradicate “pro-Ukrainian” extremism among schoolchildren.<sup>135</sup> A free online educational course titled “Prevention of Neo-Nazi Ideology Among Children and Youth” was launched on the Russian society platform “Knowledge”.<sup>136</sup> The course includes proposals to “reshape the identity” of Ukrainian children, even suggesting the return to a **“traditional Russian identity”**.<sup>137</sup>

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132 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1734-p of 1 July 2024 “[On the Approval of the Action Plan for the Implementation in 2024–2026 of the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values](#)”, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/hbafq>

133 <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/50534>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/rBMmm>

134 [https://crimeahq.org/uk/strategiya-rf-po-borotbi-z-ekstremizmom-na-2025-rik-cze-novi-zagrozi-dlya-gromadyan-ukraini-v-okupaczii/?fbclid=IwY2xjawH-LDRleHRuA2FlbQlxMAABHZ-toUC8XHx8bl9fcZAh-3LXa\\_bcpzzoOLCESTG-F07EbSQ5HPBciJFMEgg\\_aem\\_lA52odiv8C5vtPyyXySICg](https://crimeahq.org/uk/strategiya-rf-po-borotbi-z-ekstremizmom-na-2025-rik-cze-novi-zagrozi-dlya-gromadyan-ukraini-v-okupaczii/?fbclid=IwY2xjawH-LDRleHRuA2FlbQlxMAABHZ-toUC8XHx8bl9fcZAh-3LXa_bcpzzoOLCESTG-F07EbSQ5HPBciJFMEgg_aem_lA52odiv8C5vtPyyXySICg), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/Xu4PS>

135 <https://www.mk-zap.ru/social/2024/08/07/v-zaporozhskoy-oblasti-uspeshno-iskorenyayut-proukrainskiy-ekstremizm-sredi-shkolnikov.html?ysclid=m6q4m1w8ex847233909>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/2Lt4d>

136 The authors of the course materials are the National Centre for Information Counteraction to Terrorism and Extremism in the Educational Environment and the Internet.

137 <https://verstka.media/znanie-ukrainskaya-propaganda-news>, archive: <https://archive.ph/0is53>; <https://akademiya.znanierussia.ru/course/profilaktika-ideologii-neonacizma-sredi-detej-i-molodezhi/?ysclid=m43yr90etz554769849>, archive: <https://archive.ph/iUV4Q>

# Key Trends in Measures Aimed at the Eradication of Identity

## Russification

The Russian occupation authorities are pursuing an active policy of russification as the first stage of implementing the “Crimean scenario” for the eradication of the identity of Ukrainian children and youth. One of the directions of the policy in the occupied territories is the “preservation and support of the Russian language as the state language of the RF and the languages of the peoples of the RF”.<sup>138</sup> It is the Russian language that is meant to contribute to “the formation of a unified Russian civic identity, the unity of the Russian nation, and ensuring a common communicative space for the multinational union of equal peoples of the RF, united by the historical experience of state unity and the use of the Russian language across the entire territory of the Russian state”.<sup>139</sup> In 2024, it is evident that Russia is actively using the Russian language to eradicate identity, while simultaneously eliminating the Ukrainian language from circulation in the TOT.<sup>140</sup>

### Promotion of the Russian Language

In the occupied territory of Crimea, measures aimed at ensuring the dominance of the Russian language in the public space are actively promoted. In Simferopol, a collection titled “Youth, Speak Russian!” was presented, published by the “State Committee for Youth Policy of the Republic of Crimea”, which includes words from youth slang gathered by schoolchildren and students.<sup>141</sup> There are also grand events held for the birthday of Russian poet A. Pushkin (celebrated as Russian Language Day on 6 June), such as the International Festival “The Great Russian Word”.<sup>142</sup> Russian Language Day is also celebrated in other occupied territories of Ukraine. Separate celebrations are held for the birthdays of Russian writers, such as Mikhail Lermontov<sup>143</sup> and Ivan Bunin.<sup>144</sup> It should be noted that Russian literature is also an influential tool of Russian propaganda and another marker of Russian imperialism.<sup>145</sup>

### Retraining for the Teaching of the Russian Language

Russia is actively promoting the retraining of teachers to teach according to Russian standards. For example, lecturers from the Russia-controlled Sevastopol State University participated in a forum on strengthening national and interfaith harmony, which took place in the occupied Zaporizhzhia region. The central theme of their presentations was the modern Russian language and its role in uniting youth. During the forum, a workshop was held on the current state of the Russian language and its role in the world, attended by over 100 schoolchildren from the oc-

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138 <https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/409100008/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/abgeV>

139 <https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/409100008/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/abgeV>

140 <https://almenda.org/en/analitychnyy-zvit-universalnyy-soldat-2022-2023/>

141 <https://crimea.ria.ru/20230607/govorit-po-russki-v-krymu-molodezh-zamenila-sleng-klassikoy-1129242858.html?ysclid=m3ir9r5qkx484669239>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/xqp4N>

142 [https://vk.com/wall-199568704\\_457](https://vk.com/wall-199568704_457), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/6Yz9I>

143 <https://t.me/depobrherson/9742>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/XX3aX>

144 <https://t.me/depobrherson/9774>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/Uxk4w>

145 <https://localhistory.org.ua/videos/bez-bromu/koli-literatura-stala-propagandoiu-rostislav-semkiv/>

cupied town of Melitopol and Zaporizhzhia region.<sup>146</sup> At least 108 teachers from the occupied Zaporizhzhia region completed professional retraining courses under the programme “Innovative Technologies for Teaching Russian Language and Literature in Schools”. The primary goal of this course was to train teachers to prepare pupils for the Russian state exam in literature and the Russian language.<sup>147</sup> Russia is also bringing teachers from Russian regions. For instance, Boris Ramazanov from Dagestan has been working as a primary school teacher at School No. 43 in the occupied village of Vesele in Zaporizhzhia region since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, teaching Russian language, history, and social studies in the senior grades.<sup>148</sup>



Source photo: <https://surl.gd/wpzck>, archive <https://archive.ph/wip/0afa9>

## Russification is a Priority in the TOT

On 5 November 2024, a meeting of the Council for the Implementation of State Policy in the Support of the Russian Language and the Languages of the Peoples of Russia was held, with the participation of Russian President V. Putin via videoconference.

Almost the entire meeting was dedicated to the Russian language and culture. Significant attention was given to the occupied territories and the teaching of Russian language and literature in “Donbas and Novorossiia”. Russian President V. Putin suggested creating centres for the promotion of the Russian language in the TOT of Ukraine and called for priority to be given to equipping “Russian literature” classrooms in the so-called “new regions” with all necessary resources. A teacher from the occupied Luhansk region, Lyudmila Gontareva, proposed the creation of Russian language centres in the “liberated territories” and increasing the number of hours for studying the Russian language in senior grades in these areas – to ensure successful completion of Russian exams.<sup>149</sup> In line with this directive, the “Russian Cultural Society” was established in the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region, with its activities focused on implementing cultural and educational projects, including the promotion of the Russian language.<sup>150</sup>

146 [https://www.sevsu.ru/novosti/item/prepodavateli\\_sevgu\\_rasskazali\\_melitopolskim\\_shkolnikam\\_o\\_sovremen-nom\\_russkom\\_yazyke?ysclid=m3ynzh15p7342971420](https://www.sevsu.ru/novosti/item/prepodavateli_sevgu_rasskazali_melitopolskim_shkolnikam_o_sovremen-nom_russkom_yazyke?ysclid=m3ynzh15p7342971420), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/rDTnj>

147 <https://t.me/obrzp/27252>, archive: <https://archive.ph/4bXEW>

148 [https://vk.com/wall-222804071\\_5193](https://vk.com/wall-222804071_5193), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/KRVjt>

149 <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75495>, archive: <https://archive.ph/FN8o4>

150 <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/22361037>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/rWCrf>

## Indoctrination

Indoctrination is the second element of the “Crimean scenario” and is defined as “a set of actions aimed at imposing narratives favourable to the Russian Federation, which must be accepted as absolute truth, without doubt or criticism. The goal of indoctrination is to instil in Ukrainian youth in the occupied territories an unquestioning loyalty to the Russian authorities, suppress critical thinking when evaluating the actions of the Russian government, and enforce absolute belief in official narratives—along with a willingness to act in any way necessary to serve the interests of the Russian state”.<sup>151</sup>

### Initiatives for Marking Russian Holidays

Russia actively marks the space in the TOT with its symbols, which is particularly noticeable during the celebration of Russian commemorative dates and ceremonies. For example, in 2024, mass events and campaigns were held across all TOT to mark the so-called “Day of Reunification of Crimea with Russia” (21 March). In one such event, during the flash mob “Crimea-Russia. Forever”, children, standing in front of the Russian tricolour and with Russian symbols, spoke about the importance and support for the so-called reunification of Crimea with Russia.<sup>152</sup> During the flash mob “10 years together with Russia”, children danced with Russian flags.<sup>153</sup> Activists from the youth movement “YugMolodoj”(“Young South”) in the occupied Zaporizhzhia region held a quiz titled “Crimea is Russia” in honour of the so-called “Day of the Reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia”, where participants competed in their knowledge of the events of the so-called “Crimean Spring”.<sup>154</sup> By celebrating this event with slogans like “returning home”, “to the native harbour”, etc., children’s perception is manipulated, substituting concepts and imposing a positive view of the occupying country.



Source photo: <https://t.me/YugMolodoj/14135>, archive: <https://archive.ph/uFsO1>

151 <https://almenda.org/en/rosijska-sistema-znishhennya-identichnosti-ukrainskix-ditej-na-tot-sxema/>

152 [https://vk.com/wall-214910068\\_195350](https://vk.com/wall-214910068_195350), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/hIR9u>

153 <https://tavria.tv/news/society/fleshmob-v-chest-10-letiya-krymskoj-vesny-proshel-v-azovskoj-shkole/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/6Gfy4>

154 <https://t.me/YugMolodoj/14135>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/uFsO1>



In 2024, the All-Russian Children's Cultural and Educational Campaign "I am Russian" was held, dedicated to the Day of National Unity (4 November).<sup>155</sup> This campaign was, in particular, carried out at Secondary School No. 4 in Melitopol and aimed at fostering "a sense of pride for one's country and respect for its history".<sup>156</sup>

## A new children's movement for preschoolers in occupied Crimea

The occupation authorities, in addition to existing indoctrination tools, are creating and implementing new ones. In 2024, a new patriotic movement, "Young Sevastopolians", was established in the TOT of Sevastopol for older preschool children attending local kindergartens.<sup>157</sup> According to representatives of the occupation authorities, the purpose of this movement is to "instil moral and patriotic values in children, foster a sense of patriotism (i.e., patriotism towards Russia), and promote a respectful attitude toward the heroic past of their native city and country". As envisioned by its organisers, the movement will serve as a tool for engaging preschoolers in patriotic events, interacting with children's public organisations, and acting as the first stage in a multi-level system of so-called patriotic education. In reality, this system is aimed at the militarisation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children living in the TOT. The militaristic organisation "Young Army" plays an active role in the induction ceremonies and ongoing activities of the movement, and it is likely to become the next stage of "patriotic education" for these children once they enter school.<sup>158</sup> In March 2024, a large-scale enrolment of preschoolers into the movement took place, with 4,000 children becoming members.<sup>159</sup>

## Imposition of Russian Symbols

During ceremonies, the symbols of the occupying country are actively used. For example, in Sevastopol, the final of a city-wide competition for the best dance flash mob among preschool educational institutions took place, where children were dressed in Russian national costumes and outfits featuring Russian symbols.<sup>160</sup>



Source photo: <https://sun9-56.us-erapi.com/imp/p9b9aXapkfKRD-KYD7M0hVfU-D5wc13C4F9IhdQ/xcvU08qQLvM.jpg?size=1280x-853&quality=95&sign=28c46c4d-dcf239068a32beee56700a0f&-type=album>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/FBJ1D>

155 <https://t.me/depobrheron/9628>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/tEgXg>

156 <https://t.me/obrzp/27066>, archive: <https://archive.ph/jWWHJ>

157 <https://edu.sev.gov.ru/dokuments/prikazy-departamenta?doc=209384>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/6HCb9>

158 <https://www.rusprofile.ru/id/7531094>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/OuDxW>

159 <https://crimea-news.com/society/2024/03/15/1324489.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/HJwJq>

160 [https://vk.com/wall-177557250\\_26278](https://vk.com/wall-177557250_26278), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/rgxDc>



In all preschool institutions of the so-called Aleshkinsky Municipal District, events dedicated to Russia Day were held. In the photos, children are seen holding Russian flags and other symbols of the Russian Federation.<sup>161</sup>



Source photo:  
<https://sun9-6.userapi.com/impkg/KOvzqgQe-QM-MA0AKjk-y0FmAlyzIhy-scERAsvg/-Q-IYb9Q7vI.jpg?size=1280x-960&quality=95&sign=-4f1ac6ec012c66376b-9ff55b848b5b7b&-type=album>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/TLNjm>



Source photo:  
<https://sun9-68.userapi.com/impkg/jToDXWDb-D3qagqtTvq3gyn-9TLJr2IAOVUmJww/pWkM70OFb8U.jpg?-size=1280x853&quality=95&sign=a89d-831ba3c65e2b-206c96e1022c0c9d&-type=album>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/Gdcal>

Activists of the “YugMolodoj” movement in Melitopol held an event called “Russia is in the Heart of Everyone”, during which they painted the Russian Federation flag on children’s faces “as a symbol of love for the Homeland”.<sup>162</sup>

The purpose of such events is to impose a sense of belonging to Russia on children.

161 [https://vk.com/wall-215245628\\_1869](https://vk.com/wall-215245628_1869), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/vf0MY>

162 [https://vk.com/wall-216422329\\_6691](https://vk.com/wall-216422329_6691), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/dWcZ4>

## Conversations about Important Matters

The general school curriculum is supplemented by weekly assemblies held every Monday, featuring the performance of the national anthem and the raising of the Russian Federation's flag. These events are followed by extracurricular lessons called "Conversations about Important Matters", which are also mandatory. Most topics covered in "Conversations about Important Matters" are propaganda-driven and include themes such as "The Day of Reunification of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Regions with the Russian Federation", "Legends about Russia", "Along the Roads of Russia", "Heroes of Our Time", and "Russia's Allies", among others.<sup>163</sup> The first "Conversations about Important Matters" lesson of the 2024–2025 academic year was personally conducted by Vladimir Putin, who also approved the introduction of such lessons for the youngest children. Soon, they will be implemented in all kindergartens.<sup>164</sup> In January 2025, the authorities in the Russian city of Vologda became the first to introduce weekly "Conversations about Important Matters" in kindergartens. These sessions involved giving children toy weapons, dressing them in military uniforms, and playing the song "Sacred War".<sup>165</sup> Similar activities are expected to be introduced in the TOT of Ukraine in the near future.

## Militarization

Militarisation is the third element of the "Crimean scenario" and refers to a series of actions designed to cultivate both internal and practical readiness for military service in the Russian armed forces, as well as participation in combat operations on behalf of the Russian Federation. It involves framing military service as a personal civic duty and equipping individuals with the necessary skills to fulfil this "duty".<sup>166</sup>

### Training in UAVs Operation

In 2024, the RF began involving children in training on the development and operation of UAVs, which are widely used for military purposes, including in the war against Ukraine. On 13 January 2024, at the so-called "South Coast Regional Centre for Military-Patriotic and Military-Sports Training of the Regional Branch of the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF) of Russia in the Republic of Crimea" in the TOT of Yalta, training sessions were already being held for children on safety techniques for handling UAVs. Practical sessions on drone flight simulation were also held. In the shooting range and firearms training class, the boys practiced shooting from three positions and assembling and disassembling an AK-47 rifle.<sup>167</sup> Drone piloting training is also being provided to children with disabilities. For example, in the occupied Kherson region, a section on controlling FPV drones was opened at a boarding school for children with psychiatric and neurological disorders in the town of Oleshky.<sup>168</sup>

## Holidays and Events

Russia actively uses significant dates from its military history as another tool for fostering loyalty to the Russian army. For example, in 2024, actions related to the so-called "Victory Day" (9

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163 <https://xn--80aafadv9bifbaeqq0p.xn--p1ai/?year=2024>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/ba5o8>

164 <https://crimea.ria.ru/20241025/razgovory-o-vazhnom-v-detskom-sadu--v-krymu-prokommentirovali-id-eyu-1141352599.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/odZhX>

165 <https://www.severreal.org/a/vylepit-soldat-velikogo-vozhdyia-razgovory-o-vazhnom-v-detskih-sadah-vologdy/33289379.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/zs1Jr>

166 <https://almenda.org/en/rosijska-sistema-znishhennya-identichnosti-ukrainskix-ditej-na-tot-sxema/>

167 [https://vk.com/wall-196982714\\_964](https://vk.com/wall-196982714_964), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/6dkXQ>

168 <https://hersonka.ru/news/201154>, archive: <https://archive.ph/bv1i7>

May) continued. Events and competitions such as “St. George’s Ribbon”, “Windows of Victory”, “Letter to a Soldier”, “Talisman of Kindness”, “Letters from the Front,” “Immortal Regiment”, “Descendants of Victory”, “Victory Dictation”, “Guard of Memory”, “Spring of Victory”, “Victory Gardens”, “Chronicle of Hearts”, and “I Remember! I Am Proud!” were held in the TOT. These activities engaged children from preschool age to youth. These events are not focused on commemorating those who died during the Second World War; rather, they aim to draw false parallels between the “heroism” of the Soviet people in the fight against Nazism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the “heroism” of the current “heroes of the SMO”, who are waging an aggressive war against Ukraine.<sup>169</sup>

## Memorialisation as a Tool for Militarisation

In 2023, the CCE “Almenda” conducted a detailed study titled “Commemorative Plaques as the Evidence of crimes Of the Russian Federation in Crimea”, aimed at establishing a connection between the militarisation policy implemented by the RF in educational institutions in occupied Crimea and its influence on the consciousness of children who studied or are studying under occupation.<sup>170</sup> The subject of this analysis remains relevant as the installation of commemorative plaques “in honour of the participants of the SMO” continues in 2024, consistently supporting militaristic rhetoric and reinforcing ideological influence on children, preparing them to die for Russia. In the 2024 monitoring report by the CCE “Almenda”, it was found that commemorative plaques in occupied Crimea were established for individuals who, at the time of the occupation, were up to 23 years old (inclusive), with some being in the age range of 10 to 18 years in 2014. These individuals fully experienced the policy of eradicating Ukrainian identity, militarisation, and Russification actively implemented by the RF and the occupation government of Crimea over the last 10 years. For this reason, children—both those who, under the influence of Russian propaganda, were conscripted into the Russian army upon reaching adulthood in violation of the occupation rules and laws, and those currently facing this risk—are victims of illegal practices by the RF on the occupied peninsula.<sup>171</sup>

### “Warrior” Centre

In 2024, the Youth Military-Sports Training Centre “Warrior” (Transliterated from Russian as “VOIN”), established at the end of 2022, became particularly active. Its goal is to raise a new generation of patriots and defenders of Russia, with one of the organization’s priorities being the preparation of youth for military service in the armed forces of the RF. Branches of the organization were opened in the TOT, including in the Kherson region (Genichesk), Zaporizhzhia region (Berdyansk), Luhansk region (Luhansk), and Donetsk region (Donetsk and Mariupol).<sup>172</sup> The first military field exercises and training on basic tactical medical training and military preparation by the “Warrior” Centre took place at the Genichesk Construction College, involving at least 70 students. The centre is reported to prepare youth aged 14-18 for military service, with additional training available for citizens aged 19-35 under an expanded program.<sup>173</sup>

## Camps and Military Training

Under the guise of “health improvement and recreation”, one of the central aspects of Russia’s policy towards Ukrainian children from the occupied territories has become sending them to

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169 Monitoring Report “Universal Soldier” ([April-June 2024](#))

170 [“Commemorative Plaques as the Evidence of crimes Of the Russian Federation in Crimea”](#)

171 More in the material by the CCE “Almenda”: [“Memorials for Members of the ‘SMO’ in Crimean Educational Institutions or How Russia Continues to Influence the Minds of Children Under Occupation”](#)

172 <https://almenda.org/en/voini-dlya-rosijskogo-rezhimu-yak-rosiya-militarizuye-ukrainskix-ditej-z-tot/>

173 [https://dzen.ru/a/Zksnl\\_3bwX6gtiVt](https://dzen.ru/a/Zksnl_3bwX6gtiVt), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/YKI2o>



camps in Russia or third countries for the purpose of “re-education”. In some cases, this is accompanied by deportation and adoption of minors by Russians.

Also, children from the TOT of the Kherson region (as well as from the TOT of the Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia regions) were taken to the RF under the guise of “summer recreation” to Volgograd for a 21-day shift called “Time of Heroes”, organized by the “Warrior” Centre.<sup>174</sup> During this training, the conditions in which the children find themselves are far from resembling a summer recreation, under the guise of which they are encouraged to participate. The children live in field tents, are required to wear military uniforms, and strictly follow a daily routine (from 07:00 to 23:00), which includes raising the Russian flag and performing the Russian national anthem.<sup>175</sup> At the “Field” camp, which is part of the “Artek” centre, children were also taught to assemble and disassemble rifles, as well as to shoot, as part of the “Order of Courage” program, which aims at military-patriotic training for youth.<sup>176</sup>

## Involvement of the “Heroes of the SMO”

In 2024, there has been an intensification of the involvement of so-called “heroes of the SMO” in the patriotic education of children and youth. So-called “Lessons of Courage” are conducted for children by Russian servicemen who are participating in the war against Ukraine, sharing their experiences and emphasizing the importance of loving and defending Russia.<sup>177</sup> “Heroes of the SMO” also actively encourage joining higher military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defence of the RF, military institutes of the Federal National Guard Service of Russia (Rosgvardia), and the Academy of Civil Defence of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations.<sup>178</sup> For example, career guidance for senior students of school No. 24 in the occupied town of Melitopol was provided by Rosgvardia employees, offering Ukrainian schoolchildren the opportunity to consider a military career in the Russian army as a possible future option, including through admission to military higher education institutions.<sup>179</sup>



Source photo: <https://t.me/DanilchenkoGV/2653>, archive: <https://archive.ph/giKpu>

174 <https://dnr.crvsp.ru/news/programmy-tsentra-voin-v-2024-godu-ohvatjat-okolo-30-tysjach-chelovek>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/RERWH>

175 [https://vk.com/wall-217630752\\_2921](https://vk.com/wall-217630752_2921), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/067vf>

176 More details on these and other Russian propaganda activities, as well as the geography of the transportation of Ukrainian children from the temporarily occupied territories under the pretext of camp holidays, are available in the analytical report “[Russian Propaganda Camps: Where and Why Russia Takes Children from the Temporarily Occupied Territories](#).”

177 <https://t.me/DanilchenkoGV/2653>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/giKpu>

178 [https://vk.com/wall-214910068\\_218365](https://vk.com/wall-214910068_218365), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/WA1Mw>

179 <https://t.me/obrzp/26310>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/qGwLU>

# The Reaction of the International Community

## Decisions of Judicial and Quasi-judicial Bodies

In January 2024, the International Court of Justice recognized that the way the RF implemented its program of school education in the Ukrainian language in Crimea after 2014 violated its obligations under Articles 2(1)(a) and 5(v) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.<sup>180</sup>

The UN Human Rights Committee confirmed that the forced granting of Russian citizenship constitutes a violation of Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regarding the prohibition of discrimination.<sup>181</sup> The representative of the applicants stated that an important point is that the UN Human Rights Committee established that Russian citizenship was imposed on Crimeans by the Russian occupation authorities, and that this also constitutes a violation of human rights in terms of personal identity.<sup>182</sup>

On 25 June 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in the case of “Ukraine v. Russia” (regarding Crimea). First and foremost, the ECtHR confirmed that the de facto impossibility for Crimeans to renounce Russian citizenship constitutes a violation of the right to private life (Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights). Secondly, the ECtHR concurred with the International Court of Justice that the administrative practice of denying access to education in Ukrainian in occupied Crimea violates the right to education.<sup>183</sup>

## The topic of identity eradication in UN reports

In the report covering the period from 24 February 2022 to 31 December 2023 (released on 20 March 2024), the UN Monitoring Mission in Ukraine presented a comprehensive account of the systematic eradication of Ukrainian identity in the TOT. Overall, for 2024, the mission identified the following trends:

- Since September 2022, the Russian occupation authorities replaced the Ukrainian educational curriculum with the Russian one in many schools, in violation of the occupying state's obligation not to interfere with the activities of institutions on the occupied territory.
- The mission confirmed that the Armed Forces of the RF threatened parents that their children would be taken by the guardianship authorities if they did not attend local schools, which had been transferred to Russian educational standards.

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180 <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/166/166-20240131-jud-01-00-en.pdf>

181 Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>

182 <https://suspilne.media/crimea/734859-pislo-10-rokiv-sob-dovesti-so-rosijske-gromadanstvo-navazane-advokat-krimcan-pro-risenna-komitetu-oon/>

183 Judgment by the European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, in the case Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), Application nos. 20958/14 and 8334/18, 25 June 2024 <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/?i=001-235139>



- The occupation authorities may resort to repression against teachers who refuse to work according to the imposed educational systems.<sup>184</sup>
- The occupation authorities simultaneously hinder the ability to receive Ukrainian education remotely.
- The Russian occupying authorities also pursued a policy of militarisation of children (paragraph 134),<sup>185</sup> including through special classes and extracurricular activities aimed at instilling “patriotic” values, forcing loyalty to the Russian state, and preparing them for military service,<sup>186</sup> including during summer holidays.<sup>187</sup>

The UN mission also confirmed that by implementing its education system and curriculum in the TOT, the RF violated its obligation, under which the occupying state must respect existing laws and institutions. Moreover, the imposed Russian curriculum does not comply with the standards of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which require that education be “culturally acceptable” and aimed at respecting the child’s cultural identity, language, and values.<sup>188</sup>

The UN reports separately mentioned the TOT of the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, including the almost complete absence of education in the Ukrainian language.<sup>189</sup> The situation regarding access to education in the TOT of the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol was also thoroughly covered in the UNESCO report. In addition to the factual lack of access to education in Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar, special emphasis is placed on the illegality of the militarization of children and youth, and the opening of Russian youth movements that promote Russian patriotism. It should be noted that the involvement of Crimean children in the production of trench candles for Russian soldiers, weaving camouflage nets, training in drone construction and operation, as well as participation in military-patriotic games, was identified as an illegal practice that violates the Fourth Geneva Convention, specifically the prohibition of propaganda or coercion aimed at the voluntary recruitment of individuals into the armed forces of the occupying power.<sup>190</sup>

## OSCE

In the “Fifth Interim Report on Reported Violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Ukraine,” the following trends regarding education in the TOT are mentioned:

- The introduction of the Russian Federation’s educational curriculum in schools and military-patriotic education for school-age children violates international norms regarding education in occupied territories.
- The occupying power is obliged to respect institutions based on local legislation and can organize education for children only when local institutions are insufficient.
- The mass replacement of the Ukrainian educational curriculum with the Russian one, as well as the introduction of Russian military-patriotic education for children, likely violates these principles and significantly alters the status quo.<sup>191</sup>

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184 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/072/771/pdf/g2407277.pdf>

185 <https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2024-03-20-OHCHR-Report-Occupation-Aftermath-en.pdf>

186 <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/258>

187 <https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2024-12/PR41%20Ukraine%202024-12-31.pdf>

188 <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ukraine/2024/report-human-rights-situation-ukraine-1-dec-2023-29-feb-2024.pdf>

189 <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ukraine/2024-02-28-OHCHR-Ten-Years-Occupation-Crimea.pdf>

190 <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000391167/PDF/391167eng.pdf.multi>

191 [OSCE Fifth Interim Report on reported violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Ukraine](#)

## EU and the Council of Europe

Within the EU mechanisms, it should be noted that in 2024, the practice of imposing sanctions on individuals and legal entities responsible for the indoctrination of children and youth in the TOT continued (for further details, see the “Sanctions” section of this report). In 2024, the PACE approved a resolution regarding the illegality of the deportation of children to Russia and Belarus, which specifically noted that the deported children were subjected to indoctrination, where they were forced to adopt a new culture and language (editorial comment: Russian).<sup>192</sup>

A special report was published at the request of the European Parliament in February 2024, complementing the report from the European Parliamentary Research Service of April 2023, as well as other investigations into the forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children by Russia since 24 February 2022.<sup>193</sup> The report mentions practices related to the “re-education” of deported Ukrainian children and the imposition of Russian identity.

In our opinion, similar measures (adoption of resolutions at the parliamentary level, publication of specialized reports) could also be effective regarding the situation of the right to education in the TOT.

## Other NGOs

The international organization “Human Rights Watch” noted that Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine and the federal government, including the Russian Minister of Education and other high-ranking officials, took steps to suppress the Ukrainian language and curriculum, as well as to implement the Russian curriculum and Russian as the language of instruction in schools. Ukrainian children under occupation are subjected to ideological influence through anti-Ukrainian propaganda, including military training. Human Rights Watch separately mentions a history textbook that justifies Russia's invasion and portrays Ukraine as a “neo-Nazi state”.

According to the organization's conclusions, the actions of the Russian occupation authorities violate the right of Ukrainian children to an education that fosters respect for their “cultural identity, language, and values”, as well as for the “national values” of their country of origin.<sup>194</sup>

Amnesty International specifically focused on highlighting the pressure on teachers in the TOT. According to the organization's survey results, teachers from the TOT reported that the Russian occupation authorities followed the following strategy: to reopen local schools to teach the Russian curriculum, involve as many teachers as possible who had worked before the occupation, and ensure their loyalty and cooperation through various methods, including intimidation and threats of harsh reprisals, in some cases even carrying out these threats. As a result, all those who refused to cooperate with the Russian authorities were ultimately forced to leave for areas controlled by the Ukrainian government.<sup>195</sup>

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192 <https://pace.coe.int/en/files/33348/html>

193 <https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/other-publications/russias-forcible-transfers-of-unaccompanied-ukrainian-children.pdf>

194 <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/06/20/education-under-occupation/forced-russification-school-system-occupied-ukrainian>

195 [https://www.amnesty.be/IMG/pdf/20241004\\_ps\\_teachers\\_ukraine\\_.pdf](https://www.amnesty.be/IMG/pdf/20241004_ps_teachers_ukraine_.pdf)

## Sanctions

In 2024, pressure on the RF continues through the implementation of restrictive measures against individuals and legal entities. For example, from February 2022 to January 2025, the EU introduced 15 packages of sanctions or restrictive measures aimed at reducing Russia's ability to finance the war against Ukraine, weakening Russian elites, and diminishing Russia's economic base.<sup>196</sup> In addition to the EU, similar measures are also being implemented by the governments of other countries, including the USA, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.

Sanctions and restrictive measures have also been imposed on individuals and legal entities directly involved in the eradication of the identity of Ukrainian children from the TOT, continuing into 2024. For instance, when announcing sanctions against 10 Russian individuals and entities involved in "patriotic education" of children from the TOT, the UK Foreign Secretary emphasized that:

“No child should ever be used as a pawn in war, yet President Putin's targeting of Ukrainian children shows the depths he will go to in his mission to erase Ukraine and its people from the map.”<sup>197</sup>

### ● Legal Entities

In 2024, the All-Russian Public-State Movement of Children and Youth "Movement of the First" was included in the sanctions lists of the EU,<sup>198</sup> Switzerland,<sup>199</sup> and the USA.<sup>200</sup> The All-Russian Children's and Youth Military-Patriotic Public Movement "Young Army" ("Yunarmiya") was included in the sanctions lists of the UK,<sup>201</sup> Australia,<sup>202</sup> and New Zealand.<sup>203</sup> The Military-Patriotic Centre "Vympel", established by former Russian security service employees with the aim of patriotic education for children, was included in the sanctions lists of the EU<sup>204</sup> and Switzerland.<sup>205</sup> The International Children's Centre "Artek" was included in the sanctions lists of the EU,<sup>206</sup> Switzerland,<sup>207</sup> and New Zealand<sup>208</sup> in 2024 (and of the UK<sup>209</sup> and the USA<sup>210</sup> in 2023). Additionally, the

196 <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11897>

197 <https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-sanctions-russian-officials-indoctrination-ukrainian-children-2024-11-19/>

198 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R0753> (para.359)

199 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html) (link to the list (p. 45))

200 <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240612>

201 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice\\_Russia\\_191124.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice_Russia_191124.pdf)

202 <https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/consolidated-list>

203 <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/europe/ukraine/russian-invasion-of-ukraine/sanctions/russia-sanctions-register>

204 [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/?utm\\_source=x.com&utm\\_medium=social&utm\\_campaign=20240624-fac-russia-sanctions-14-package&utm\\_content=visual-card](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/?utm_source=x.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=20240624-fac-russia-sanctions-14-package&utm_content=visual-card)

205 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html)

206 [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L\\_202401738](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401738)

207 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html)

208 <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/europe/ukraine/russian-invasion-of-ukraine/sanctions/russia-sanctions-register>

209 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list>

210 <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230824>

director, Konstantin Fedorenko, was added to the sanctions lists: in 2024, by New Zealand,<sup>211</sup> in 2023, by Switzerland,<sup>212</sup> the EU,<sup>213</sup> and the USA.<sup>214</sup>

## ● Individuals



**Grigory Gurov** is the chairman of the board of the Russian youth movement “Movement of the First” and was appointed head of “Rosmolodyozh.” He leads an organization focused on indoctrination and the eradication of the Ukrainian identity of children in TOT of Ukraine. In 2024, due to his significant role in these activities, he was included in the sanction lists of the EU,<sup>215</sup> Switzerland,<sup>216</sup> and the USA.<sup>217</sup>

Source photo: <https://guu.ru/wp-content/uploads/Гуров-ГА.jpg>,  
archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/jJCga>



**Serafim Ivanov** headed the “Young Army” in the occupied Kherson region from 2022 to 2024. For his activities, in 2024, he was included in the sanction lists of the UK,<sup>218</sup> and before 2024, the EU<sup>219</sup> and Switzerland.<sup>220</sup>

Source photo: [https://investigator.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Screenshot\\_234.png](https://investigator.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Screenshot_234.png),  
archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/EsmGp>



**Igor Kazarev** is the former director of the “Warrior” centre, a position he no longer holds since August 2024. In 2024, he was included in the sanctions list of the UK.<sup>221</sup>

Source photo: [https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSlvGYfXYPmZrElpM\\_YyXLzAE-qVtgWuSKSQ&s](https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSlvGYfXYPmZrElpM_YyXLzAE-qVtgWuSKSQ&s),  
archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/IVJNx>

211 <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/europe/ukraine/russian-invasion-of-ukraine/sanctions/russia-sanctions-register>

212 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html)

213 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2023:159I:FULL>

214 <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230824>

215 [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L\\_202400753](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202400753)

216 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html)

217 <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240823>

218 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice\\_Russia\\_191124.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice_Russia_191124.pdf)

219 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice\\_Russia\\_191124.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice_Russia_191124.pdf)

220 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html)

221 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice\\_Russia\\_191124.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice_Russia_191124.pdf)





**Nikita Nagorny** led the General Staff of the “Young Army” until 2025. He is currently the deputy chairman of the board of the “Movement of the First” Since 2024, he has been under sanctions from the USA<sup>222</sup> and the UK,<sup>223</sup> and since 2023, from Canada.<sup>224</sup>

Source photo: [https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3366-3139-4537-b031-613235613564/\\_jpeg](https://static.tildacdn.com/tild3366-3139-4537-b031-613235613564/_jpeg), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/x3UOC>



**Vitaliy Suk** is the director of the Oleshky boarding school for children with disabilities, who played an active role in the transfer of Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia.<sup>225</sup> He has been under sanctions from the UK since 2024.<sup>226</sup>

Source photo: [https://www.oprichniki.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Screenshot\\_5-4.jpg](https://www.oprichniki.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Screenshot_5-4.jpg), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/lxYGi>



**Lyudmila Yermakova** is the director of the state-owned enterprise “Sunny Tavrika” in occupied Crimea, where children from the TOT were allegedly taken for “recreation”. In 2024, she was added to the sanctions lists of Switzerland,<sup>227</sup> and in 2023, to the sanctions lists of the European Union.<sup>228</sup>

Source photo: <https://pravoilevo.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ermakova2.jpg>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/1qGoL>

## The so-called “Ministers of Education of the TOT”



**Ivan Kusov** (TOT of Luhansk region)

Ivan Kusov is the so-called “Minister of Education and Science” of the Luhansk People’s Republic. Sanctioned in 2022 by Canada,<sup>229</sup> the UK,<sup>230</sup> and New Zealand.<sup>231</sup>

Source photo: <https://news.gtrklnr.ru/news/lnr/10862-ivan-kusov-v-hode-brifinga-rasskazal-o-nachale-vstupitelnoj-kampanii-dlja-abiturientov-respubliki.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/PdtkN>

222 <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240612>

223 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice\\_Russia\\_191124.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice_Russia_191124.pdf)

224 [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues\\_development-enjeux\\_developpement/response\\_conflict-reponse\\_conflits/crisis-crisis/ukraine-sanctions.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crisis/ukraine-sanctions.aspx?lang=eng)

225 <https://stories.media/stories/2024/10/23/kak-voina-unichtozhila-detskii-dom-v-oleshkakh/> , archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/i8HyT>

226 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice\\_Russia\\_191124.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice_Russia_191124.pdf)

227 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html)

228 [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL\\_202302871&qid=1702915124272](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL_202302871&qid=1702915124272)

229 <https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2022/2022-10-12/html/sor-dors203-eng.html>

230 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list>

231 <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/europe/ukraine/russian-invasion-of-ukraine/sanctions>

## Former "Ministers"



### Alexey Galchenkov (TOT of Kherson region)

Alexey Galchenkov is the so-called "Minister of Education" of the TOT of Kherson region. Since 2024, he has been under EU<sup>232</sup> and Swiss<sup>233</sup> sanctions.

Source photo: <https://s12.stc.yc.kpcdn.net/share/i/4/2659510/wr-750.webp>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/fAJGu>



### Olena Shapurova (TOT of Zaporizhzhia region)

Olena Shapurova held the position of "Minister of Education of Zaporizhzhia Region" until January 2025. Due to her activities in this role, she was added to the UK's sanctions list in 2024,<sup>234</sup> following her inclusion in the sanctions lists of EU,<sup>235</sup> US,<sup>236</sup> and Canada<sup>237</sup> in 2023. Since January 2025, she has been working as Vice-Rector for Additional Education Development at the Russian State Pedagogical University named after A. Herzen.<sup>238</sup>

Source photo: [https://www.oprichniki.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Screenshot\\_1-528x600.jpg](https://www.oprichniki.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Screenshot_1-528x600.jpg), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/mK5XI>



**Olga Koludarova** is a former so-called "Minister of Education and Science of the Donetsk People's Republic" since 2022, where she worked on "developing the education system in the context of integration with the educational system of the RF". In August 2024, she was appointed Deputy Minister of Education and Science of the RF.<sup>239</sup> In 2024, she was included in the sanctions lists of the EU<sup>240</sup> and Switzerland.<sup>241</sup> In 2022, she was sanctioned by Canada,<sup>242</sup> the UK,<sup>243</sup> and New Zealand.<sup>244</sup>

Source photo: <https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSLrikLcc8V8N-vxn-0Qsi3lxKIHYcB1xm6dA&s>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/GSbff>

Note: The new "Minister of Education of the Donetsk People's Republic" is Oleg Trofimov.<sup>245</sup>

232 [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L\\_202400753](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202400753)

233 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html)

234 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice\\_Russia\\_191124.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/673c56047524e1b17c494e3b/Notice_Russia_191124.pdf)

235 [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL\\_202302875&fbclid=IwAR05WU2jWbwJPH-ftb-vhe-Ho1LOwokBudRD2bqTwxYUyIFJD8fv-LM5gaqg](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202302875&fbclid=IwAR05WU2jWbwJPH-ftb-vhe-Ho1LOwokBudRD2bqTwxYUyIFJD8fv-LM5gaqg)

236 <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230824>

237 <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/06/minister-joly-announces-additional-sanctions-to-protect-ukrainian-culture-from-destruction-by-russia.htm>

238 <https://nstar-spb.ru/vysshaja-shkola-nauka/v-gertsenovskom-universitete-obsudili-perspektivy-sotrudnichestva-s-bgpu-im-m-akmully.html>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/bAkUr>; <https://www.herzen.spb.ru/about/org-control/rukovodstvo-universiteta/prorektor-po-razv-dop-obr/>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/XqhCl>

239 <https://www.xn--80aeamngm0adkqpb3grdp.xn--p1ai/?p=2657>, archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/ET6ZP>

240 [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L\\_202401738](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401738)

241 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html)

242 <https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2022/2022-10-12/html/sor-dors203-eng.html>

243 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list>

244 <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/europe/ukraine/russian-invasion-of-ukraine/sanctions>

245 <http://mondnr.ru/minobr>, archive: <https://archive.ph/WlkyC>



### Mikhail Rodikov

Mikhail Rodikov is a former so-called “Minister of Education and Science of Kherson Region” and a former head of the so-called “Department of Education and Science of the city of Sevastopol”. He has been under Swiss sanctions since 2024<sup>246</sup>. In 2022, he was added to the sanctions lists of the USA,<sup>247</sup> Canada,<sup>248</sup> the EU,<sup>249</sup> the UK,<sup>250</sup> Australia,<sup>251</sup> New Zealand,<sup>252</sup> and Japan.<sup>253</sup>

Source photo: [https://sevastopol.su/sites/default/files/styles/node/public/2022-07-22/sevastopol\\_mihail\\_rodikov\\_hersonskaya\\_vga\\_ministerstvo\\_nauki\\_i\\_obrazovaniya.jpg](https://sevastopol.su/sites/default/files/styles/node/public/2022-07-22/sevastopol_mihail_rodikov_hersonskaya_vga_ministerstvo_nauki_i_obrazovaniya.jpg), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/r8rhU>



### Igor Astranin (TOT of Kherson region)

Igor Astranin is a former “Minister of Youth Policy” of the TOT of Kherson region (resigned on 7 February 2025).<sup>254</sup> In 2024, he was included in the sanctions lists of the EU<sup>255</sup> and Switzerland.<sup>256</sup>

Source photo: [https://api.tavria.tv/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/photo\\_2023-08-11\\_13-32-43.jpg](https://api.tavria.tv/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/photo_2023-08-11_13-32-43.jpg), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/wtkBp>

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246 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html)

247 <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20220915>

248 <https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2022/2022-10-12/html/sor-dors202-eng.html>

249 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D1907&qid=1665048069586>

250 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list>

251 <https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/further-actions-response-russias-illegal-invasion-ukraine>; <https://most.ks.ua/news/url/avstralija-zaprovadila-sanktsiji-proti-rjadu-osib-jaki-povjazani-z-okupatsijeju-hersonschini/>

252 <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/europe/ukraine/russian-invasion-of-ukraine/sanctions>

253 [https://www.mof.go.jp/policy/international\\_policy/gaitame\\_kawase/gaitame/economic\\_sanctions/ukraine\\_kankeisha\\_20221007.pdf](https://www.mof.go.jp/policy/international_policy/gaitame_kawase/gaitame/economic_sanctions/ukraine_kankeisha_20221007.pdf)

254 [https://t.me/SALDO\\_VGA/5857](https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/5857), archive: <https://archive.ph/wip/cqnvT>

255 [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L\\_202400753](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202400753)

256 [https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik\\_Wirtschaftliche\\_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html](https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/de/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/exportkontrollen-und-sanktionen/sanktionen-embargos/sanktionsmassnahmen/massnahmen-zur-vermeidung-der-umgehung-internationaler-sanktionen.html)

# Conclusions

1. The occupation of Ukrainian territories continues, and Russia's policies of Russification, indoctrination, and militarisation are only intensifying. The occupation authorities are making significant efforts and allocating vast resources to ensure that Ukrainian children and youth forget their roots and begin to see Russia as their only homeland. By effectively eradicating Ukrainian identity in the occupied territories, Russia seeks to legitimise its unlawful actions and create a propaganda narrative that portrays its war of aggression against Ukraine as a so-called "humanitarian" mission to protect supposed ethnic Russians on "their historic lands".
2. However, the truth about Russia's unlawful actions in the TOT of Ukraine, aimed at eradicating Ukrainian identity, has been repeatedly highlighted in reports by governmental and non-governmental international organisations. The UN mission in Ukraine characterised Russia's policy of imposing its federal educational standards in the TOT as a violation of the occupying state's obligations and fundamentally incompatible with the right to education. Similarly, attempts to pressure children and teachers in the TOT who refused to adopt Russian standards, the forced passportisation of residents from the age of 14, and the recruitment of children and youth into movements designed to foster loyalty to the Russian authorities have been widely condemned. NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented testimonies of teachers who faced pressure from the occupation authorities and were ultimately forced to flee their homes to save their lives. All this information should serve as the basis for holding Russian high-ranking officials accountable for overseeing Russia's repressive educational policies in the TOT.
3. In 2024, significant attention was drawn to the militarisation of children and youth in the TOT. In our view, the intensification of propaganda aimed at fostering a positive attitude towards serving in the Russian armed forces is the most dangerous trend of 2024. This is especially concerning given that conscripts are also being deployed in the war against Ukraine. The example of occupied Crimea, where commemorative plaques for those killed in the so-called "SMO" have been installed, clearly demonstrates the lethal impact of the "Crimean scenario". In this scenario, everything Ukrainian is first destroyed and replaced with Russian symbols, so that children are later prepared to die for Russia and its "values". Therefore, timely and proactive responses to the eradication of Ukrainian identity in the TOT by Russian occupation authorities must be a priority for both Ukraine, which is already investigating these cases through national legal channels, and the global community at large.
4. Overall, we believe that investigating crimes against Ukrainian children should remain a priority in the coming years. National governments and international justice institutions should investigate violations of the right to education, identify those responsible, and hold them accountable, including Russian high-ranking officials, such as the senior officials of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science and Education. Additionally, an important step in drawing attention to Russia's unlawful practices in the TOT should be including the issue concerning restrictions on educational rights, including militarisation and interference in the educational process in Ukraine's TOT, in the Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict and the Annual Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict.



5. At the national level, it should be noted that in 2024, the Ministry of Reintegration of the TOT was reorganised into the “Ministry of National Unity”, focusing on the return of Ukrainians from abroad. The new minister noted that the powers of the previous ministry are now distributed between the Ministry of Community and Territorial Development and the Ministry of Social Policy.<sup>257</sup> The absence of a centralised body specifically focused on the TOT reintegration may slow the development of state policies and strategies for children and youth in the TOT. This includes those who managed to leave the TOT and require special adaptation measures in the government-controlled areas. We must also not forget the approximately 1.6 million children<sup>258</sup> still in the TOT, who are awaiting Ukraine's return. Comprehensive and impactful reintegration programmes must also be developed for them, including addressing the potential harmful influence of Russia on the minds of young Ukrainian citizens.<sup>259</sup>
  
6. In our opinion, a child-centred approach should prevail in all areas concerning the documentation of Russian crimes, accountability, and addressing the harmful effects of Russian influence, with the best interests of the child as the priority. This approach should continue until every Ukrainian child has returned home, both physically and mentally.

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257 <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/ministersto-ednosti-zamist-minreintegracii/33305493.html>

258 The number is approximate and may differ from the actual figure.

259 More details can be found in the study “[Lessons \(not\) learned: countries' experiences in reintegrating children and youth](#)”.

Specific potential steps for reintegration are outlined in the “[Recommendations \(Roadmap\) On the policy for reintegration of children and young people who have been under occupation](#)”

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