{"id":7216,"date":"2024-12-22T23:01:48","date_gmt":"2024-12-22T21:01:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/almenda.org\/?p=7216"},"modified":"2025-05-23T16:06:19","modified_gmt":"2025-05-23T14:06:19","slug":"rosiiska_molodizhna_politica_na_tot_zaporizhzhia_oblast","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/almenda.org\/en\/rosiiska_molodizhna_politica_na_tot_zaporizhzhia_oblast\/","title":{"rendered":"Russian Youth Policy in the Temporarily Occupied Territories: Zaporizhzhia Region"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

After the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (hereinafter \u2013 AR of Crimea) and the city of Sevastopol and the start of the military operation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014, Russia shifted its focus to fostering \u201ctrue\u201d patriots among the youth, both within its own borders and in the territories it had occupied. The primary goal of these efforts is to ensure loyalty, unconditional support, and readiness to defend Russia at any moment, even if the threat is imaginary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This strategy significantly intensified after the full-scale invasion in 2022, when the Russian Federation unlawfully<\/strong> incorporated<\/a> parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions into its territory on 30 September of the same year. In the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine (hereinafter \u2013 TOT), Russian legislation was introduced, including in the field of youth policy, similar to what had previously happened in the occupied territory of the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. As a result, a significant portion of Ukrainian youth fell under Russian control and pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a short time, \u201cstate bodies\u201d responsible for youth policy were established in the TOT, and all major children\u2019s and youth organisations promoting \u201ctraditional Russian spiritual and moral values\u201d<\/a> began operating. Through these structures, the Russian authorities systematically influence young people in the TOT, aiming to instil a Russian identity in them and turn them into a potential mobilisation reserve for its army.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In June 2024, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko stated<\/a> that the \u201cnew regions\u201d had been fully integrated into Russia\u2019s youth policy system. He also announced<\/a> that over 336 million roubles had been allocated for the comprehensive improvement of youth policy in 2024 through the \u201cRegion for the Young\u201d programme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In view of the above, the CCE \u201cAlmenda\u201d has conducted a <\/em>study<\/em><\/a> to raise public and international awareness of  the violations committed by the Russian Federation in the youth sector in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The study highlights the use of youth policy as a tool for Russification, indoctrination, and militarisation of individuals aged 14 to 24.<\/pre>\n\n\n\n
We continue to highlight the formation of Russian youth policy in the TOT, the officials responsible for its implementation, the activities aimed at militarising young people, and the eradication of their Ukrainian identity. This article focuses on the TOT of Zaporizhzhia region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Legal Regulation and Funding of Youth Policy in the TOT of Zaporizhzhia Region<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The \u201clegal basis\u201d of youth policy in the TOT of Zaporizhzhia region consists of regulatory and legal acts of the Russian Federation and the occupation authorities in the region: the Constitution, the Federal Law \u201cOn Youth Policy in the Russian Federation\u201d, acts of the President, the Government, and other federal executive bodies, as well as the so-called law \u201cOn Youth Policy in Zaporizhzhia Region\u201d, adopted<\/a> in 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the relevant \u201claw\u201d, one of the tasks of youth policy in the region is defined as \u201cthe formation and establishment of patriotic views and a sense of loyalty to the Motherland (note \u2013 Russia) in the minds of young people, pride in their country, respect for the military past of the Zaporizhzhia region, its sacred sites, and traditions of service to the Motherland<\/em> [\u2026]\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In December 2023, Yevhen Balytskyi, the so-called \u201cgovernor of the Zaporizhzhia region\u201d, approved the \u201cAction Plan for the Implementation of the State National Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation in the Zaporizhzhia Region for 2024\u20132025, covering the period up to 2025\u201d. One of its sections is dedicated to<\/a> \u201cthe formation of an all-Russian civic identity, patriotism, and a culture of interethnic communication among children and young people\u201d. It also includes<\/a> a list of activities aimed at \u201cshaping civic consciousness, patriotism, and a sense of pride in Russia\u2019s history\u201d \u2013 in other words, measures designed to eradicate the Ukrainian identity of young people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n